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PREFACE 
This volume brings together the papers presented at a confer-
ence held at the Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, March 19-20, 2004. 
The topic of the conference - the concept of authority - lent 
itself particularly well to its multi-disciplinary approach. 
Different forms of authority play decisive roles, and ought to be 
examined not only in the political sphere but also in the areas 
of social relations more generally and education. 
Organized collective life would be impossible without forms 
of authority, however legitimate. It is thus difficult to imagine 
constructing a shared knowledge without thinking critically 
about "authority," even though we simultaneously need it to 
focus our criticism. Without authority, knowledge itself would 
become completely subjective, unstructured, incommunicable 
and unable to build upon itself. 
From the cognitive sciences to political and legal philosophy, the 
subject discussed in this volume remains one of the most fascinat-
ing areas of research and analysis in the humanities. In the interest 
of providing the reader with a wide spectrum of disciplinary per-
spectives, we thought it important to begin with the study of the 
origin of the concept: the auctoritas partum which, together with 
potestas and majestas, capture in the language of the political insti-
tutions of ancient Rome what we now regard vaguely as "power." 
The goal of this volume is to stimulate thought and further study, 
in drawing from the contributions of scholars of diverse cultural and 





1. THE ROMAN NOTION OF AUCTORITAS 
«Auctoritas, non veritas facit legem», reads a famous sentence 
in the Latin version of Thomas Hobbes' «Leviathan». Or, as 
Hobbes said elsewhere, «It is not wisdom but authority that 
makes a law». Hobbes is often quoted by Carl Schmitt, who 
takes this dictum as a basis for his theory that a decision of the 
sovereign originates from a normative void1. Whether Schmitt 
offers an adequate interpretation of Hobbes is, of course, not 
my question and, anyway, beyond my competence. I just want 
to make the point that an understanding of auctoritas as imply-
ing the idea of a top-down command and its forceful imple-
mentation, if necessary, is a far cry from the original Roman 
notion. 
However, it is impossible to give a straightforward definition 
of the Roman term. Its implications have to be inferred from an 
embarrassing variety of usage in legal and literary texts2. Thus, 
the title of my paper should better read: «Roman notions of auc-
toritas», and not: «The Roman notion of auctoritas». 
I should state from the outset that my discussion is an 
exercise in the history of social and political concepts 
1 Compare Martin Rhonheimer, "Autoritas non veritas facit legem". Thomas 
Hobbes, Carl Schmitt und die Idee des Verfassungsstaates, Archiv fur Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie 86, 2000, 484-498. 
2 Compare André Magdelain, De l'"auctoritas patrum" à l'"auctoritas sena-
tus", in: idem, Jus, Imperium, Auctoritas. Études de droit romain, Paris 1990, 
385-403. 
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(«Begriffsgeschichte»)3. It thus seeks to examine the usages of 
the very term auctoritas and to explain its political and social 
connotations; it is not an attempt to define a universally appli-
cable ideal-type of «authority» and then to ask to which social 
and political phenomena in the Roman world it might properly 
be applied. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, German classical philologists in par-
ticular understood auctoritas - in connection with such terms 
as dignitas, honor, gloria, gravitas, fides, pietas, iustitia and 
mos maiorum - as the core of an ensemble of so-called Roman 
virtues that allegedly made up the peculiar national spirit of the 
Romans4. A seminal article on auctoritas by Richard Heinze was 
later republished in a volume of Heinze's collected essays with 
the title, «Vom Geist des Romertums»5. Heinze pointed out that 
3 That means the approach practised in Otto Brunner / Werner Conze / 
Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 8 vls., Stuttgart 1972-
1997; compare Horst Rabe, "Autoritat", ibid., vol. I (1972), 382-406. 
4 Compare the articles collected in Hans Oppermann (ed.), Romertum. 
Ausgewahlte Aufsatze und Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1921 bis 1961, Darmstadt 
1962; idem (ed.), Romische Wertbegriffe, Darmstadt 1967. On Oppermann and 
his ideological stance in the Nazi period compare Jurgen Malitz, Romertum im 
"Dritten Reich": Hans Oppermann, in: Imperium Romanum. Studien zu 
Geschichte und Rezeption. Festschrift fur Karl Christ zum 75. Geburtstag, 
Stuttgart 1998, 519-543. - The Italian equivalent was the cult of romanità in the 
fascist era which included the praise of a new impero allegedly based on the 
Augustan model; its manifestations include the "Mostra Augustea della 
Romanità" and the reconstruction of the Augustus Mausoleum on occasion of 
the 2000th anniversary of Augustus' birthday in 1937. Compare Mariella 
Cagnetta, Il mito di Augusto e la "rivoluzione" fascista, Quaderni di Storia 3, 
1976, 139-181; Friedemann Scriba, Augustus im Schwarzhemd? Die "Mostra 
Augustea della Romanità" in Rom 1937/38, Frankfurt am Main 1995; and vari-
ous articles (in Italian) in: Beat Naf (ed.), Antike und Altertumswissenschaft in 
der Zeit von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus, Mandelbachtal 2001. 
5 Richard Heinze, Auctoritas, Hermes 60, 1925, 348-366, reprinted in: idem, 
Vom Geist des Romertums (1938), 4th ed., Darmstadt 1972, 43-58. Inspired by 
Heinze are works like Joseph C. Plumpe, Wesen und Wirkung der auctoritas 
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there was no Greek equivalent that could properly render the 
Roman term auctoritas6. This stress on Roman «values» was 
partly due to a yearning for a strong state based more on polit-
ical leadership and national unity than on a constitutional sys-
tem, as was the case with the Weimar Republic7. But the special 
interest in auctoritas was also stimulated by the contemporary 
discovery that the first Roman emperor, Augustus, had 
described his position with this very term; I shall come back to 
this point later. 
It seems probable that auctoritas originated in the sphere of 
private law, and is derived from augere, to augment, in the 
sense that the expressed will of certain categories of persons 
needed an approbation by their superiors in order to gain a 
legal quality. Auctoritaspatris designated the consent of a pater 
familias to the marriage of his daughter8. Auctoritas tutoris 
meant the guardian's affirmation of a ward's act; only in this 
way did it acquire legal validity9. And the seller of a certain 
good had to take responsibility (auctoritas) that he was its legal 
owner10. 
In the public sphere, auctoritas is primarily associated with 
the role of the Roman senate. There are various technical mean-
ings, as well as more general ones. Patrum auctoritas depicted 
the patrician senators' ratification of the decisions by the popu-
maiorum bei Cicero, Dissertation Munster 1932; Fritz Furst, Die Bedeutung 
der auctoritas im privaten und offentlichen Leben der romischen Republik, 
Dissertation Marburg 1934. 
6 Heinze, Auctoritas, in: Vom Geist des Romertums, 56. 
7 Heinze, Von der Ursache der GròRe Roms (1921), in: Vom Geist des 
Romertums, 9-27. Compare Alessandro Perutelli, Richard Heinze e i 
Wertbegriffe, Quaderni di storia 6, 1977, 51-66. 
8 Compare Max Kaser, Das romische Privatrecht, vol. I, Munchen 2nd ed. 
1971, 76. 
9 Compare Kaser, Das romische Privatrecht, vol. I, 87. 
10 Compare Kaser, Das romische Privatrecht, vol. I, 132. 
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lar assembly concerning legislation and elections of magis-
trates; only thus did the assembly's votes become legally bind-
ing11. The rule applied only to the older type of the popular 
assembly, the comitia centuriata (and the archaic comitia 
curiata), and not to the assemblies of the Roman plebs12. The 
ratification was performed only by the patrician senators, even 
at the time when the senate was already composed of plebeian 
senators as well13. Starting in 339 B.C., the assent was given in 
advance14 and thus did no longer imply an effective control. 
However, we do not really know its original function; whether 
it had been understood as a possible check on the content of 
laws or just an approbation of correct procedure in accordance 
with the rituals of sacral law15; and there is no evidence that the 
assent was denied in an actual case16. That patrum auctoritas 
remained a privilege of patrician senators is one of many fea-
tures of the development of the Roman political system that 
made certain rules obsolete in any practical sense without for-
mally abolishing them17. (In this respect, the parallel with the 
11 Cicero, De re publica 2, 56. 
12 Digesta (Pomponius) 1, 2, 2, 12; Gaius, Institutiones 1, 3. 
13 It has often been assumed that since the middle republic this right of ratifi-
cation was transferred to the senate as a whole (compare for example Pierre 
Willems, Le sénat de la république romaine, vol. II, Louvain 1883, 38ff.; Vincenzo 
Mannino, L'auctoritas patrum, Milano 1979) but Cicero, De domo sua 38 is deci-
sive on the point that it remained exclusively with the patrician senators. 
14 The law of 339 applied to legislation; Livius 8, 12, 15; the same proce-
dure was extended to elections by a later law, probably of the third century; 
the exact date is not known; Cicero, Brutus 55. 
15 For an interpretation in the latter sense compare Theodor Mommsen, 
Der Patriciersenat der Republik, in: idem, Romische Forschungen vol. I, 
Berlin 1864, 243f.; Adalberto Giovannini, Auctoritas patrum, Museum 
Helveticum 42, 1985, 28-36. 
16 Theodor Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht (1871-1888), reprinted Graz 
1955, vol. III/2, 1041 with n. 1. 
17 Compare Livius 1, 17, 9 for the survival of the procedure in Augustan 
times. 
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English constitution is obvious; consider in particular the royal 
assent to acts of Parliament which in theory is still necessary, 
even though such assent has not been refused since 1707). 
According to Theodor Mommsen, patrum auctoritas can be 
seen in the light of auctoritas tutoris; the people is considered 
as an assembly of minors who cannot legally act without the 
consent of the fathers18. But the political function would prob-
ably have been aimed more at controlling the magistrates, who 
might initiate legislation, than controlling the people, who 
passed almost any law the magistrates proposed. Anyway, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to derive the further usage of auc-
toritas from this allegedly primary meaning. 
Auctoritaspatrum as a privilege of the patrician members is 
to be distinguished from the auctoritas of the senate as a 
whole. In the later republic, auctoritas senatus had different 
meanings. It could be used alternately with senatus consultum, 
the senate's formal decree19. In a technical sense, it designated 
a resolution of the senate which was passed and even recorded 
in the journal of the senate, but remained invalid because it was 
vetoed by a tribune of the people or because of some proce-
dural irregularity20. Under certain circumstances, referring to 
auctoritas senatus in this sense might imply an exhortation to 
magistrates and citizens to comply nevertheless with the 
expressed will of the senate and to trust in this body's backing 
in the case of ensuing conflicts21. 
That something was done ex auctoritate senatus could 
mean, on the one hand, that the senate supported a particular 
step, for example that magistrates initiated a law to be passed 
18 Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht, vol. III/2, 1038f. 
19 For example, Cicero, Epistulae as Atticum 1, 16, 2. 
20 Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 1, 2, 4; 8, 8, 4-8; Cassius Dio 55, 3, 5; com-
pare Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht, vol. I, 281f.; vol. III/2, 997f. 
21 For example, Livius 4, 57, 5. 
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by the popular assembly22; on the other hand it could simply 
mean a delegation of powers, for example to envoys who need-
ed a certain room for negotiations23. 
In most cases, however, auctoritas senatus referred to the 
role of the senate in a more general sense. It meant that the 
magistrates were supposed to present all issues of public 
importance to the senate and then follow the advice given to 
them by the senate24. It is impossible to define whether this 
advice was binding in a de iure or a de facto sense; that corre-
sponds to the general difficulty in defining the relation between 
ius and mos in the sense of a distinct hierarchy of sources of 
law25. Or, as Mommsen put it: «auctoritas as a term which 
evades any strict definition corresponds to the senate's power-
ful position which is very effective on the one hand but cannot 
be defined in legal terms on the other hand. Auctoritas is more 
advice than command but it is advice that one cannot properly 
avoid»26. 
The senate's central position was due to the fact that it con-
sisted of members for life who were admitted to the body after 
having obtained one of the annual magistratures. They repre-
22 For example, Livius 4, 49, 6; 9, 46, 7. Compare in general Jochen 
Bleicken, Lex Publica. Gesetz und Recht in der romischen Republik, Berlin 
1975, 304ff. 
23 For example, Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 1, 19, 2. 
24 Compare [Cicero], Rhetorica adHerennium 4, 47. 
25 Compare Dietmar Schanbacher, Ius und mos: Zum Verhaltnis rechtlicher 
und sozialer Normen, in: Maximilian Braun et alii (eds.), Moribus antiquis res 
stat Romana. Romische Werte und romische Literatur im 3. und 2. Jh. v. Chr., 
Munchen 2000, 353-371. 
26 Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht, vol. III/2, 1034. - Mommsen's posi-
tion was heavily criticized by Wolfgang Kunkel, Magistratische Gewalt und 
Senatsherrschaft, in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt, vol. I/4, 
Berlin 1972, 3-22, who, however, also could not solve the riddle of how to 
adequately define the senate's competence with respect to the magistrates. 
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sented the political and military élite of the republic and dis-
posed of a social power that any individual office-holder could 
not ignore and they guaranteed the continuity of policy despite 
of the permanent change with respect to individual office-hold-
ers. 
And the leading members were, as a rule, scions of families 
that could boast of having provided magistrates for generations. 
As an institution, the senate stood for the continuity of the polit-
ical system over the centuries, from the very beginning. Its legit-
imacy derived from the origins of Rome, thus it could be under-
stood as being grounded in the auctoritas maiorum. This 
authority of the ancestors was invoked in order to argue that a 
peculiar decision had to be taken in accordance with long-
established practice27. 
But the political system had developed over centuries and 
combined an extraordinary stability of its basic structures with 
an astonishing flexibility in adapting to new requirements28. It 
was based on undisputed primordial rules and institutions, new 
regulations based on laws passed at a given time (and some-
times repealed later), decisions of the senate, new practices 
introduced at one time and accepted after they had proved 
appropriate, and on precedents that had been created with 
decisions in disputed cases. The heritage of the ancestors, so 
Cicero once claimed, included their insight that new circum-
stances required the recourse to new measures29. 
In such a system, one could refer neither to the intentions of 
a distinct generation of founding fathers and, of course, nor to 
a constitutional charter they had created30. There was no clear-
27 Cicero, In Verrem 2, 1, 38; 2, 5, 85; Pro Balbo 31. 
28 Livius 4, 4, 1ff. 
29 Cicero, De lege Manilia 60. 
30 See Cicero, De re publica 2, 2 for the contrast between the great Greek 
lawgivers and the Roman development through centuries. 
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cut hierarchy with respect to rules that had originated in differ-
ent times and diverse sources. This can be seen in a passage of 
an oration of Cicero. Here Cicero tries to define the fundamen-
tal features of the constitution. He mentions the sacral laws, the 
competence (potestas) of the magistrates, senatus auctoritas, 
the laws, mos maiorum, the courts and other elements, but he 
can only do this in form of an enumeration31. Mos maiorum, 
and accordingly auctoritas maiorum, were extremely flexible 
concepts that needed authoritative interpretation in peculiar 
instances32. The senate was the only institution that was or 
should be acknowledged as being able to offer such an exege-
sis of the tradition33. That would necessarily imply a certain 
amount of arbitrariness and fiction. That was also due to the fact 
that this tradition was understood as man-made and was not 
ascribed to a transcendental authority - and this seems indeed 
to be a Roman peculiarity34. 
The somewhat fictitious character of this reference to tradi-
tion is also indicated by Cicero. In De Legibus, a tract which 
constituted a mixture of long-established rules and some pro-
grammatic demands for reforms35, he said he would formulate 
the set of rules in an archaic language in order to enhance the 
auctoritas of the rules he put down in a single text36. But his 
31 Cicero, Pro Sestio 98. 
32 Compare Cicero, De legibus 2, 40. 
33 Compare Cicero, Pro Sestio 140. 
34 Compare Ton Hol, Authority, Law and the Roman Experience, in: Viva vox 
iuris Romani. Essays in Honour of Johannes Emil Spruit, Amsterdam 2002, 39-49. 
35 Compare Gustav Adolf Lehmann, Politische Reformvorschlage in der 
Krise der spaten romischen Repubik. Cicero De legibus III und Sallusts 
Sendschreiben an Caesar, Meisenheim/Glan 1980; Elizabeth Rawson, The 
Interpretation of Cicero's De legibus, in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der romis-
chen Welt, vol. I/4, Berlin 1973, 334-356; Andrew R. Dyck, A Commentary on 
Cicero, De legibus, Ann Arbor 2004. 
36 Cicero, De legibus 2, 18. 
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very attempt to write down a sort of constitutional charter 
demonstrates that in fact the senate was no longer the undis-
puted interpreter of the constitution. That could easily be 
shown in an analysis of the late Republic's constitutional dis-
putes on which I cannot embark here. 
That the senate's authority in a general sense should consti-
tute the cornerstone of the political system is pointed out by 
Cicero, who often associated the senate's authority with its role 
as the institution that really governed the state and that should 
be regarded as the guardian of the constitution37. In De re pub-
lica, Cicero declares that a well-balanced constitution depends 
on the magistrates having enough potestas, the senate enough 
auctoritas and the people enough libertas38. (Cicero also con-
trasted the auctoritas of the senate and the potestas of the peo-
ple39; postestas then stood for the institutionalized competence 
of the popular assemblies which otherwise could also be 
depicted as maiestas). Ideally, the magistrates should execute 
their formal competences in compliance with the senate's 
advice40, the people should follow the senate's lead. To submit 
themselves to the will of a body that represented the collective 
political wisdom of the Romans neither diminishes the role of 
the public officials nor detracts from the people's freedom41. 
That is why Cicero in his political orations would claim that dis-
regarding the senate's authority meant endangering the peo-
ple's liberty42. 
In De Legibus, a fictitious dialogue between himself and his 
younger brother Quintus, Cicero presents Quintus' polemics 
37 Cicero, Pro Sestio 137: The senate as custos rei publicae. 
38 Cicero, De re publica 2, 57; compare 1, 69. 
39 Cicero, De legibus 3, 28. 
40 In this sense they were "in auctoritate senatus"; Mommsen, Staatsrecht 
III/2, 1034, n. 2. 
41 Cicero, De legibus 3, 25. 
42 Cicero, De domo sua 130; Cicero, Philippica 10, 23. 
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against the introduction of the secret ballot, which was in place 
in popular assemblies since the late second century B.C. and 
was praised as an expression of libertas populi43. Quintus 
argues that this procedure had destroyed the auctoritas of the 
ruling élite. Cicero replied that one could not abolish a symbol 
of political freedom, but should allow the citizens to pay 
respect to the authority of the leading citizens by voluntarily 
showing them their voting tablets44. 
The tension between potestas and auctoritas does not only 
apply to the relationship between magistrates and senate but 
also to the performance of magistrates and other leading politi-
cians. Potestas is the competence any incumbent of a public 
office has in his official capacity. A man's auctoritas can be 
seen as deriving from the public office (especially the consul-
ship) that he holds45, but also as a personal quality that he has 
to acquire and maintain, and which under certain circum-
stances can be more effective than the execution of potestas. In 
this sense, the authority of a consul does not only emanate from 
his office, but also depends on his personal conduct and the 
public trust it creates46. Roman magistrates lacked an effective 
enforcement agency, a sort of police apparatus; thus in situa-
tions of public disturbances it was a matter of their personal 
reputation and rhetorical skills whether they were able to 
43 Compare Bruce A. Marshall, Libertas populi. The introduction of secret 
ballot at Rome and its depiction on coinage, Antichthon 31, 1997, 54-72; 
Ursula Hall, Species libertatis: Voting Procedure in the Late Roman Republic, 
in: Michel Austin et alii (eds.), Modus Operandi. Essays in Honour of Geoffrey 
Rickman, London 1998, 15-30. 
44 Cicero, De legibus 3, 34-39. - Montesquieu (De l'Esprit des Lois, Book II, 
chapter 2) shared Quintus' position. - The "voluntarily" open voting reminds 
of the practice in the German Democratic Republic though it was there (and 
elsewhere) surely not inspired by recourse to Roman sources. 
45 Cicero, De lege agraria 1, 24; Pro Rabirio Perduellionis 22. 
46 Cicero, De lege agraria 1, 27; Epistulae ad Atticum 1, 16, 6. 
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enforce their will47. Magistrates who were successful in quelling 
riots by their appearance on the spot were praised for their 
auctoritas48. In 138 B.C. a consul addressed a crowd that 
demanded measures against an increase in corn prices by 
declaring that he understood the public good better than they 
did. The crowd fell silent «paying more regard to his authority 
[auctoritas] than to their own nutriment»49. In 61 B.C. a consul-
designate, who was technically a private person before entering 
his office, was able to make a crowd comply with a decision of 
the senate; Cicero stressed that this person acted in virtue of his 
auctoritas and not a magistrate's potestas50. The same holds 
true for great generals. Pompeius or Caesar enjoyed the loyalty 
of their troops not only due to their formal competence as bear-
ers of a military imperium and their military ability, but because 
of a personal authority that was of much greater importance, at 
least in critical situations51. 
The standing of a senator within the ranks of the senate could 
also be a question of his personal authority. Though all mem-
bers had one vote and the decisions were taken by the majori-
ty of votes, the senate was ordered hierarchically. The senators 
were classified according to the magistrature they had last 
occupied; the former incumbents of the highest office, the ex-
consuls, were asked to give their opinion first, and thus could 
considerably influence the process of decision-making. But 
sometimes members of the lower ranks might attain an impor-
tance that was higher than their status, especially when the top 
47 Compare Wilfried Nippel, Public Order in Ancient Rome, Cambridge 
1995. 
48 Cicero, Pro Sestio 62; Valerius Maximus 7, 5, 2. 
49 Valerius Maximus 3, 7, 3. 
50 Cicero, In Pisonem 8. 
51 Cicero, De lege Manilia 28; Epistulae ad Atticum 7, 7, 6. Compare Cornelius 
Nepos, Chabrias 4, 1. 
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ranks shrank from committing themselves in a controversial 
question. Thus Cicero in some cases ascribes a consularis auc-
toritas to members who had not yet reached the ranks of the 
ex-consuls, but made an impact on decisions as if they had 
already done so52. 
In Cicero's writings one can also find references to the auc-
toritas principum53. Those principes were understood as the 
leading citizens who formed the senate's inner circle, especial-
ly the ex-consuls ( though probably not all of them)54. But 
Cicero's insistence on their importance also indicates his per-
ception that during the crisis of the late republic, the senate as 
a body was often divided over questions of fundamental impor-
tance and thus was no longer able to exercise the authority it 
was supposed to55. 
The increasing use of the popular assemblies to achieve deci-
sions against the will of the senate entailed that the rhetorical 
abilities of politicians in addressing crowds would become a 
new source of authority and thus undermine the traditional 
basis of political influence56. Some one hundred and fifty years 
later, Tacitus, looking back to crisis of the late republic, spoke 
of orators who as private persons had been able to influence 
political decisions because of their individual auctoritas57. 
In other spheres of social and political life authority was a 
quality that was ascribed to leading experts in a certain disci-
52 Compare Frank X. Ryan, The Meaning of "consularis auctoritas"in Cicero, 
Mnemosyne 47, 1994, 681-685. 
53 Cicero, De re publica 2, 56; compare De legibus 2, 30. 
54 Compare Matthias Gelzer, Die Nobilitat der romischen Republik (1912), 
reprinted in: idem, Kleine Schriften, vol. I, Wiesbaden 1962, 53ff.; Alfred 
Gwoszd, Der Begriff des romischen princeps, Dissertation Breslau 1933, 24ff. 
55 For example, Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 1, 18, 3. 
56 Flattering the popular assembly could imply speaking of the auctoritas 
populi Romani in opposition to the opinions of principes as Cicero himself 
had done in 66 B.C.; De lege Manilia 64. 
57 Tacitus, Dialogus de oratoribus 36. 
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pline in relation to others of a lesser reputation or with regard 
to laymen. Cicero acknowledged Plato's overarching impor-
tance in philosophy by claiming that he would follow Plato's 
auctoritas even if Plato gave no reasons for his opinion58. Or, 
Quintilianus said that Cicero's statements in court displayed 
such an auctoritas that one would blush to disagree59. In philo-
sophical and rhetorical contexts, however, there are also state-
ments that, in case of a collision between auctoritas and ration-
ality, reason should prevail60. 
The idea that the recognized specialist is not expected to 
base his opinion on arguments which other people would not 
understand anyway is particularly relevant to the role of the 
Roman jurists. In Republican times, the jurists were experts who 
acted not in an official capacity but as private persons, 
«Honoratioren» in the sense of Max Weber. Their authority was 
based on their giving legal advice - free of charge and only ori-
ented to the objective legal situation - to any party who asked 
them, as well as to magistrates and judges61. They gave opin-
ions (responsa) on matters of law, not matters of fact and, as a 
rule, they did this without giving grounds for their position62. 
But judges, who were themselves laymen, based their decisions 
with respect to legally-disputed points on those statements, 
though they were not strictly bound to do so. A problem arose, 
of course, if opposite statements by two jurists were presented. 
58 Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1, 49; compare De o f f i c i i s 2, 10 on the 
authority of philosophers. 
59 Quintilianus, Institutio oratoria 10, 1, 111. 
60 [Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium 4, 4; Cicero, De natura deorum 1, 10; 
Academica 2, 60; De legibus 1, 36f. 
61 Cicero, De oratore 1, 198 and 239; Pro Murena 9. 
62 Seneca, Epistulae ad Lucilium 94, 27; compare Wolfgang Kunkel, 
Herkunft und soziale Stellung der romischen Juristen, Weimar 1952, 282, n. 
597. - Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5th ed., Tubingen 1976, drew 
the comparison with the "fatwa" of Islamic religious authorities. 
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The judge would then have to decide who was the expert with 
the higher reputation63. At the same time, a judgment grounded 
in the auctoritas of a well-known jurist might become a prece-
dent for future decisions64, especially since responsa were no 
longer given orally but were submitted in writing65. In the jury 
courts that decided primarily on political crimes, the outcome 
was ascribed to the respective auctoritas of the speakers who 
acted as counsel for the prosecution and the defence, and also 
to the auctoritas of witnesses on both sides66. 
Responsa were also issued by various bodies of priests - pon-
tifices, augures, haruspices - that were responsible for declar-
ing that a public act was performed in accordance with sacral 
law or, on the contrary, that it was void and should be repeat-
ed. They addressed their advice to the senate (or the magis-
trates), and the senate, as a rule, followed the auctoritas of 
these bodies of specialists67 in taking its decision. This proce-
dure did not diminish the position of senate and officials since 
those experts were themselves members of the ruling élite68 
(though not all priests were senators)69 and since they based 
their advice on citing precedents that were recorded in the files 
of their respective boards70. 
63 Cicero, Pro Caecina 69. 
64 Cicero, Topica 28; Digesta (Papinianus) 1, 1, 7. 
65 Compare Detlef Liebs, Romische Rechtsgutachten und "Responsorum 
libri", in: Gregor Vogt-Spira (ed.), Strukturen der Mundlichkeit in der romis-
chen Literatur, Tubingen 1990, 83-94. 
66 Cicero, Pro Murena 58f. 
67 Cicero, De haruspicum responsum 14; De divinatione 2, 70; De legibus 
2, 31. 
68 Cicero, De domo sua 1f. 
69 Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 4, 2, 4. 
70 Cicero, De domo sua 33 and 136f.; compare in general Georg Wissowa, 
Religion und Kultus der Romer, 2nd ed. 1912, reprinted Munchen 1971, 513-
515; Jerzy Linderski, The Augural Law, in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der 
Romischen Welt, vol. II/16, 3, Berlin 1986, 2146-2312. 
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Some exceptions notwithstanding, auctoritas in Roman 
Republican usage denoted a socially legitimized power that did 
not amount to binding commands and did not rely on means of 
enforcement. It presumed a likely obedience to social superiors 
(or acknowledged experts) in a society that presupposed a 
hierarchical order in all its segments, an obedience that emanat-
ed from the bottom-up. 
The implications of auctoritas changed with the establish-
ment of a new type of monarchy by Augustus, from 27 B.C. 
onwards. Octavian, the great nephew and (by testament) adop-
tive son of Caesar, had started with an illegal command that was 
later legalized by a decree of the senate71. Since 43 B.C., his 
constitutional position had been based on an Enabling Law (for 
the triumvirate Octavian, Antonius and Lepidus) that was later 
prolonged but then expired72 in 32 B.C. Thereafter his control 
of the state, which surpassed the competence of his annual 
consulship, was based on the constitutional puzzle of a con-
sensus universorum73 which had been expressed by the oath of 
allegiance that the Italians and Western provincials had sworn 
on the eve of the war against Antonius and Cleopatra74. In 
January of the year 27, he declared that, after having restored 
71 In this sense Cicero pleaded in late 44 B.C. that the senate should give 
auctoritas to Octavian lest his then fight against Antonius should no longer be 
based on his private initiative; Cicero, Philippica 3, 5. 
72 For the constitutional niceties compare Klaus Bringmann, Das zweite 
Triumvirat. Bemerkungen zu Mommsens Lehre von der auféerordentlichen 
konstituierenden Gewalt, in: Alte Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte. 
Festschrift Karl Christ, Darmstadt 1988, 22-38; Jochen Bleicken, Zwischen 
Republik und Prinzipat. Zum Charakter des Zweiten Triumvirats, Gottingen 
1990. 
73 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 34, 1; compare Karl-Ernst Petzold, Die 
Bedeutung des Jahres 32 fur die Enstehung des Printipats, Historia 18, 1969, 
334-351. 
74 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 25, 2. 
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the peace and unity of the Roman people, he would give up all 
power except his post as a consul within the year. In return the 
senate asked him to keep in control over the troops stationed in 
provinces which were not yet fully pacified and it conferred a 
corresponding command upon him. And only then did he 
receive, by a resolution of the senate, the honorary title of 
Augustus. This title (and the additional honours that acknowl-
edged his virtues75) gave him a sacral nimbus; its connotations 
and a possible allusion to auctorias are, however, far from 
clear76. 
A key document for the new official ideology is the Res 
Gestae Divi Augusti. Old Augustus had ordered that this record 
of his deeds and achievements be publicly displayed as an 
inscription on his Mausoleum at Rome. The original is lost; the 
text has been known since 1555 from a bilingual copy - in Latin 
and Greek - which had been discovered at Ancyra (now the 
Turkish capital). The crucial passage in which Augustus 
described his constitutional position after the so-called restora-
tion of the republic in 27 B.C. had survived only in the Greek 
version. The Greek term axioma was translated by Mommsen 
as dignitas11, which corresponded with Mommsen's theory that 
the principate should be considered like a republican magistra-
ture78. The hierarchy of magistrates corresponded to different 
degrees of dignity. In 1914 and 1924 fragments of another copy 
which had only the Latin text were found in Antiochia, another 
city in modern Anatolia. It turned out that the crucial term must 
75 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 34, 2. 
76 Suetonius, Augustus 7, 2; Ovid, Fasti 1, 607ff.; Cassius Dio 53, 16, 8; com-
pare Dietmar Kienast, Augustus. Prinzeps und Monarch, Darmstadt 1982, 80, 
n. 47; Edwin S. Ramage, The Nature and Purpose of Augustus "Res Gestae", 
Stuttgart 1987, 100ff. 
77 In his edition of the inscription, Berlin 1865; 2nd ed. 1883. 
78 Mommsen, Staatsrecht II/2, 749ff. 
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read auctoritas79. This detection fostered the boom of scholar-
ly works on this concept in the 1920s and 1930s which I had 
mentioned earlier. 
The key sentence now reads: «After this time [that is, the set-
tlement of 27 B.C.] I excelled all in authority [auctoritas], but I 
possessed no more power [potestas] than the others who were 
my colleagues in each magistracy»80. 
Two sentences earlier, Augustus had said that he had «trans-
ferred the republic from my power [potestas] to the dominion 
of the senate and people of Rome»81. We see that, as in 
Republican times, auctoritas is contrasted with potestas82, the 
competence of magistrates; it is the authority of the one and 
only princeps (as Augustus styled himself83) and not of the sen-
ate or of a smaller circle of leading senators. Augustus wanted 
to stress that he no longer had any extra-constitutional power in 
comparison to the other magistrates84 (and contrary to the mos 
maiorum85) and that his dominant position emanated from the 
exercise and acceptance of his auctoritas in a traditional sense. 
This was part of his strategy to present the new system as a 
restoration of the republic86 and to veil his position and leave it 
79 Compare Ernst Schoenbauer, Wesen und Ursprung des romischen 
Prinzipats, Zeitschrift fur Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung 47, 1927, 
264-318. 
80 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 34, 3. 
81 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 34, 1. 
82 In 2 B.C., Augustus received the title paterpatriae, father of the father-
land. That he mentions this title at the very end of his Res Gestae underlines 
that he considered it as the highest honour that had been conferred on him. 
A Roman father had auctoritas but also potestas in a legal sense over the 
members of his family. 
83 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 13; 30; 32, 3; compare Tacitus, Annales 1, 9, 5. 
84 That is why he did not accept the offer of a dictatorship in 22 B.C; Res 
Gestae Divi Augusti 5, 1. 
85 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 6, 1. 
86 Compare Velleius Paterculus 2, 89, 3f. (with the rather strange formula-
tion that Augustus restored the auctoritas of the courts and the maiestas of the 
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to others to interpret it87. However, the republic had not known 
a monopoly of auctoritas in the political sphere88. The domina-
tion of one man, who took his decisions behind closed doors 
and with the help of a kitchen cabinet, gives no room for auc-
toritas and consilium, as Cicero had remarked in 44 with 
respect to Caesar89. 
In the case of Augustus, the idea of a voluntary acceptance of 
auctoritas was reduced to a fiction, albeit a pleasant one90, in 
the context of the new political system that he had declared as 
the best possible government91. The emperor was in command 
over the military and over newly created paramilitary forces, he 
disposed of unprecedented competences (as the tribunicia 
potestas for life since 23 B.C.), he was pontifex maximus (since 
12 B.C.) and member of other priestly colleges, he controlled 
the elections of magistrates and the access to the senate, he was 
the initiator of new laws, he disposed of immense financial 
means to exercise patronage over soldiers and urban masses 
alike. The emperors (at least Augustus and his successor 
Tiberius) still used to ask the senate for advice und undertook 
certain measures ex auctoritate senatus92 but the senators must 
senate - maiestas had sometimes been associated with the Roman people, but 
not with the senate). 
87 Compare Wilhelm Weber, Princeps. Studien zur Geschichte des 
Augustus, Stuttgart 1936, 221. 
88 In a letter to Cicero, Brutus wrote in May 43, that Cicero had now 
acquired auctoritas to the highest degree that was tolerable in a free repub-
lic; Cicero, Epistulae ad Brutum 1, 4a (12), 2. 
89 Cicero, De o f f i c i i s 2, 2. 
90 The formulation "was neither wholly true, nor wholly false, but it was 
true enough to be believed by those who had no wish to challenge it", Frank 
E. Adcock, A Note on Res Gestae Divi Augusti 34, 3, Journal of Roman Studies 
4, 1952, 12. 
91 Suetonius, Augustus 28, 2. 
92 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 20, 4; Frontinus, De acquis urbis Romae 104. 
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have felt highly uncomfortable if, in matters of great impor-
tance, they had not been unequivocally instructed as to the 
specific advice that the emperor wanted to hear93. Since every-
body looked attentively to the emperor's instructions94, main-
taining the republican fagade depended on the ruler's self-
restraint. 
It is sometimes claimed in the scholarly literature that the 
Augustan auctoritas constituted a charismatic authority in the 
sense of Max Weber95. But this identification is only partly con-
vincing; it was not assumed that, due to supranatural qualities, 
he was the saviour one needed in a fundamental crisis96; rather, 
the assignment of such qualities followed only after the crisis 
had been overcome, at first with military means and then by a 
constitutional settlement which claimed a return to normality97. 
The sources do not enable us to trace the further develop-
ment of the notion of auctoritas in the post-Augustan princi-
pate. The assumption of some scholars that it was transformed 
into a sort of legal definition of the emperor's position98 is not 
supported by convincing evidence. We know the Enabling Law 
that was passed at the accession to the throne99. It conferred a 
93 See, for example, Tacitus, Annales 1, 74, 5; 2, 35. 
94 Tacitus, Annales 1, 4, 1. 
95 See Fritz Schulz, Prinzipien des romischen Rechts, Munchen 1934, 123f. 
96 On Weber's concept of charismatic leadership compare Wilfried Nippel, 
Charisma und Herrschaft, in: idem (ed.), Virtuosen der Macht. Herrschaft und 
Charisma von Perikles bis Mao, Munchen 2000, 7-22 and 281-289. 
97 Admittedly, the case of Augustus is complicated due to the fact that 
Caesar had been officially deified in 42 B.C., henceforth his adoptive son 
could claim to be divi filius. 
98 Anton von Premerstein, Vom Werden und Wesen des Prinzipats, Munchen 
1937; André Magdelain, Auctoritas principis, Paris 1947; compare for criticism 
Wolfgang Kunkel, Review of Magdelain, Zeitschrift fur Rechtsgeschichte. 
Romanistische Abteilung 70, 1953, 437-445; Jean Béranger, Recherches sur 
l'aspect idéologique du principat, Basel 1953, 116ff. 
99 An inscription, detected by Cola di Rienzo in 1347, gives the text of the 
law passed by the popular assembly at the accession of Vespasian in 70 A.D, 
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bundle of competences upon the emperor by popular legisla-
tion. Auctoritas has no place in this legal construction100. In later 
times it was understood that the emperor's will had acquired 
the force of law: «quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem», 
according to the formula recorded in the «Digest»101. 
All in all, it rather seems that auctoritas has lost its emphatic 
connotation. The often used formula, ex auctoritae principis, 
simply meant that a person or a body acted with a mandate of 
the emperor, but did not depict the source of legitimation of the 
emperor himself. 
A special form of delegation was the ius respondendi that 
Augustus created. A select number of jurists was now entitled to 
deliver opinions (responsa) ex auctoritateprincipis102. Probably, 
it simply meant «with permission of the Emperor» and did not 
imply that the Emperor's authority in an emphatic sense was 
the lex de imperio Vespasiani (in: Michael H. Crawford, ed., Roman Statutes, 
London 1996, vol. I, 549ff.); it refers to similar regulations in favour of former 
emperors since Augustus; however, it is not clear when such an enabling law 
was passed for the first time. 
100 Auctoritas is mentioned in the lex de imperio Vespasiani only in the for-
mulation that the senate could be convened by an order (ex auctoritate) of 
the emperor. 
101 Digesta (Ulpianus) 1, 4, 1 pr. The original meaning of the so-called dis-
cretionary clause of the lex de imperio Vespasiani that the emperor could do 
anything he thought best for the state is disputed since taken literally it would 
undermine the whole construction; perhaps it constituted only a sort of emer-
gency power. - The ambivalence of a construction that seemed to confer 
unlimited power, yet by popular legislation is underlined by the reception in 
later times; on the one hand it could be seen as a legitimation for absolutism, 
on the other hand as an expression of popular sovereignty (as Cola di Rienzo 
wanted to read it). 
102 The criteria for the selection of these privileged jurists are disputed; 
compare for divergent interpretations Wolfgang Kunkel, Das Wesen des ius 
respondendi, Zeitschrift fur Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung 66, 
1948, 423-457; Franz Wieacker, Augustus und die Juristen seiner Zeit, 
Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 37, 1969, 331-349. 
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applied to the jurists' opinion. In any case, the new procedure 
indicates that the social authority of the jurist was no longer 
considered as a sufficient basis for the interpretation and devel-
opment of the law. Augustus was apparently disturbed that 
opposing opinions of jurists shuttered legal security and thus is 
said to have made this decision out of concern about the 
authority of the law (auctoritas iuris)103. This might have led to 
the jurists' opinions having a major importance in the develop-
ment of the law104. But, at least in the second century A.D., such 
a trend was stopped; the importance of the responsa as sources 
of law began to decrease because of the numbers of imperial 
laws, decisions of imperial courts and the instructions the 
emperor gave to his judges in individual cases, which then 
became precedents for future ones. Finally, the authority of 
jurists was stripped of any social dimension by a law of 426 
A.D., which ruled that a judge could only consult the writings 
of five named jurists of the second and early third century, and 
that in case of disagreement, the majority of quotable authors 
should be decisive105. 
In the Roman Empire, the idea of auctoritas was also taken 
over by the church106. We can only follow this development 
with the beginning of a Christian literature in Latin from the late 
103 Digesta (Pomponius) 1, 2, 2, 49. 
104 According to a rule issued by the Emperor Hadrian responsa had the 
force of law if the opinions of jurists agreed; otherwise the judge was free in 
his decision; Gaius, Institutiones 1, 7; however, this rule is far from clear; com-
pare Franz Wieacker, Respondere ex auctoritate principis, in: Satura Roberto 
Feenstra, Fribourg (Suisse) 1985, 71-94. 
105 Codex Theodosianus 1, 4, 3. 
106 Compare Hendrik Wagenvoort / Gerd Tellenbach, "Auctoritas", in: 
Reallexikon fur Antike und Christentum, vol. 1 (1950), 902-909; Karl-Heinrich 
Lutcke, Auctoritas bei Augustin. Mit einer Einleitung zur romischen 
Vorgeschichte des Begriffs, Stuttgart 1968; Thomas Gerhard Ring, Auctoritas 
bei Tertullian, Cyprian und Ambrosius, Wurzburg 1975. 
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second-century onwards. Cyprianus, bishop of Carthage in the 
mid-third century, depicted the internal government of the 
church with categories of the Roman political tradition. He 
insisted on the sole decision-making power of the bishops, 
which is why he identified the potestas and auctoritas of a bish-
op. The bishop's auctoritas is an ingredient of the office and 
thus independent of the personal qualities of its incumbent. 
Cyprianus was fixed upon the internal stability of the church in 
view of the great crisis caused by persecutions that undermined 
ecclesiastical structures. In later times, the relationship between 
church and state became a point of issue. In the last decade of 
the fifth century, Pope Gelasius I protested against the emper-
or's interference with church matters by distinguishing between 
two powers - the spiritual authority (auctoritas) of the Roman 
See and the temporal power (potestas) of the Emperor. Though 
this opposition between auctoritas and potestas did not consti-
tute a clear-cut theory in the case of Gelasius107 it would 
become fundamental for the controversies about the relation-
ship of church and state during the Middle Ages. The claim of 
auctoritas for the church was backed by invoking the auctori-
tas of God, Christ and of the Bible. And auctoritas divina could 
also be identified with veritas. 
Thus it was a long and complicated path towards the identi-
fication of sovereign power and authority that Hobbes would 
later propagate. And, of course, neither Hobbes nor Carl 
Schmitt had the final word on this issue of authority. 
107 Compare Wilhelm Enhlin, Auctoritas und Potestas. Die 




2. POLITICAL THEOLOGY: THE AUTHORITY OF GOD 
2.1 Introduction 
There are two theses that are intimately related to the idea of 
authority. One is political theology. It is associated with Carl 
Schmitt. The second is moral theology. It is associated with 
Elizabeth Anscombe (though she never used the expression 
«moral theology»). Political theology is the claim that key 
notions of modern and secular political doctrines are unwit-
tingly moored in theological and teleological world-views. In 
their secularized version, these notions ultimately make no 
sense and thus can be validated only from within the kind of 
theological framework from which they come. «Sovereignty» 
and «Authority» are paradigmatic cases of such key notions. 
Moral theology makes a parallel claim. Key notions in mod-
ern moral doctrines are moored in a theological and teleologi-
cal framework, and depend on it for their meaning. Considered 
from within a modern secular framework, these doctrines have 
lost their significance. «Obligation» and «duty» are paradigmatic 
examples of such notions, as they are anchored in the ancient 
idea of God the law-giver. Without God the law-giver, these 
notions make very little sense. Secular morality is like the 
famous explanation of what is wireless. You know what wire is. 
It is like a dog. And if you pull its tail in Jerusalem, it will bark 
in Rome. Now, wireless works in the same way, but without the 
dog. Morality without God is like wireless without the dog. 
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I hold a moderate version of political and moral theology. On 
my account, authority and sovereignty do have a content which 
stands independently of a religious or theological framework. 
Still, I see these notions as being in the grip of a theological pic-
ture of the world. To be in the grip of a picture is to uncon-
sciously confuse a model of reality with reality itself. There are 
in fact two tiers to the picture of God. On the ground level, the 
idea of the theistic God and the authority of God is in the grip 
of the picture of God as the father or God as the King. But at the 
second tier, the idea of God the almighty creates a model which 
greatly intensifies the ideas of authority and sovereignty as 
models for earthly rulers and states. 
So what I would like to do now is explore an idea of author-
ity as it depicted by a religious picture (note the indefinite arti-
cle). It is just a picture and not the picture. Precisely, it is a pic-
ture of God as the supreme decision-maker, which does not 
also depict Him as a deliberator. I shall call this the decisionist 
picture of God. In this picture, God's authority is based on His 
absolute Will, and is unhindered by any laws and rules, and in 
particular by any laws of morality. The decisionist picture of 
God can also be seen as a fascist picture of God. This is perhaps 
abusive but not inaccurate. «That there must be», in the lan-
guage of the 18th-century jurist Blackstone, «a supreme, irre-
sistible, absolute, and uncontrolled authority, in which the... 
right of sovereignty resides». It is this idea and ideal that I am 
interested in. Pompously put, I am interested in the genealogy 
of authority. 
2.2 Who needs justification of authority? 
Anarchism in political theory has a function comparable to 
the null hypothesis in science. For political theory to justify 
authority, any authority, it should first provide cogent argu-
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ments against the anarchist claim that there is no justification for 
any politicai authority at all. 
Let me briefly state an anarchist argument against authority. 
A familiar idea, expressed in many different ways, is that you 
can do anything with bayonets except sit on them. Rule by the 
use of brute force («bayonets») is ultimately unstable (Rousseau 
argued that even the strongest man has to sleep and then he is 
vulnerable), hence the need for legitimacy. A legitimate ruler is 
accepted by its subjects and is thus free from having to con-
stantly oversee them. Rulers' pursuit of legitimacy is a manipu-
lative move to reduce the costs of using force; it is based on 
indoctrination rather than persuasion. Legitimacy is the use of 
force by other means. Legitimacy by indoctrination produces 
the belief that the state has authority. But this is not a justifica-
tion, in the sense of demonstrating that this belief is true. 
The anarchist is willing to accept expert authority. Expert 
advice, however, is different from authority based on com-
mand. 
The anarchist argues that authority is a matter of justification 
and that there is no justification for political authority, except 
that your own reasons for acting ultimately coincide with the 
reasons given by the authority in telling you what to do. But 
such justification has the status of expert advice, rather than 
command by political authority. Listening to the anarchist argu-
ment, one may be tempted to adopt Ramsey's philosophical 
strategy: if you see a philosophical dispute that goes on for too 
long without being resolved, see what the opposing sides have 
in common and deny that. 
The decisionist seems to follow Ramsey's strategy. He detects 
that both the anarchist and the believer in authority think that 
the issue between them is the issue of justification - the justifi-
cation of power. The anarchist denies that there is such justifi-
cation and the believer in authority believes that there is such 
justification. The decisionist denies the need for and the impor-
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tance of justification altogether, in the sense of giving reasons 
for the use of power. What really matters to the decisionist is the 
style in which the power is used, rather than the reasons for its 
use. By style, he means for example the ruler's being resolved 
and decisive. Justification by style rather than by content can be 
pretty absurd, as illustrated by the cutting philosophical joke by 
the scholar who summarized Heidegger's lecture, saying «I am 
resolved. I just don't know what on». There is a whole style of 
square jawed politicians who try to assert their authority by 
being decisive about nothing in particular. But what I have in 
mind is something far more sinister. Something casts its shadow 
on the decisionist picture. It is the decisive leader that Schmitt 
and Heidegger had in mind. 
I shall advance my little genealogy of the idea of authority in 
three stages: first, I will examine the authority of God; second, 
the authority of God's messengers; and third the authority 
God's scriptures. 
2.3. The Authority of God 
There seems to be no need to justify God's authority. One 
reason is that this authority is correlated with God's three attrib-
utes. He is omniscient, omnipotent and supremely benevolent. 
What better justification could there be than to obey the com-
mandments of such a perfect being? 
It takes Lucifer, the fiery fallen angel, to find God's attributes 
(especially his benevolence) irritating and to try to assert his 
freedom by rebelling against God's perfection. Lucifer's gesture 
expresses the Augustinian notion of the will, which includes the 
possibility of knowing the good and yet doing evil. Augustine's 
idea was so novel in philosophy and theology because it meant 
that simply recognizing the maximal attributes of God was not 
enough to secure actual acceptance of his reign. 
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But this of course does not mean that the three attributes do 
not provide justification; indeed these three attributes seem 
almost self-explanatory. But the God of the three attributes is 
the God of the philosophers. And the God of the philosophers 
is not the only picture of God that emerges from the scriptures. 
The Gnostic reading of the Bible, particularly of the Old 
Testament and many parts of the New (the parts ascribed to 
Paul), points to a very different interpretation. According to the 
Gnostics, the God of the Bible is a mischievous God who plays 
nasty tricks on us. This wretched God is the world's jailor, who 
keeps us from contacting the true God. The Gnostics did not 
ultimately challenge the authority of God, they only quarreled 
over which God should have it. 
The heretical Gnostic account is interesting in and of itself. 
Yet for our purposes, the important thing to remember is that 
the scriptures that are traditionally meant to provide reasons for 
accepting the authority of God can also be read very different-
ly. The trick lies in switching the light, switching from reading 
the text in the best light to reading it in the worst one. The tra-
ditional reading of the Bible tries to present the God of the 
scriptures in the best light; the Gnostics present God in the 
worst light, and thus provide powerful reasons for subverting 
his authority. So the issue of justifying the authority of God 
depends on the question of how to describe the God whose 
authority we accept. 
Turning now to the God of the philosophers: there is a ten-
sion between two of God's attributes, which should concern us 
with respect to justifying God's authority. There is a tension 
between his omnipotence and his benevolence. Now I am not 
referring to the banal tension between God's omnipotence and 
benevolence on the one hand, and the evil found in world on 
the other. The tension that I have in mind is of a different sort: 
it is how to reconcile God's omnipotence with his benevolence, 
so as to prevent the omnipotent God from being constrained by 
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the good. The decisionist holds that God who is constrained by 
the good is not omnipotent, and hence being constrained by 
the good diminishes God's absolute sovereignty. On the deci-
sionist account, God's absolute authority rests on his absolute 
will, namely, on his capacity to decide the way he wants, 
unhindered by anyone and anything. Any of God's decisions 
may of course be regarded as good by definition. But this is 
uninteresting, because if he had decided to do the opposite, 
that too would have been regarded as good. The goodness of 
his decision is thus independent of its content. God's will is 
beyond good and evil. This chain of thoughts with regard to 
God's omnipotence and sovereignty is what motivates the deci-
sionist picture of God as the One who is supremely capable of 
making decisions which are absolutely unconstrained, and 
specifically unconstrained by moral laws. 
The particular focus of the decisionist picture is anchored in the 
view of both the mind and the body as living phenomena. The 
mind has a psychic force that is exerted on and by its owner to 
bring about things in the world. This force is the will. The will is 
what distinguishes individual personalities. According to the the-
istic view, God has personality without having a body. His will not 
is the most characteristic trait of his personality, not his reason. 
God presides over the world in the same way that the mind pre-
sides over the body. In both cases, the will is what makes the pre-
siding possible. The will is manifested in the faculty of decision, 
but it should regarded as an internal primary force; in the case of 
God, it is the force to determine the world. In this view, the will is 
the ability to start a causal chain that can be ascribed to the indi-
vidual subject of the will. He is the creator of this chain. 
God's force of will is so overpowering that there is no way of 
recognizing it without admiring and thereby surrendering to it. 
Humans have the will to power; God has the power of the will. 
Thus the decisionist picture of God provides God's true answer 
to Job. Admiration should replace justification. 
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According to the decisionist picture, God's will is, paradoxi-
cally, a normative brute force. It is a brute force, in the sense 
that it is a will that can bring about things without being con-
strained by any antecedent reasons, since acting for reasons 
means that independent reasons have power over God and 
thus undermine God's absolute authority. But God who exer-
cises brute force arbitrarily may have mere coercive power over 
us but not the legitimacy needed for authority. It may be pru-
dent to obey his will but there is no duty to do so. So the deci-
sionist fantasy also wants us to ascribe a normative character to 
God's will, and feel a sense of duty in bowing down to it. The 
decisionist wants to depict God the father and not the 
Godfather. Whereas God the Godfather is a brute force with no 
normative quality, God the father is a brute force which also has 
a normative character. God's will, though ultimately arbitrary, is 
not necessarily despotic or mischievous. It can be a benign will, 
like the one we meet in the forgiving God: the act of forgive-
ness or amnesty is a benevolent act of a sovereign, which is not 
justified by reasons of law. It is rather a gratuitous act of grace 
that the sovereign is free to enact. God the father is a forgiving 
god and not a ferocious oriental despotic god, at least not by 
temperament. He is the benevolent manifestation of the deci-
sionistic image of God. But God's authority does not hinge on 
his benevolence. God's benevolence is a bonus, not a condition 
of his authority. 
Carl Schmitt drew an interesting analogy: «the exception in 
jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology» (Politicai 
Theology, p. 36). The point of this analogy is that it is precisely 
when the laws fail to constrain the sovereign that he manifests 
his full power to decide and hence his authority. Miracles man-
ifest the sovereignty of God. He can bend the laws of nature to 
his will and thereby create exceptions to the law. For political 
ruler, it is in the cases of exceptions to the laws, as in times of 
war and states of emergency, when nothing constrains the will 
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of the sovereign and his power and authority are exerted in full. 
This explains why fascists thrive on crisis situations of emer-
gency and why war plays such key role in their thinking. It is 
not the mere fascination with the excitement of war which is at 
the center of the fascist picture of politics. It is also the fascina-
tion with authority. It is in war and emergency crises that unre-
strained and unconstrained decisionism flourishes, and the 
authority of the sovereign is on full display. But this benighted 
picture of the sovereign acting outside the law can just as easi-
ly be a benign picture of giving amnesty in which the sovereign 
also acts outside the law. 
We may well argue that the human capacity to decide upon 
an action is a capacity to act for reasons. It follows that the idea 
of God as a being with a will should also have been based on 
his capacity to act for reasons - a higher reason to be sure but 
reasons all the same. Acting for reasons as a manifestation of 
the will is very much played down in the fascist picture of God, 
as it is in the secular fascist picture of man. The God of hosts as 
the supreme commander in the cosmic struggle is the best 
exemplar of the will that, in the fascist picture, commands 
respect. Respect here means submission of human will to this 
overpowering force. Submission of human will does not mean 
the annihilation of human wants. On the contrary, the more one 
is inclined to do A the more value is attached to one's not doing 
it. A famous rabbinical dictum says «I should not say that I do 
not want pork. I do, but what can I do when my father in heav-
en commands me not to» (Sifra, Kedusihm). It is God's inexpli-
cable will against individual will, and his is stronger. 
Authority lies not in Reason but in the power to take impor-
tant decisions. The authority of God is based on his matchless 
power to decide. The corresponding secular principle of the 
authority of the big decider is terribly grim. It is the 
Fuhrerprinzip that grounds the absolute authority of the leader 
in his charismatic power as a resolute decider. The fascist pic-
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ture of God is far from being the most common picture of God, 
nor is it the only one. But it would be excessively apologetic to 
deny its existence. This picture takes the idea of the absolute 
authority and sovereignty of God as the key concepts in depict-
ing God as the king of kings - the one true king, who is also the 
lord of hosts.There is another picture of God, which I shall call 
the feudal picture. The feudal picture casts the lord's authority, 
and the loyalty owed to him, as earned by favors that he or his 
ancestors bestowed on his vassals or their ancestors. Here, 
authority and loyalty are based on gratefulness. 
In a similar vein, Judaism teaches that each and every human 
being should be grateful to God for the gift of creation, and thus 
obey his will. Jews also have a special obligation of gratefulness 
for being delivered from Egypt, «the house of slavery». The jus-
tification of feudal authority is based not on present or future 
benefits, but on past ones. In the feudal picture of God, God is 
both a father and a king, and his authority is both paternal and 
royal. The father's authority is earned by his giving us our lives. 
He is our progenitor. In the case of a king, it is usually due to 
his or his ancestors providing protection when it was most 
needed. 
The feudal picture of God does find the need to justify his 
authority. His authority is not self-explanatory. But giving life is 
a good justification for recognizing authority, while acting 
against the will of the one who gave us life is being ungrateful 
in the extreme. 
There are two trends in political philosophy: one is interest-
ed in political power as the main feature of political life, the 
other in the justification of political power. The first trend tries 
to avoid the project of justification, but it doesn't altogether. 
One such justification in the decisionist picture is that stable 
political power produces stability and order. Stability and order, 
the negation of anarchy, is a good justification of power. The 
decisionist picture, though downplaying the need to justify 
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power, tacitly assumes justification due to stability and order. 
This justification takes the form of justification by protection, 
which it partly shares with the feudal justification. 
What the decisionist and feudal pictures share can be termed 
the protectionist model of authority. Authority is justified if it 
can provide effective protection for its subjects. The idea of 
God as the best protector of his servants is consistent with this 
picture. The political theology of «security philosophers» such 
as Hobbes is very much in the grip of this picture. Security 
philosophers put a premium on securing life rather than on 
securing the good life. Security is the only goal worth pursing 
in politics. Any power that can secure life is thereby authorita-
tive. 
Protection is manifested in order and stability. Any order and 
stability can justify the power which is effectively capable of 
imposing it. The content of that stable order is, however, imma-
terial to the justification of the authority. We should judge use 
of power by the Sicilian mafia in the same way as we judge the 
Spanish government's use of power - by the protection it pro-
vides. When Carl Schmitt addresses Hobbes' protectionist 
Leviathan as the expression of a kindred decisionist soul, he 
endlessly quotes Hobbes' saying: «auctoritas, non veritas». This 
is the essence of the political order. The essence of auctoritas 
is order, not moral order but any order, be it in heaven or on 
earth. 
So far we have encountered three justifications for the 
authority of God. All were rooted in rather unflattering pictures: 
the fascist picture based on sheer decisionism, the feudal pic-
ture based on gratefulness and the protectionist («mafia») pic-
ture based on protection. These three pictures, and their corre-
sponding justifications for the authority of God, are by no 
means the most common ones, but it would be a mistake to 
view them as merely eccentric. 
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2.4. The Authority of the Messenger 
The word of God is conveyed by a messenger, a prophet. 
How to distinguish the true messenger from a false one was a 
major concern of the Bible. The messenger is not a mere post-
man, nothing but a vehicle for transmitting the word of God. 
The most interesting contemporary issue of a messenger's 
authority centers on the prophetic authority of Muhammad. In 
one sense, he is as close to God's postman as anyone can be, 
since Islam makes the strong claim that Muhammad received a 
book, the Koran, filled with both words and meanings. But 
Muhammad's authority cuts much deeper than that of a passive, 
though divine, messenger. In one important sense Muhammad 
is more like Jesus than Moses; he is not only a messenger but 
he is the message as well. 
Unlike Jesus, the Prophet Muhammad does not have two 
natures, a human and a Divine one. Islam regards imputing 
God's nature to anyone and anything as idolatry. The Prophet 
is no exception. But the prophet does have two personae: the 
human and the prophetic. He is fallible as a human, but in his 
prophetic mode, he is infallible in both words and deeds. 
So apart from the Koran, a book conveying the word of God, 
Muhammad's deeds and words, as told by an authentic tradition 
(sunnat al- nabi), are another source of authority in Islam. 
Even the word of God in the Koran can only be understood in 
the light of the Sunna. In the case of the Koran, there is both 
phonetic fanaticism and meaning fanaticism. Both the words 
and the meanings are given by heaven. But in the case of the 
holy stories about Muhammed (hadith), the meaning - the con-
tent of the stories - is constant, but there is no phonetic fanati-
cism with regard to the wording. This differential wording does 
not however detract from the normative force of an authentic 
story about the life of Muhammad in Sunni Islam. In Shi'a Islam 
this status of authority is transferred in part to the messianic 
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Imams. Imitation of Muhammad is not just a pedagogical ideal 
of imitating the life of a perfect human being. Muhammad led a 
normative existence. His life has normative force commanding 
how Muslims ought to lead their lives. His life is a source of 
authoritative commandments and not just a fountain of good 
advice. This amounts to a strong doctrine of the infallibility of 
the Prophet and his God-like authority. 
What does all this have to do with the picture of religious 
decisionism? A great deal, I believe. Islam's two authentic 
sources of authority, Koran and Sunnat al nabi, can create the 
impression that decisionism does not hold with respect to 
Islam, since decisionism assumes that the unity of the will of 
God is the only legitimate authority. However this impression is 
wrong. The Prophet as a prophet has no independent will of his 
own. Muhammad is a Muslim, meaning one who totally surren-
ders his will to the will of God. 
This point calls for further elucidation. The ultimate sin in Islam, 
as in Judaism, is the sin of idolatry. In Islam, idolatry does not mean 
the sin of replacing God (Allah) with another (false) god, but rather 
giving God a partner. To view the Prophet as a partner to God is a 
terrible blasphemy. This does not mean that God has no servants 
in his heavenly court - the angels are such servants. What distin-
guish a servant from a partner is that he has no will of his own. The 
great Islamic teacher Al-Gazzali (d. 1111) expressed this point 
forcefully: «though men, genii, angels and devils might conspire 
together either to put one simple atom in motion, or cause it to 
cease its motion, without His will and approbation, they would not 
able to do so». This holds true for the prophet as well. As I claim, 
Muhammad's life is part of God's message, as much as it is the 
revealed word of God to Muhammad. Hence the authentic stories 
about his life are authoritative stories that express God's will 
through the medium of Muhammad's life. 
On this account, the authority of Muhammad does not under-
mine the decisionist picture of Allah but in fact reinforces it. 
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But the dialectic here is more complicated. Radical political 
Islam, which plays up Muhammad's authority, especially in 
political matters, seems to turn quickly from admiration of the 
prophet to his deification. Modern radical Islamic movements 
(both conservative and reformist) appealed to the two original 
sources of authority, the Koran and the Sunnat al-nabi, to chal-
lenge the authority of the four schools which dominated Islam 
for hundreds of years. They were even called the people of the 
Koran and the people of the Hadith. There was actually much 
tension between these two movements, but they had a com-
mon enemy in the classical law (taqlid), and its learned estab-
lishment, the Ulma. Thus, in the name of authenticity triumph-
ing over a corrupt tradition, political Islam is aiming towards 
something like Muhammad's direct rule over the pristine com-
munity of the early days. In doing so, its exponents tend to 
regard the Sunnat al-nabi as the primary source of authority. 
Though Islamists in no way seek to undermine the authority of 
God, their privileging of the Sunnat al-nabi does create a dual-
ity of authority, a duality that they themselves would find 
shocking. 
Let me address a question that hovers over my whole discus-
sion and is very much at the center of Islamic thinking. 
If, according to the decisionist picture, justification is not the 
ground for accepting authority, what is? 
Let's look first at the motives for human acceptance of God's 
authority. This is an important religious issue, specifically rela-
tive merits and demerits of accepting God's authority out or 
love or out of fear. Joseph Raz has insightful things to say about 
the meaning of accepting God's authority out of love. The lover 
who wants to have the same taste in music as her beloved is not 
just trying instrumentally to ingratiate herself but instead to be 
one with him. 
The decisionist picture of religion seeks something else: a 
fusion of fear and love for the veneration of God and the 
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acceptance of his authority. The fusion of love and fear is what 
creates ambivalence, according to Freud's account; first, 
towards the primal despotic father and then towards God the 
Father. The decisionist is not interested in deep psychology but 
in effective submission; the combination of the two works best 
for obtaining submission. Stalin made even his admirers shiver, 
but many also sobbed bitterly at his funeral. For the decisionist, 
the combination of tremors of fear and tears of love is just about 
right. The decisionist picture of God has strong hold on politi-
cal Islam. 
It is directed against another source of authority in Islam, the 
legalistic authority of the four schools of Islamic law. As a mat-
ter of fact, this source of authority was most influential in shap-
ing religious life in the Islamic world. Of course this legalistic 
source of authority presents itself as derived from the Koran 
and the Sunna, but it is in fact an independent source of author-
ity. 
2.5. The Authority of the Scriptures 
For most religious thinkers, God's authority is so obvious that 
it does not call for any justification. God is posited as the self-
justified authority, and other authorities are justified by their 
relation to the authority of God. Though the authority of God 
does not pose a problem for many thinkers, what counts as the 
authoritative Word of God still does. The word of God is author-
itative. But who decides what the word of God is? Politically, 
the authority to determine what is the authoritative word of 
God is far more relevant than God's authority to begin with. 
How does the authority of the word of God fit in with the 
decisionist picture of God? Let me redraw the outlines of the 
decisionist picture. God is a personality with no body. The main 
trait of his personality is his will. It is his will and not his reason 
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that counts, because reason does not individuate a personality. 
Reason in principle is shared by all. 
The will of God is the individuating principle of God's per-
sonality. The will individuates personality in the same way that 
matter rather than form individuates substances in Aristotelian 
metaphysics. Matter is corrupt, so it cannot be imputed to God. 
The immaterial will is thus supposed to do the trick of marking 
God's uniqueness. The will of God is the unifying principle of 
his complicated personality. It is a simple will. This is the basic 
view of the decisionist picture of God. 
The will of God is expressed by his commands more than by 
anything else that he says and does. To be a believer is to 
accept his authority and obey his command. To be a true ser-
vant of God is to achieve the highest religious status. Moses and 
Muhammad were such servants indeed, or even slaves. To carry 
out the will of God is to obey his command, and to obey his 
command requires an interpretation of his words. There are 
about 6000 verses in the Koran, but only 200 of them are con-
veyed by imperative sentences. By command, I understand 
roughly what Hobbes says: «Does this or Does not this, without 
expecting any other reason than, the Will of him that says it». 
God is a super commander. But commands call for understand-
ing, an understanding not of the reasons for the command, but 
an understanding of what to do to execute them. Commands 
may be baffling. One reason is that they are not always linguis-
tically marked by imperative moods. The epitome of the bibli-
cal law is the Ten Commandments, which are for the most part 
marked by the imperative mood of «you shall not» (kill, steal, 
covet etc.). But then it is generally accepted that «I am the Lord» 
is the first commandment and this is given in an indicative state-
ment and does not look like a command. For it to be a com-
mand it should already presuppose the authority of God to 
command. But to believe in God and accept his authority is 
what the first commandment commands. Roughly speaking 
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Judaism and Islam are action-centered religions, consistent with 
the decisionist picture of authority as expressed in commands. 
Christianity, by contrast, is more of a belief-centered religion 
(Man is justified by faith). 
The prophet Muhammad was the first to coin the very useful 
expression «people of the book». He meant Jews and Christians. 
Muslims, through their messenger Muhammad, join this book 
club too. The idea is that all these religions, unlike the religions 
of the heathens, are based in scripture. Jews and Christians are 
entitled to protection under Islamic rule for the very fact that 
they are people of the book. Being people of the book does not 
mean that there is primacy of the written word of God over the 
spoken word. Indeed, for religious purposes, hearing is more 
important than seeing. Faith after all is, in the language of the 
famous eleventh chapter of Hebrews, «the conviction of things 
not seen». But whether the scriptures were handed over as a 
book or were reveled by a spoken word (and were committed 
in writing by prophets), there are written canonical texts at the 
center of each of the three religions. The authority to determine 
the canon is important to the understanding of religious and 
political authority. An excellent account of canonization in 
Judaism can be found in Moshe Halbertal's «People of the 
Book». 
Who the people of the Book are can be a highly contestable 
matter. Heretics swear in the name of the holy books that they 
and only they are the «true» people of the book. One may argue 
that in some peculiar way «the Book» is even more important to 
heretics and fundamentalists than to the orthodoxy. Appeal to 
the book is a way to offset the authority of the orthodoxy that 
counts in fact more on «living traditions» than on the book itself. 
Paradoxically put, «the people of the book» are the fundamen-
talists and the heretics who try to undermine traditional reli-
gious and political authorities by direct appeal to the authority 
of the book. 
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What, according to the decisionist picture of God, is the right 
interpretation of the scripture? Right interpretation is the inter-
pretation that gets God's intentions right. But this is easier said 
than explained. 
The influential literary theory of the «intentional fallacy» holds 
that literary interpretation should not pursue the author's inten-
tion, but should instead be based on the shared linguistic mean-
ings of the words. Various arguments are advanced to promote 
the idea of «the intentional fallacy», including a denial of first 
person authority over her own words. 
For the decisionist picture, God's authority over his own 
words is of great moment. It ties in with another religious pic-
ture of God - the creator picture or the creator fallacy. 
According to this picture, only the creator fully knows what he 
created. The potter knows everything there is to know about 
his products and the carpenter knows everything about the 
tables and cupboards that she produces. God as the creator of 
the world is the sole being that knows the world. Stories origi-
nating in Prague exposed the creator picture as a creator falla-
cy. First the old story about the Golem and then the new story 
about the Robots. In both stories, the creator lost control over 
his products. It is this loss of control over one's artifacts that 
shaped the modern sensibility of not understanding the world 
we created around ourselves. In any case, God is the author of 
his world. He created the world and handed down a book 
based on his creation (though in Islam there is a doctrine of the 
eternity of the Koran), so he is in the best position to know 
everything about the meanings of his words. Moreover he is not 
constrained by the plain meanings of the words. He is the sov-
ereign. This last claim is actually untenable, since the only the-
ory of meaning that goes with such account is the Humpty 
Dumpty theory: «when I use a word it means just what I choose 
it to mean». Remember how Humpty Dumpty famously turns 
«glory» into «a nice knock down argument». 
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The decisionist picture of interpretation is pushed into a 
Humpty Dumpty position. There is no glory in this account and 
it is nothing but a knock down argument against God's com-
manding his creatures to obey his will in whatever language he 
pleases. The point is that a decisive and deciding God who 
exerts his authority by commanding his creatures should make 
sure that they understand him. And this can be done if and only 
if God speaks in the language of his creatures, which puts many 
strictures on what he can and cannot say. The decisionist can 
ignore morality but not linguistics. Human understanding is a 
constraint upon the way God understands himself, even when 
God is trying to be a decisionist God who is unconstrained by 
morality. 
The decisionist picture of God may not be a coherent picture 
- a great deal hinges on how we understand God's omnipo-
tence - but this does not stop it from being an influential pic-




3. TRUST IN AUTHORITY 
Here is a list of the main points I shall make in what follows: 
- that authority can be practical or theoretical and it can be 
personal or impersonal; 
- that there are two formative models of personal authority: 
paternalistic authority v. expert authority, and that these 
models inform/affect the case of impersonal (or institu-
tional) authority; 
- that trust in an institution is not a necessary condition for 
sustaining its authority; 
- that distrust, by contrast, plays a significant role in eroding 
the authority of institutions, especially if it is widespread 
and if there is common knowledge of this; 
- that despotic regimes do not need to worry about distrust: 
they rely on bayonets and on fear; 
- that democracies need to worry about institutional distrust; 
- that distrust in institutional authority can arise when the 
institution is seen as partial or corrupt; 
- that distrust in institutional authority can also arise when it 
is seen as non-expert, as lacking special knowledge. 
"Familiarity breeds distrust." 
«In God we trust», proclaims the American dollar. The God in 
whom we trust is the supreme authority. Does this imply that 
God is the only authority - that only in God we trust? Bumper 
stickers in Israel proclaim: «We have no trust except in our heav-
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enly father». This is more helpful: it says explicitly that only in 
God do we trust. It is also helpful in another respect. It explic-
itly equates God with the father. 
Is trust in God to be understood on the model of trusting 
daddy? Or does God come first? 
The question in turn relates to what is the formative picture 
that has a primary hold on us: is it our trust in God, such that 
trust in daddy is a derivative of it, or is it the other way around? 
God is omniscient; but then, «daddy knows best». Knowing 
all or knowing best surely affects our trust in either one. But 
their superior knowledge is not sufficient. They also have to be 
competent in order for us to trust them; they have to be able to 
deliver. Well, God is not only omniscient, he is also omnipotent. 
Daddy may not be - but for the small child he is. And there is 
also a third requirement. It has to do with benevolence. God is 
all-good, as well as omniscient and omnipotent. As for daddy, 
his "knowing best" should be construed as not only knowing 
most but also as always knowing what is best for me. 
Daddy wants and aims at my well-being. 
Defining authority as the power to make decisions for others, 
God and the father are models of authority. They are models 
both of theoretical (doxastic, epistemic) authority and of practi-
cal authority. Theoretical authority tells you what to believe, 
practical authority tells you what to do. If I am on the receiving 
end of some authority, it is not the case that the authority mere-
ly supplies me with additional reasons for believing that p or for 
doing x. Rather, it gives me exclusionary reasons (in Raz's 
sense) for belief or for action, reasons that are supposed to 
trump all other reasons. It is practical authority that I want to 
explore in the main bulk of this paper. 
Still, I shall have something to say, at the end, about a specific 
historical example of a peculiar theoretical-religious authority: I 
shall present the case of the Teacher of Righteousness of the 
Dead Sea sect and the unique genre of pesharim that came to 
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light among the Dead Sea scrolls. This literary genre is associat-
ed with a special kind of authority exerted by the Teacher, and 
by the texts that he is believed to have authored. 
3.1 Paternalistic Authority 
Regardless of who is the primary model and who the derivative, 
both God and the father exemplify what we may term personal 
authority. Contrasted with personal authority is impersonal author-
ity, which is vested, typically, in a regime or in its institutions and 
agencies (such as the police or the courts). Personal authority on 
the model of God or the father is paternalistic. It knows what is best 
for you, and it wants what is best for you. Or at least this is what you 
believe - or, sometimes, this is what the authority will make you 
believe. Furthermore, personal authority makes decisions on your 
behalf. You should trust this authority and comply with it. 
The particular paternalistic pattern of authority involves a rela-
tion of near-ownership. The believer "belongs" to God in much the 
same way that the child belongs to his or her father. This property 
relation is supposed, in and of itself, to account for the authority 
exerted by the owner upon the owned. But the ownership here is 
of a special kind. God and the father own their children qua their 
makers or creators. The authority of makers over their creations 
supposedly derives from the notion that the maker qua maker 
knows his creation - his child - best, and hence that the maker also 
knows what is best for his child, and that he wants it. 
Personal authority may be paternalistic in an even wider sense 
than is exemplified by God and the father. The authority of the feu-
dal lord over his vassals is an example. It, too, is based on owner-
ship relations. But here the lord owns his vassals in the sense that 
they are his property, not in the sense that he is their creator and 
maker. Further away still from the model of God and father is the 
authority exercised, for example, by a plantation owner or a sweat-
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shop boss over his workers, or by a tyrant over his people (think 
of a Peron-type or a Papa Doc-type tyrant). Here there is no own-
ership, strictly speaking, but rather pure subjection. 
Such authority relations need not be paternalistic, but they can 
be. And inasmuch as these authority relations are paternalistic there 
seems to be a conscious effort on the part of the "pater" to style 
them on the father model. Typical of such authority relations is the 
constant invocation of the family metaphor: the workers/subjects 
are like children; the boss is like their father. It is clearly in the inter-
est of the boss to use this metaphor and to have his subordinates 
internalize it. He would want them to believe that he cares about 
them and that he knows what is best for them, and therefore they 
should expect him to tell them what to do. Their role is to be grate-
ful and to obey. The father's authority over his children is natural 
and its legitimacy is not questioned. By exploiting the family 
metaphor, the idea is that the naturalness and legitimacy of the 
father's authority will carry over smoothly to the relationship 
between master and subordinates, thus assuring their obedience. 
In authority relations that are modeled, whether narrowly or 
broadly, on the paternalistic father/child relationship, trust in 
the authority is implicit and taken for granted. Of course, such 
trust is not always justified and it can be betrayed. Gods may 
fail. The phenomenon of a father who betrays the trust of his 
children by exploiting or abusing them is both familiar and 
abhorrent to us, regardless of historical period and social con-
text. In contrast, the exploitation and abuse of subordinates by 
their masters and rulers, say in feudal or early modern times, is 
commonplace and almost to be expected. There is much to 
explore here, regarding the psychological mechanisms that 
connect fear of a despotic-paternalistic authority with trustful 
obedience to it. The first link in the putative causal chain is from 
fear to obedience. This is straightforward. The second more 
complex link is from obedience to trust, via the machinations of 
the dependence relation and of both cognitive and emotional 
dissonance. I shall not pursue these issues here. 
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3.2 Expert Authority 
In addition to personal authority relations that are paternalis-
tic there are also non-paternalistic relations of personal author-
ity. These are mostly exercised by experts. Expert authority is 
the second formative model of authority, at the opposite pole 
of the father/God model. 
We defer to experts in a variety of domains and we let them 
control, to some extent, what we believe and what we do. The 
tax consultant, the doctor, the home decorator are authorities 
for us by virtue of their special knowledge and professionalism. 
They generally know better, and in some cases they know best, 
and so we take their word for it. 
But is not the source of paternalistic authority precisely this, 
namely that it knows best - or at least that it is supposed to know 
best? So how is personal authority of the expert variety different 
from personal authority of the paternalistic variety? Well, in the first 
place let us recall that «daddy knows best» was only one element 
in what constitutes the paternalistic authority of the father. In addi-
tion to knowledge (or omniscience, in the case of God) there were 
also the elements of competence (or omnipotence, in the case of 
God), of benevolence, and of proprietorship. These additional ele-
ments are not constitutive of authority relations of the expert kind. 
On the other hand, the element of knowledge - of special knowl-
edge - is dominant in the case of authority exercised by experts. 
Secondly, expert authority relations are contractual in nature, 
and are typically entered into voluntarily. They are also limited in 
scope: they concern the patient's knee operation, the customer's 
tax returns or the client's plan to build an attic. Paternalistic 
authority relations, in contrast, are non-voluntary and they tend 
to be of a wide, sometimes all-encompassing scope. The child 
defers to the father in just about everything, and so does the vas-
sal to his lord and the subject to the tyrant. But the essential point 
of difference seems to be this. The paternalistic authority is per-
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sonal in the strict sense of being de dicto and non-substitutable. 
This particular person is my father and as such my fatherly 
authority, while the authority exerted upon me by my doctor or 
by the dean of my faculty is ex o f f i c i o , qua my doctor or my dean, 
regardless of who the actual person is who happens to sit in that 
particular chair. What this involves is something neither entirely 
impersonal nor strictly personal. It is in their social roles or capac-
ities that my doctor or my dean can exert authority over me. Last 
year it may have been a different doctor, next year the dean will 
be replaced: the persons exercising this kind of personal author-
ity are in this sense substitutable. 
The status of what expert authorities tell us to do is different 
from the status of what paternalistic authorities tell us to do: it is 
more in the nature of advice, not command. The price for non-
compliance is not external punishment but rather, at worst, having 
to live with the consequences of wrong decisions. Still, in both 
cases noncompliance involves a disutility of one sort or another, 
which has to be taken into account in one's overall practical delib-
eration. Trust in expert authority differs markedly from trust in 
paternalistic authority. It depends on the extent to which the 
authority is believed to possess expert knowledge relevant to the 
situation at hand, and it is limited to the domain of that expert 
knowledge. We usually turn to expert authority voluntarily, and 
we usually turn to the authority we judge to be best and most 
trustworthy, subject to some obvious constraints such as access, 
financial resources, time etc. We will normally not turn to an expert 
authority who we have prima facie reasons to distrust. Whether or 
not the experts turn out to justify the trust bestowed on them is a 
different matter.Expert authority, as mentioned before, is not limit-
ed to practical matters of how to act and what to do. 
Expert authority can also be theoretical. We may turn to experts 
in order to know what to believe. Einstein is an authority for us in 
matters of physics and Stephen Jay Gould in maters of paleontol-
ogy. As for the Pope or the Lubavicher Rebbe, well, they are cer-
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tainly authorities for many people in matters of belief (even though 
I hesitate in referring to them as strictly theoretical authorities). I 
note in passing that religious authorities function not only as 
authorities for what to believe but often also as authorities for what 
to do and how to do it. In Judaism, the practical facet of the reli-
gious authority is especially pronounced, the rabbi being expect-
ed to issue halakhic decrees on every aspect of daily life. 
3.3 The Matrix 
The discussion until now concerned two models of personal 
authority. This will serve me as scaffolding for my main con-
cern, which is impersonal authority within a democratic frame-
work. But before continuing, let me pause for a moment and 
consider the following classificatory schema: 




God, Pope, rabbi, 
lord, tyrant "eminence" 
personal 
authority [Teacher of 
Righteousness? - see 
last section] 
non-paternalist: 









(courts, police etc.) 
the Church 
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The discussion thus far belongs mostly in the upper left and 
upper right cells of this matrix, comprising the paternalist and 
the non-paternalist models of personal authority - both practi-
cal and theoretical. I want now to turn to impersonal authority 
of the practical kind (the lower left cell). I want to look at insti-
tutions that have some control over what we do, and to focus 
on the question of trust in such institutional authorities. In par-
ticular, I want to ask whether the authority of institutions 
depends on our trusting them. Basically I shall argue for an 
asymmetry thesis. Namely, that the question of trust does not 
really come up with regard to institutional authority: it is distrust 
that counts. The relevant question to ask is when does trust in 
the authority of institutions in a democracy break down, and 
what are the consequences. 
An etymological digression: the New Collegiate Dictionary 
lists several distinct meanings for the word "authority". It has 
the «power to influence or command thought, opinion, or 
behavior». Using the terminology used here, this is both theo-
retical and practical authority. Also: «person in command; 
specif: government; a governmental agency or corporation, as 
in "the transit authority"» - namely, personal and institutional 
authority. In addition, the dictionary includes: «an individual 
cited or appealed to as an expert». The dictionary does not stop 
here, however. Among the further entries we find: «a citation 
used in defense or support; the source from which the citation 
is drawn; testimony; grounds, warrant». These latter meanings 
reflect the fact that the word "authority" comes from "author" 
(Latin: auctor), meaning «promoter, originator, author; source». 
Now in Hebrew the word for authority (samchut) does not 
derive from authorship. But it does turn up revealing connec-
tions. The three-letter root for authority is "s-m-ch". And when 
we check the various Hebrew words that derive from this root, 
we find (inter alia): support, lean against, rely on and have 
confidence in; accreditation and certification; to back or to sup-
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port by evidence; reference and documentation; an expert; per-
mission, right and power. Some of these cognates will turn up 
in what follows. 
3.4 Trust in Institu,tional Authority 
It is taken to be a necessary condition of a well-functioning 
democracy that its citizens trust its institutional authorities. 
Social institutions are sometimes seen as trust mediators. In 
modern mass democracies, in contrast to the intimate city-states 
of ancient times, no level of general interpersonal familiarity 
and trust can be assumed. As a result, an important role of insti-
tutions is to facilitate social transactions by essentially replacing 
the need for personal trust among citizens. Consider, for exam-
ple, the role of legally binding contracts as a replacement for 
promises. On the other hand, once institutions are in place, in 
order for them to fulfill their role as trust substitutes it is often 
supposed that citizens need to trust them. So, for example, in 
order for contracts between individuals to work it is commonly 
said that the individuals need to have trust in the country's legal 
system and in its enforcement mechanisms. 
A number of writers seem to diagnose a malaise in many con-
temporary democracies, where a general decline in the degree 
of trust in institutional authorities is observed. This relates to 
both public and private institutions. There is substantial evi-
dence, for example, that institutional trust in the US has been 
declining for several decades - in federal government, univer-
sities, medical institutions and journalism, as well as in several 
major private companies. These finding are alarming if the 
authority of an institution is directly linked to its ability to func-
tion properly, and if its ability to function properly depends in 
no small measure upon the public's trust in it. 
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According to another view, the authority of representative 
democracy goes hand in hand with a modicum of distrust. «A 
certain amount of distrust», says Hardin, «may be useful to a 
society or government. Certainly, large, modern democracies 
work better if we can be sure that there are professional dis-
trusters or cynics or skeptics, people who act as watchdogs, 
raise alarms, or provide contrary information». A quick com-
ment on this is that a skeptical attitude is not quite the same as 
distrust, and while skepticism may be healthy, distrust may be 
detrimental to the authority of an institution. 
Still, how threatening to a democracy are various forms and 
degrees of distrust in its institutional authorities? Or we could 
ask, how healthy are they? And is the distrust that one is talking 
about when arguing that it is threatening the same as the dis-
trust assumed when arguing that it is healthy? 
I recently had occasion to come up with a detailed analysis 
of the notion of personal trust. 
It says, roughly, that I trust you when I believe that you have 
the right intentions toward me. This is a personal, intention-
based account of trust. It requires that for me to trust X, I need 
to entertain certain beliefs about X's intentions, and about what 
motivates those intentions. Since it is to persons, not institu-
tions, that we attribute intentions and motivations, the analysis 
does not carry over smoothly to the notion of trust in institu-
tions. 
It is often the person who is the figurehead of an institution 
that embodies for us the institution as a whole. Roderick 
Kramer cites a speculation that «people may use the behavior of 
institutional leaders as reference points [for gauging their basic 
beliefs - ] when appraising the trustworthiness of society's insti-
tutions in general. In other words, people may draw general 
inferences about institutional trust from the behavior of highly 
visible role models». If this is so, then the question of trust in an 
institutional authority translates into trust in personal authority 
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- of a paternalist, expert, or any other kind. The question of 
trust in the authority of the police, say, or the Supreme Court, is 
translated into the question of trust in the authority of the com-
missioner of police or the chief justice - and is thus ultimately 
unpacked in terms of people's beliefs about the intentions and 
motivations of these personae. 
When no such personification of the institution takes place, I 
believe that talk of trusting an institution is loose talk. It usual-
ly amounts to no more than one's reliance on the institution or 
one's degree of confidence in its competence and performance. 
This can typically be expressed in the probability one assigns to 
the institution's doing such-and-such. A caveat here is that only 
when the goals of the institution accord with our interests do 
we tend to say, in this loose sense, that we trust the institution. 
Or at any rate this is the case when the institutional goals do not 
outright conflict with ours. When there is such conflict, we are 
unlikely to feel or to say that we trust the institution in question. 
Indeed, it is possible for me to have confident expectations that 
an institution will do exactly what it is supposed to do, and to 
distrust it for that reason, when what it is supposed to do is 
against my interests. 
But more specifically and more crucially, talk of trusting an 
institution is generally to be construed in terms of our degree of 
confidence that the institution will continue to pursue its set 
goals and to achieve them regardless of who staffs the institu-
tion. There is a principle of substitutability at work here. 
Invoking the idea of substitutability raises the question of 
what it is that remains constant over the substitution. In the case 
at hand, when we express trust in an institution we express our 
belief that, even if the present officeholders in that institution 
were to be replaced with others, the performance of the insti-
tution would remain more or less the same. In other words, so-
called trust in an institution is tantamount to a belief in the 
impersonality of its performance, in addition to the belief that 
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its goals are compatible with our interests. In contrast, when I 
trust other individuals, I expect their behavior toward me to be 
entirely personal: I expect their behavior to reflect the fact that 
it is I who am affected by it, not just anyone, and that it is pre-
cisely because it is me that they behave the way they do. But 
when I say I trust an institution, I expect its behavior toward me 
to be impersonal: I expect its rulings and decisions to be unaf-
fected by whether it is I or anyone relevantly similar who stands 
to be affected by those rulings and decisions. 
3.5 Distrust of Institutional Authority - Partiality 
Having said something about what trusting an institution may 
be construed to mean, I now want to consider distrust of insti-
tutions. I believe that there is an important asymmetry here. 
Distrust adversely affects the authority of institutions more than 
trust positively affects it. I also claim that, in the case of distrust 
of institutions, we do attribute intentions and motivations to the 
institutions themselves, and not just to their figureheads. 
Consider, for example, the case of the ultra-Orthodox in 
Israel, who in recent years have expressed their growing dis-
trust of the Israeli Supreme Court. Consider also the case of the 
Arab Israeli minority, many of whose members have in recent 
years come to lose whatever trust they had in the Israeli police. 
In expressing their distrust of the respective institutions, these 
people are conveying something other than a mere factual pre-
diction that the Court or the police will act against their inter-
ests. Their distrust has a surplus element that goes beyond 
expressing non-reliance or a low degree of confidence in the 
performance of the institutions. These communities want also 
to be understood as imputing intentions to the people who staff 
the respective institutions. 
What intentions can these be, given that there is no personal 
acquaintance and there are no personal relations between the 
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individuals involved? Fundamentally, I think that the question 
of our distrust of an institution boils down to our belief in the 
unfairness of the institution - and to the ancillary belief that the 
unfairness works against our own interests. When an institution 
faces a crisis of trust, which is at the same time a crisis of author-
ity and legitimacy, this means that social groups in need of 
recourse to that institution suspect it of operating in an unfair 
manner, a manner that goes against their interests qua members 
of those social groups. More specifically, in many cases this 
means that the members of the social groups in question tend 
to impute discriminatory intentions quite generally to the office-
holders of the institution, at all levels of the institutional hierar-
chy - for example, to all the judges or to all policemen and 
policewomen. Such imputed discriminatory intentions may be 
racist, sexist, homophobic, anti-Semitic or antireligious ones. 
The flip side of imputed discriminatory intentions that make 
some people distrust an institution, is that the very same insti-
tution may become highly favored by people with other, 
opposing, interests. In a city where the police favor the Mafia, 
or let's say the Sunni Muslims, it may be expected that the gen-
eral citizenry will distrust the police. Can we say that the mem-
bers of the Mafia, or of the Sunni segment of the population, 
trust the police? Well, they sure do, in some sense. But their 
trust in the police is in the personal sense of trust, not in the 
institutional sense that is premised on impersonality and substi-
tutability. The trust of these groups in the (favoritistic) police is 
"bad" trust, if you will: it is the kind of trust that actually serves 
to undermine the authority of the police with the population at 
large. 
The Mafia's trust in the police cannot be the trust that we 
value when we reflect upon the authority exerted by institu-
tions in a healthy democracy and, in particular, upon the role of 
trust in it. The Mafia's trust is a perversion of the trust in institu-
tions that is claimed to be required in order for mass democra-
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cy to work. It undermines rather than enhances the authority of 
the police as far as the general public is concerned. A necessary 
condition for trust in an institutional authority worthy of its 
name is confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the insti-
tution. When this condition is fulfilled - or, at any rate, when 
this condition is not flagrantly violated - no personal intentions 
are imputed to the officeholders of the institution; the principle 
of substitutability holds. 
The point, then, is that in contrast to the case of trust in insti-
tutional authorities, distrust of institutional authorities does 
involve the imputing of intentions. It involves a shared belief 
among groups of citizens about the personal intentions of the 
institution's officeholders. These intentions are taken to be 
operative while the officeholders are executing their official 
duties. The typical belief here is that the officeholders are 
infected with discriminatory intentions against members of the 
relevant groups and that these intentions generally result in 
unfair practices. The unfair practices are believed to adversely 
affect the interests of the people who belong to those groups. 
Schematically put, the putative chain of events here is this. 
Belief in discriminatory intentions leads to distrust. When this is 
true for an increasing number of individuals, a threshold is 
crossed and the authority of the institution is eroded. This in 
turn leads to increasing noncompliance. When all of this not 
only happens, but is also generally known to happen, tipping 
phenomena and cascades are likely to occur and to amplify the 
effects. 
The likely result: a breakdown of trust in the authority of the 
institution in question. 
When this chain of events is generalized across institutions or 
governmental agencies, indignation may spread and threaten 
the authority of the regime. 
Institutional distrust may also emerge when there is wide-
spread belief that the institution is corrupt. David Hume sug-
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gests that institutions should be designed in such a way that 
they would work well even if, in his well-known phrase, they 
were staffed by knaves. 
Should the design fail, however, or should the level of the 
knaves' corruption pass a certain threshold, the institution qua 
institution may be perceived as corrupt. Here, too, people's atti-
tude toward the institution turns in an essential way on their 
beliefs about the personal motives of the institution's office-
holders at its various hierarchical levels. Once the officials' per-
sonal motives become suspect - as, for example, when there is 
a shared belief that they are open to bribes - then distrust in the 
institution qua institution spreads and its authority is eroded. 
A difference may be noted between cases in which the ero-
sion of an institution's authority is due to a distrust that relates 
to partiality and discrimination, and cases in which it is due to 
a distrust that relates to corruption. The first case of discrimina-
tion-related distrust tends to be a case of group distrust, based 
on membership in groups defined by race, gender, ethnic ori-
gin, sexual orientation, and so forth - as in the examples cited 
above of the Israeli Arabs or ultra-Orthodox. The second case 
of corruption-related distrust tends to be a case of class distrust. 
Here the institution is taken to operate in such a way that the 
rich who can afford to bribe get away with things that the poor 
cannot get away with (think of driving violations in the case of 
the police, or tax evasions in the case of the IRS). The two kinds 
of institutional distrust may of course overlap, and there may be 
various intermediate cases too. I leave the question open as to 
which kind of distrust is more detrimental to institutional 
authority and, ultimately, to the stability of the regime. 
So: what we ordinarily mean by saying that we trust an insti-
tution is best captured in terms of the high degree of confidence 
with which we can predict the future steps or decisions that the 
institution will take. This can often be cast in terms of our con-
fident prediction that the institution will be pursuing its goals. 
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Also, when we say that we trust an institution we expect the 
institution to be impersonal, whereas in trusting an individual 
we expect his or her attitude toward us to be entirely personal. 
Distrusting an institution, in contrast, is not a matter of confi-
dent predictions, and it involves the attribution of intentions. It 
boils down to our belief that the intentions of the officeholders 
of the institution are discriminatory (or profit-seeking), and that 
the institution is consequently unfair (or corrupt) in ways that 
work against our interests. 
3.6 Distrust of Institutional Authority - Familiarity 
Ben-Gurion, the mythical and authoritative founding father 
of the state of Israel and its first prime minister, is often quoted 
as having said in the 1950s something like the following: «Every 
Hebrew mother shall know that when she sends her son to 
enlist in the Israel Defense Forces she is entrusting him to the 
very best commanding officers». (I do not think Ben-Gurion 
said «son or daughter» as he should have.). This was meant to 
instill and to inspire in the general Israeli population a high 
degree of trust in the country's newly formed armed forces, to 
the ranks of which there was - and still is - a general duty of 
conscription. 
In promising that the young soldiers would be the charges of 
«the best» officers, Ben-Gurion was making the case, among 
other things, that these officers are responsible professionals, 
that «they know what they are doing». The self-righteousness of 
Ben-Gurion's statement notwithstanding, I read it as an attempt 
to base the people's trust in the authority of the army, at least in 
part, on the attribution to its officers of some relevant expertise, 
of some sort of special knowledge. (I say "in part"' because 
there is surely an additional, moral aspect to be read into Ben-
Gurion's statement.) 
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In the early decades, the army did indeed command a high 
degree of respect in the Israeli population and enjoyed its con-
siderable trust. The trust has eroded over the years, however. I 
believe that this is only partly due to the less-than-exemplary 
performance of the Israeli armed forces in recent years. My 
claim is that, in comparison with the past, when parents send 
their children to become soldiers today they trust the army less 
because they know the army better. In contrast with parents of 
the previous generation, today's parents have themselves 
served in this army, and precisely because they are more famil-
iar with it, they are more suspicious and less trustful of it. The 
halo and the mystique are gone; the attitude that is summed up 
in the phrase «they know things we don't: who are we to pass 
judgment?» no longer prevails. In other words, familiarity may 
breed distrust. 
In a despotic regime, like Stalin's or Saddam's, it is relatively 
easy to maintain distance between the ruler and the ruled and 
it is relatively easy to shroud the regime with a halo of omnis-
cience and omnipotence. Authority in such regimes is sustained 
first and foremost by fear. It is also sustained by the particular 
kind of trust that is induced by fear from a ruler who is per-
ceived as all-knowing. But in democracies things are different. 
Most state agencies or institutions in democracies are in prin-
ciple supposed to be transparent, accessible and familiar. So 
long as no widespread suspicions of impartiality and unfairness 
give rise to distrust in an institution, the effectiveness and 
authority of the institution can be sustained. Think, for exam-
ple, of the police or the income-tax authorities in most liberal 
democracies. Alternatively, the effectiveness and authority of 
an institution can be sustained so long as the institution suc-
ceeds in maintaining a reputation for possessing professional, 
special or expert knowledge in the relevant area of its activity. 
Think, for example, of the Supreme Court, the Federal Reserve 
Bank or the MI-5. We should note, however, that these special-
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knowledge institutions are also less transparent and accessible 
than the institutions of the first category. 
There seems indeed to be some delicate balance or tradeoff 
between fairness and impartiality on the one hand, and expert-
ise on the other, with regard to the degree of trust in an insti-
tution. After all, in a democracy many governmental ministries 
and agencies are staffed by elected officials who may be 
replaced at the next election and who are not, strictly speak-
ing, professionals in what they do. Still, if the way an agency 
conducts itself and carries out its duties is perceived as fair, this 
appears to compensate to some degree for the lack of expert-
ise or special knowledge. The paradox, however, is that the 
more transparent, accessible and familiar the institutions in a 
democracy are, the less they are able to maintain the sem-
blance of expert knowledge and to fend off suspicion and dis-
trust. 
In sum: despotic authorities do not need to inspire trust; fear 
will do well enough for them. Still, to the extent that a despot-
ic ruler fashions himself on the model of the «father of the 
nation», he may inspire the peculiar sort of unquestioning trust 
that is associated with paternalistic authority. In democracies, 
paternalistic trust is by and large unavailable. 
Some institutions in a democracy, like the court or the central 
bank, derive their authority from their claim to expertise; they 
inspire trust inasmuch as they are thought to possess special, 
expert knowledge. But in general the authority of a democratic 
regime and its institutions relies less on trust than on the per-
ceived legitimacy of the authority and the proper and generally 
fair functioning of its institutions. What democratic authority is 
vulnerable to and cannot afford is the spread of distrust. I have 
tried to sketch some of the possible sources and causes of such 
distrust. The spread of distrust may lead to growing indignation, 
and significant indignation may undermine the authority of the 
regime and threaten its stability. 
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3.7 Theoretical/Doxastic Authority: Pesharim 
Going back to the promissory note given at the outset, I now 
want to briefly present a rather special case of religious author-
ity. This comes out of the discovery of the Dead Sea scrolls in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Among the sectarian scrolls found at the Dead Sea site of 
Qumran, several texts constitute a separate genre, referred to as 
pesharim (sing: pesher). The w o r d p e s h e r means interpretation, 
and in the pesharim scrolls selected biblical texts are applied to 
the contemporary sectarian setting of the second and first cen-
tury BCE by means of a special literary technique of interpreta-
tion. 
A pesher takes a biblical composition, usually one of the 
twelve Minor Prophets, as a starting point. (Thus the longest, 
most important and best-known pesharim found at Qumran are 
Pesher Habakkuk and Pesher Nahum.) It proceeds, first, with a 
direct and explicit citation from the biblical text (the lemma), 
then an introductory formula such as «its pesher is upon...», and 
then an application of the text to a contemporary reality outside 
of its original biblical context. The selected text to be interpret-
ed is typically of an eschatological prophetic nature, and the 
interpretation is typically historical, not theological. It offers a 
typological version of the history of the sect itself, regarding its 
own «Historia Sacra». 
Here is an example, from Pesher Habakkuk (col. V, 8-12): 
«Why do you stare, traitors, and maintain your silence when a 
wicked person consumes someone more upright than himself? 
[Hab. 1. 13] Its interpretation is upon the House of Absalom 
[Alexander Janaeus's younger brother] and the members of his 
council, who kept silent at the time of the reproach of the 
Teacher of Righteousness, and did not help him against the Man 
of Lies, who rejected the Law in the midst of their whole 
Community». 
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The Qumran community saw biblical prophecy as coded 
messages, which might only be unraveled by a specially 
endowed and divinely inspired individual. The author of the 
pesher, most often the Teacher of Righteousness who was the 
leader (and possibly the founder) of the Qumran community, 
deciphers the coded biblical messages and reveals their «true 
meaning» to the members of his community. In this way the 
author becomes a theoretical authority to the members of his 
community: he instructs them about what they are to believe 
about their reality. (However, the modern reader is «often chal-
lenged to identify the historical realities reflected in the allu-
sions found in these interpretations», which are themselves usu-
ally couched in veiled terms such as «the Man of Lies» cited 
above.) 
In fact, the Hebrew word pesher is related to the root of p-t-
r, meaning solution, release or unbinding (pitaron) - which, in 
antiquity, specifically came to denote the unraveling of dreams. 
Biblical prophecy, then, is here regarded as analogous to a 
dream whose mysteriously encoded message is in need of 
decoding. And just as biblical prophecy is divinely revealed, so 
too is its act of interpretation. It is not the power of scholarly 
study (or of psychoanalytical training, for that matter) that 
makes the pesher possible: in this respect the pesher differs from 
ordinary, scholarly interpretative endeavor (or midrash). 
Nor is it mere charisma that enables the leader to come up 
with the pesher. It is by divine revelation that the author of the 
pesher becomes the authoritative decoder of the Holy 
Scriptures, themselves divinely revealed. Revelation legitimizes 
the authority of the pesharim. 
The literary genre of the pesharim is unique to the corpus of 
the Dead Sea scrolls. The authority of the leader of the sect, the 
Teacher of Righteousness, is also unique. It is an intermediary 
case, between the authority of the prophets on the one hand 
and the sages on the other: it partakes of both the prophets' 
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divine inspiration and the sages' interpretative skills. The mes-
sages of the Teacher are political, and his authority extends to 
interpreting for the members of his congregation the concrete 
political reality in which they live. He is their authority regard-
ing how they are to see the world and what they are to believe. 
The worldview of the Dead Sea sectarians, like that of so 
many other religious and political sects, is Manichean. It is «we» 
v. «them», or «sons of light» v. «sons of darkness». The latter is 
indeed the name of one of the more famous Dead Sea scrolls, 
but it is also an apt epitaph for a mood and for a worldview typ-
ical of sects and various isolated extremist groups, ancient and 
contemporary. Questions relating to the nature of the authority 
of the leaders of such religious and political sects are therefore 
relevant, even urgent. 
In a noteworthy twist on the scroll community, there are 
sects around us today - like «Esh Ha-Torah» (in California) and 
others - who return to the idea of looking to the bible for 
encoded messages. The latter-day equivalent to the Teacher of 
Righteousness, the figure endowed with the capacity and 
authority to reveal the secret messages, seems therefore to be 
the mathematician-statistician. For certain groups of people, 
then, computer science may be on its way to replace divine 




4. NOTES ON AUTHORITY AND COMPLIANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
The ideas of power and of authority (as I understand them) 
differ in several ways. Only individuals have power, whereas 
authority can be an attribute of norms and institutions as well as 
of individuals. The power of an individual rests on his ability 
make others act in accordance with his desires by means of 
intentional action directed to that end. Authority, when vested 
in an individual, rests on the ability to inspire following rather 
than on the ability to overcome resistance. Jesus had no power, 
but certainly authority. Hitler had both power and authority 
(«working towards Hitler»). Stalin had power but no authority. 
Authority, when vested in norms and institutions, rests on mate-
rial sanctions and on a broad spectrum of emotional reactions. 
Power as well as authority may induce compliance. The main 
topic of the present paper is to examine the mechanisms sus-
taining compliance. I begin in Section II by discussing how 
powerful and resourceful individuals deploy threats and prom-
ises to make others act in accordance with their desires, and 
why these efforts are sometimes counterproductive. The rest of 
the paper is devoted to compliance with authority. In Section III 
I discuss how the wishes of an authoritative figure may induce 
compliance even in the absence of (explicit or implicit) threats 
and promises. In Section IV I consider the authority of unwrit-
ten rules: social norms and conventions. Section V moves on to 
consider the authority of written rules: laws and constitutions. 
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4.2 Threats andpromises 
Power operates through incentive schemes, based on threats 
and promises. Considering first the use of threats, the standard 
view is that people comply with threats when ( i) they believe 
the threat will be carried out if they don't comply and (ii) they 
prefer complying to the execution of the threat. This statement 
is ambiguous, however, in that it does not distinguish between 
pre-threat and post-threat preferences. According to what psy-
chologists describe as "reactance" (Brehm, 1966), or what John 
Roemer (1985) cites as «the psychology of tyranny», threats may 
in fact have a dual effect. A threat raises the costs of non-com-
pliance, but can also change the preferences of the person 
being threatened by making him more willing to suffer these 
costs. When during World War II German occupiers threatened 
to kill ten nationals for every German who was killed, the threat 
(and even more its implementation) often seems to have rein-
forced hatred of the Germans and induced more rather than 
fewer killings of Germans. In Palestine today, much seems to 
indicate that Israeli reprisals are counterproductive for the same 
reason. Similarly, efforts to make workers make an effort by 
punishing substandard performance often backfire (Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000). 
Even when threats leave preferences unchanged, so that (ii) 
above is true, they may still fail to induce compliance, viz. if (i) 
is false. To be effective, threats have to be credible. An agent 
who is both all-powerful and (believed by the target to be) all-
rational may find that he is powerless, since his threat to pun-
ish non-compliers may not be credible. Credibility may thus be 
enhanced if the target believes the agent to be irrational 
(Schelling, 1956). It may also be enhanced if the target is irra-
tional, due to lack of ability to engage in the kind of reasoning 
(«backwards induction») that is needed to perceive that a given 
threat lacks credibility (Camerer, 2003). Credibility may also be 
76 
enhanced by rational precommitment, such as burning one's 
bridges or one's ships (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991). Reputation 
effects are also important. 
Promises, to be effective, must have the same properties: 
they must leave preferences unaffected and they must be cred-
ible. The first condition is not always satisfied: promises may 
induce preference changes that work against the desires of the 
promiser. There is evidence that children who are rewarded for 
good grades lose interest in schoolwork and that incentive 
schemes in the workplace are similarly counter productive 
(Kohn, 1993). The same is true about participating in family 
household work. The child who has been praised or rewarded 
for doing something nice has learned that the only reason to 
continue being nice is to get something for it. When there is no 
longer a goody to be gained, there is no reason for the child to 
continue helping. Rewards, in other words, can induce a shift 
from autonomous to instrumental motivations. 
The credibility of promises (unlike that of threats) can be 
enhanced by enlisting the law as a precommitment device. By 
writing a legally enforceable contract I can persuade other people 
that I will not renege on my promise to share the profits of a joint 
venture with them. If this technology is unavailable, reputation 
effects can be very robust in sustaining the credibility of promises. 
These may be combined with another piece of precommitment 
technology, as when I take pains to make my promise known to 
the largest possible audience. It remains likely, nevertheless, that 
many promises, that if believed and kept would benefit both par-
ties, would not be credible and hence are not made. 
4.3 Wishes 
To comply with someone's wish is to do what that person 
desires you to do, assuming (i) that the action in question is not 
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what you would have done anyway (and ignoring cases in 
which the other's wish serves as a tiebreaker), and (ii) that there 
is no implicit or explicit threat or promise. There are several 
subcases, all of which are frequently observed in the sphere of 
family relations. When you love the other person, it follows 
almost by definition that you want to satisfy his or her desires. 
If you respect the other, you may take him or her as an author-
ity concerning the appropriate object of desire. If you are in 
fear and awe of the other, you may comply to avoid disap-
proval or punishment. Although in this last case compliance is 
motivated by the prospect of the negative consequences of 
non-compliance, by assumption these are not embodied in 
explicit or implicit threats. 
To comply with a wish, you first have to know what it is. One 
way of learning it is by the other telling you. But to express a 
wish may easily induce guilt in the other. (Examples are «I wish 
you wouldn't work so often in the evenings» or «I wish you'd 
visit your grandparents more often».) Guilt easily turns into 
anger at the person who makes one feel guilty. The anger can 
easily make one refuse to comply with the wish. Expressing 
wishes may therefore, as the expression of threats and promis-
es, work against the purpose of the speaker. Because people 
know this, their wishes may remain unstated. Because people 
know this, they may try to guess what the other might wish. 
Outside the family and a circle of close friends, this aspect of 
wish-compliance is probably insignificant. 
Charismatic authority rests on all the attitudes enumerated 
above: love, respect, fear and awe. The mix of attitudes may 
vary, from Jesus to Hitler, but typically all are present to some 
extent. A charismatic leader does not stoop to making threats or 
promises, although he may well issue warnings and make it 
known that good performance will be rewarded. Rewards and 
punishments are backward-looking and merit-based, not part 
of a forward-looking incentive scheme. The leader is also quite 
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ready to make his wishes known; in fact, he is expected to do 
so. Compliance in this context takes the form of discipleship. 
Although the relation of a charismatic leader to the disciples is 
one of authority, relations among the disciples tend to rest on 
power, with regulation of access to the leader being the most 
important power base. 
Wish-compliance, in the cases discussed so far, rests on pre-
existing and intensely personal attitudes in the complier. Trust 
offers a more impersonal mechanism for generating wish-com-
pliance. As often understood, trust must rest on a prior belief 
that the other person is in fact trustworthy. Trustworthiness may 
also emerge endogenously, however, through the interaction 
itself. Montaigne (1991, pp. 1078-79), wrote that «When I am on 
my travels, whoever has my purse has full charge of it without 
supervision. He could cheat me just as well if I kept accounts, 
and, unless he is a devil, by such reckless trust I oblige him to 
be honest». To meet distrust with distrust and trust with trust 
seems to be a general propensity of human nature, as shown in 
many experiments with «Trust Games» (Camerer, 2003). 
4.4 Unwritten rules: norms and conventions 
The authority of individuals is a tangible, incontestable 
causal fact. The authority of norms, laws and so on seems more 
obscure. We may want to distinguish between written and 
unwritten injunctions to act or to refrain from acting. Written 
documents, by themselves, have no causal efficacy, whence the 
pejorative phrase «parchment barriers» that is sometimes used 
about laws and constitutions. To produce an effect they have to 
be the object of specific desires and beliefs of the citizens. 
Unwritten norms and conventions, which exist only in the 
minds of individuals, may be causally efficacious by virtue of 
affecting their desires or beliefs. 
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Given that beliefs and desires can lend causal efficacy to writ-
ten and unwritten injunctions, why use the term "authority" to 
describe this fact? My answer is that people often comply with 
rules and norms for the reasons sketched in the first paragraph 
of Section III. They perceive them as supra-individual social 
facts which command attitudes of love, respect, fear and awe. 
This perception is not the only reason for compliance, as we 
shall see, but I believe it is virtually always one component of 
the individual's response and often the most important one. In 
the rare cases where it its absent, the authority of the rule is 
diminished. 
I shall distinguish between two kinds of unwritten rules, 
social norms and conventions, the former being sustained by 
desires and the latter by beliefs. Social norms, as I understand 
them, are non-consequentialist injunctions to act or to refrain 
from acting (Elster, 1999, Ch.III.2). Examples include norms 
against behavior «contrary to nature» (incest, cannibalism), 
norms of etiquette, norms of revenge, work norms, and many 
others. Their causal efficacy is due in part to the material sanc-
tions to which norm-violators are subject, and in part to the 
powerful emotions of shame (in the norm-violator) and con-
tempt (in observers of the violation). Often, the most important 
aspect of the material sanctions is the cost of sanctioning to the 
sanctioner, since the intensity of his emotional reactions can be 
inferred from how much he is willing to give up in order to 
punish the norm-violator (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). 
In many cases, social norms are utterly arbitrary, yet are 
experienced as having the weight and authority of objective 
principles. I do not perceive the person who comments on my 
improper attire at a dinner party as an interfering busybody, but 
as the authoritative vehicle of a social judgment. This is the psy-
chological grain of truth in the Durkheimian thesis that norms 
are social facts. The perceived objectivity of norms has, to be 
sure, no foundation in reality. «What kind of Good can it be, 
80 
which was honoured yesterday but not today and which 
becomes a crime when you cross a river? What kind of truth can 
be limited by a range of mountains, becoming a lie for the 
world on the other side?» (Montaigne, 1991, p. 653). Yet the per-
ception that norms possess some kind of objectivity contributes 
essentially to their immense motivating power. 
The idea of a convention can be taken in two ways. On the 
one hand, conventions can be coordination equilibria, based 
on expectations about other people's behavior. The often-cited 
example of driving on the right or the left side of the road is 
misleading in that this behavior is also sustained by the fear of 
legal sanctions. A better example is the Australian and South 
Korean convention of walking on the left side of the sidewalk. 
If everyone expects everybody to act in this way, the comic 
sidewalk ballets that occur in cultures lacking a firm convention 
in this respect will not occur. Yet even this example is not per-
fect. In theory, conventions are sustained merely by the annoy-
ing consequences incurred by anyone who deviates from them. 
In practice, as shown by the sidewalk example, they may also 
be sustained by disapproving remarks by victims of unilateral 
deviations («Watch where you're going»). Even when not 
backed up by legal norms, conventions tend to be reinforced 
by social norms. There are exceptions, such as the Norwegian 
convention that we all parade in the streets on May 17th, the 
national holiday. If I don't show up, my absence will only have 
a marginal effect on the pleasure others derive from the occa-
sion. Moreover, since others have no way of knowing that I 
wasn't there, they will not express disapproval of my absence. 
Although my expectation that others will show up is often 
enough to make me show up too, the element of authority gen-
erated by the normative expectations of others towards me is 
lacking. 
On the other hand, there are constitutional conventions, that 
is, unwritten constitutional norms. In several countries, includ-
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ing Norway and Canada, there is an unwritten convention to 
the effect that the government must step down if it loses the 
support of parliament. In Canada, there is even a convention 
regulating what should be done if the government violates that 
convention: the Governor General who is normally (conven-
tionally in fact) lacking in discretionary powers would have to 
step in to dismiss the Government (Heard, 1991). I doubt 
whether anyone knows what would happen in a similar situa-
tion in Norway. To use a phrase coined by Paul Veyne (1976, p. 
279), any politicians who might be tempted to violate the con-
vention are probably deterred by a mix of «precise fear of dif-
fuse sanctions» and «diffuse fear of precise sanctions». Also, the 
normative authority of the democratic system may be such that 
the issue does not even arise in their minds. 
Other conventions do not have the same degree of intrinsic 
authority, partly because they do not have a democratic pedi-
gree and partly because they are constantly «open to challenge 
on the basis of fresh arguments about the precedents that 
allegedly support them» (Marshall, 2003, p. 39). An example is 
the convention that the British Prime Minister must always be a 
member of the House of Commons. Constitutional conventions 
of this weaker sort are sustained mainly by the fear of political 
sanctions, such as revolution or electoral losses. The sustaining 
mechanism is entirely different from that underlying coordina-
tion equilibria. Whereas the latter can be represented as nor-
mal-form games that model the costs of unilateral deviation, the 
stability of constitutional conventions must be represented by 
extensive-form games that model the risk of retaliation. 
4.5 Written rules: laws and constitutions 
Compliance with laws depends both on their authoritative 
character and on the expected punishment for non-compli-
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ance. (It may be worth mentioning that citizens are never 
rewarded for complying with the laws.) For those who believe 
that punishment is the only aspect that matters, there is no dif-
ference between a fine and a price. While this view may be 
approximately true of parking tickets and other minor offenses, 
it cannot claim general validity. It presupposes not only that 
people subject to the law have no respect for it, but also that 
they are shameless in the sense of being unaffected by what 
others think about them. Or perhaps the view simply presup-
poses that others don't care about what their fellow citizens do, 
as long as they pay the price for wrongdoing stipulated in the 
law. In either version, the view is self-evidently absurd. Almost 
everybody would prefer spending a month in hospital to 
spending a month in jail. 
The authority or majesty of the law depends on its impartial-
ity (equality before the law) and on its procedural pedigree. In 
principle at least, it applies to all and is adopted by a system 
(majority voting) that is approved by all. Up to a point, the 
majesty of the law and the fear of stigma induce people to com-
ply with laws they do not agree with, over and above the 
degree of compliance that may be induced by fear of legal sanc-
tions. Beyond that point, substantive objections can undermine 
compliance. Many people think that the ban on using marijua-
na is sufficiently unjustified to justify non-compliance. Lack of 
majesty, e.g. because of procedural irregularities, may also 
reduce compliance. My willingness to comply with a tax code 
that imposes a heavy burden on me might evaporate if I learn 
that it was adopted to favor special interests rather than the 
public interest. Draconian sentencing regulations («Three 
strikes and you're out») may also undermine the respect for the 
law, leaving nothing but deterrence in its place. As in the case 
of threats, the net effect on behavior may be indeterminate. 
Civil disobedience is a special case of non-compliance. 
Whereas most law violators try to keep their violations secret, 
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to avoid punishment, it is an important part of the ethics of civil 
disobedience that it should be public and that the non-compli-
ers should accept punishment. In this case, the aim of non-com-
pliance is to change the law rather than to get away with vio-
lating it. 
Whereas laws regulate the behavior of individuals, constitu-
tions regulate the behavior of the state and its institutions. At 
least, this is true of the Anglo-American tradition. In the 
Continental tradition, some constitutions enumerate individual 
duties as well as rights against the state. Also, in this tradition 
some constitutions protect the rights of individuals against 
other individuals. Here I focus on the (parts of) constitutions 
that regulate the behavior of state institutions. 
Some acts of non-compliance with the constitution are indu-
bitably so. In 1962 it was clear to all that de Gaulle was in non-
compliance with the 1958 constitution when he had the direct 
election of the President approved by referendum. (To be sure, 
his defenders, including the tame chairman of the Constitutional 
Council, wove a web of words to justify his action, but nobody 
was taken in.) The result of the non-compliance was that the 
constitution was changed, by a constitutional convention, to 
accommodate the practice. 
Often it is not obvious whether a given action constitutes 
non-compliance with the constitution. The US constitution does 
not mention the right to privacy, which was the ground for the 
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade that the state of Texas 
was in non-compliance with the constitution when it banned 
abortion. In such cases, which are very frequent, compliance or 
non-compliance simply means conformity or non-conformity 
with the Court's interpretation of the constitution, that is, with 
the reading preferred by at least five out of nine members of the 
Court. 
An action may comply with the letter of the law but not with 
its spirit. Hitler's rise to power did not rest on violations of the 
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constitution, but of a clever exploitation of its weaknesses. The 
breakdown of Weimar Germany occurred through the opera-
tion of two separate clauses in the constitution, which had not 
been considered in conjunction by the framers. By Article 48, 
the President could assume dictatorial powers, subject to an 
overrule by parliament which was supposed to prevent abuses. 
By Article 25, however, he could dissolve parliament and hence 
remove this check on his power. Each of the two clauses by 
itself might not confer a great deal of power on the President, 
but their combination did. This being said, the idea of «comply-
ing with the spirit of the constitution» is very nebulous. In the 
following, I restrict myself to determinants of compliance in the 
more literal sense. 
Compliance with «the constitution» can mean two things. 
First, framers might want their successors to comply with the 
very document they create. Second, they might want them to 
comply with the constitution that is in force at any given time, 
assuming that it derives from the original one by a series of 
changes each of which has taken place by the rules of the con-
stitution in force at the time of that change. If the framers are 
motivated by the first goal, they will write very stringent amend-
ment clauses into the constitution. That strategy may, however, 
induce non-compliance rather than compliance, for two distinct 
reasons. First, the successors might react to the very idea of 
being bound, because of something like a reactance mecha-
nism (Tocqueville, 1990, p. 181; Bryce, 1980, p. 56). Second, 
and more important, they will not comply with an unamend-
able constitution if it turns into a suicide pact, to use a phrase 
of Justice Robert Jackson. Farsighted framers, therefore, will 
aim at the second goal and make the constitution somewhat dif-
ficult, but not too difficult, to amend. 
Although ease of amendment makes compliance more like-
ly, it does not make it certain. Even if constitutional amend-
ments were as easy to pass as ordinary laws, there might still be 
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groups who, being unable to change the constitution, would 
rather overthrow it than abide by it. When this doesn't happen, 
why doesn't it? A common explanation of political stability is 
that the system is in an equilibrium where no actor or coalition 
can improve its (expected and discounted) material rewards by 
non-compliance. In my opinion, this explanation is worthless. 
In well-functioning democracies, the issue doesn't arise. Heads 
of state, chiefs of the armed forces and party leaders are not 
constantly recalculating whether to comply with the constitu-
tion. There is no equilibrium because the beliefs and prefer-
ences in terms of which it would be defined simply don't exist, 
that is, have no subjective reality. 
In ill-functioning democracies, where such calculations may 
be made, they are shrouded in radical uncertainty. Equilibrium 
explanations assume that the actors have well-defined beliefs 
(or subjective probabilities) about each other's behavior as well 
as other matters, such as their support in the population. They 
also assume that the actors have stable preferences with well-
defined trade-offs among different objectives. We know, how-
ever, from theories of bounded rationality and from behavioral 
economics that these assumptions are fictions. Standard 
assumptions about time discounting, too, are extremely fragile. 
Theories of coalition-formation are so numerous that none of 
them can be trusted. In any case, treating collective actors as if 
they were individuals raises problems of aggregation that, as 
we know, can be insurmountable. 
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5. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO TRUST IN EPISTEMIC 
AUTHORITY? 
"There must be a minimal degree of trust in communication for 
language and action to be more than stabs in the dark" 
Sissela Bok, Lying 
"Mais qu'y a-t-il donc de sipérilleux dans le fait que les gens 
parlent, et leurs discours indéfiniment prolifèrent?" 
Michel Foucault, L'ordre du discours 
"I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human 
authority, and then I found some things confirmed or disconfirmed 
by my own experience" 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty 
Consider this case. At high-school in Italy many years ago I 
heard my teacher of Latin say: "Cicero's prose is full of synec-
doches"1. I had a vague idea of what a synecdoche was, and 
had ignored until then that one could characterize Cicero's writ-
1 This example is a reformulation of a Francois Recanati's example in his 
paper: "Can We Believe What We Do Not Understand?" Mind and Language, 
1997, that I have discussed at length in another paper: "Croire sans compren-
dre", Cahiers de Philosophie de l'Universite de Caen, 2000. The problem of 
deferential beliefs was originally raised by Dan Sperber in a series of papers: 
"Apparent Irrational Beliefs", "Intuitive and Reflexive Beliefs" Mind and 
Language, 1997. 
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ing in this way. Nevertheless, I relied on my teacher's intellectu-
al authority to acquire the belief that Cicero's prose is full of 
synecdoches, and today have a more precise idea of what my 
teacher was talking about. Was I justified in any sense in uncriti-
cally accepting that pronouncement by deferring to my teacher's 
authority? Let us have a closer look at the example. Many things 
were going on in this apparently trivial case of belief acquisition. 
I was sitting in a classroom, aware of being in a social institution 
- school - dedicated to knowledge transmission, and I had been 
properly instructed to believe what people say in school. While 
listening to the teacher, I was simultaneously learning a fact, that 
Cicero's prose was full of synecdoches, and acquiring a linguistic 
concept, that is, the word "synecdoche" (or, if not acquiring it, at 
least acquiring a rule about its appropriate use, or, better, enrich-
ing its meaning). I was learning a fact and learning a language 
meaning at the same time. My reliance on Italian educational 
institutions was strong enough to accept this on pure deferential 
bases. Or consider another example. I was born in Milan on 
February 8, 1967. I believe this is true because the office of Vital 
Records in the Milan Municipal Building registered a few days 
after that date the testimony of my father or my mother that I was 
indeed born on the 8th of February in a hospital in Milan, and 
delivered a birth certificate with this date on it. This fact concerns 
me, and of course I was present, but I can access it only through 
this complex, institution-mediated form of indirect testimony. 
Or else: I know that smoking causes cancer, I've been told 
this and it was enough relevant information to make me quit 
cigarettes 10 years ago. I don't have the slightest idea of the 
physiological process that a smoker's body undergoes from 
inhaling smoke to developing a cellular process that ends in 
cancer. Nevertheless, the partial character of my understanding 
of what it really means that smoke causes cancer doesn't stop 
me from declaring it in conversations and governing my behav-
ior according to this belief. 
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Our cognitive life is pervaded with partially understood, 
poorly justified, beliefs. The greater part of our knowledge is 
acquired from other's people spoken or written words. The 
floating of other people's words in our minds is the price we 
pay for thinking. Traditional epistemology warns us of the risks 
of uncritically relying on other people's authority in acquiring 
new beliefs. One could view the overall project of classical 
epistemology - from Plato to the contemporary rationalist per-
spectives on knowledge - as a normative enterprise aiming at 
protecting us from credulity and ill-founded opinions. Various 
criteria, rules and principles on how to conduct our mind have 
been put forward as a guarantee to preserve the autonomy and 
freedom of thought necessary for the acquisition of knowledge. 
Just as an example, a great part of Locke's Essay concerning 
Human Understanding is an attempt to establish principles for 
the regulation of opinions, stated in terms of obligations on 
one's own "epistemic conduct", that strengthen our intellectual 
autonomy. According to Locke, four major sources of false 
opinions threaten our mind: 
I. Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evi-
dent, but doubtful and false, taken up for principles 
II. Received hypotheses 
III. Predominant passions or inclinations 
IV. Authority 
(Locke, Essay, Book 4, XX, 7) 
Reliance on other people's authority is thus viewed as a 
major threat to the cognitive autonomy that distinguishes us as 
rational thinkers. Exposure to received beliefs increases our risk 
of being "infected by falsity", the worst danger, against which 
the overall epistemological enterprise was built. 
Yet, the massive trust of others that permeates our cognitive 
life calls for an epistemic treatment, and has become a central 
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issue in contemporary debates in philosophy of knowledge and 
social epistemology. A number of approaches have been put 
forward in order to account for the epistemic reliability of the 
"division of cognitive labour" so typical in contemporary, infor-
mation-dense societies. 
Most analyses that have been recently proposed in social 
epistemology concentrate on the evidential grounds for trusting 
in other people's authority: trusting someone's authority on a 
given matter means assessing her trustworthiness on that mat-
ter. Trustworthiness depends on both competence and benev-
olence. In order to assess other people's trustworthiness one 
needs evidential criteria of their competence and their benevo-
lence. For example, a scientist who trusts in the authority of a 
colleague on a certain experimental data grounds her judgment 
in her knowledge of her colleague's track record in that scien-
tific domain (such as the number of publications in the relevant 
reviews of the domain, or the number of patents, etc.) plus the 
beliefs that she is self-interested in being truthful for the sake of 
their future collaborative work2. Yet, this "reductionist" analysis, 
which I will detail later, misses some central intuitions about the 
presumptive character of our trust in others and its motivation-
al dimension. Trust in testimony has a spontaneous dimension 
that doesn't seem to be based on a rational assessment of other 
people's truthfulness. Also, an evidential analysis of epistemic 
authority doesn't account for cases of partial understanding, as 
in the examples above, in which the overt asymmetry between 
the epistemic position of the authoritative source and the inter-
locutors is such that it cannot be treated by appealing to evi-
dential criteria only. Here, my aim is to explore some treatments 
2 Another possible rational motivation to be trustworthy in the case of sci-
ence is the high cost of cheating in the scientific community and the fear of 
risking permanent exclusion (see M. Blais [1987]). 
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of the more familiar notion of trust in the social sciences, moral 
and political philosophy in order to understand to what extent 
the notion of epistemic trust may be illuminated by these analy-
ses. I will contrast evidential vs. motivational analyses in the 
social sciences and claim that motivational analyses can find 
their places in an epistemology of trust. Motivational analyses 
have often been described as non-cognitive. Take, for instance 
Lawrence Becker's distinction between cognitive vs. non cog-
nitive treatments on trust: "Trust is 'cognitive' if it is fundamen-
tally a matter of our beliefs or expectations about others' trust-
worthiness; it is non-cognitive if it is fundamentally a matter of 
our having trustful attitudes, affects, emotions, or motivational 
structures [...] To say that we trust others in a non-cognitive way 
is to say that we are disposed to be trustful of them independ-
ently of our beliefs or expectations about their trustworthiness" 
[Becker 1996, 44, 60]3. I will oppose this distinction by arguing 
that in the case of epistemic trust a motivational analysis of trust 
can be cognitive, that is, it can shed some light on our mental 
processes of acquisition of beliefs and knowledge. In particular, 
I will try to ground the cognitive bases of our epistemic trust in 
our communicative practices. My purpose here is to explore a 
broader notion of epistemic trust, one that could account for 
what is common in cases as different as the blind trust of the 
patient in her doctor, the trust needed in collaborative intellec-
tual work and the everyday trust needed to sustain our ordinary 
conversations. 
Intellectual trust is a central question of contemporary epis-
temological concerns. Yet, most of the debate surrounding this 
3 It is interesting to notice that Becker liquidates much of the recent debate 
around the epistemic role of motivational trust by introducing credulity, as the 
disposition to believe what another person says and to banish skeptical 
thoughts, and reliance, as a disposition to depend upon other people in some 
respects (pp. 45-46), both of them that lie outside the reach of a rational moti-
vation to accept other people's intellectual authority. 
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notion fails to provide a proper analysis of the notion and only 
superficially connects it to the parallel social, political and 
moral treatments of trust. The result is a lack of explanatory 
power of this notion in epistemology. One often has the feeling 
that talking about trust in epistemology is just a way of evoking 
the need to varnish our study of knowledge with some moral 
and social considerations4. My belief is that intellectual trust 
deserves more attention, and its intricate relation with the 
notion of trust in use in the social sciences needs to be better 
disentangled. 
On the other hand, sociological and moral theories of trust in 
authority fail to make the distinction between epistemic vs. 
political authority and present themselves as simultaneously 
accounting for the two concepts. 
There are some obvious parallels between the notion of epis-
temic trust and that of social and political trust. Trust in author-
ity poses a similar puzzle in both cases. How can someone - an 
institution or an individual - legitimately impose her/its will on 
other people and have a right to rule over their conduct? How 
is this compatible with freedom and autonomy? And why 
should we trust an authority to impose upon us a duty to obey 
for our own good? 
Much ink has been spilled on this apparent paradoxical relation 
between trust in authority and freedom. And of course an equiv-
alent puzzle can be reformulated in the case of intellectual trust: 
how can it ever be rational to surrender our reason and accept 
what another person says on the basis that she is saying this? What 
does it mean to grant intellectual authority to other people? 
4 Take for example Hardwig's analysis in his paper: "The Role of Trust in 
Knowledge". There are exceptions to this criticism, as for example R. Foley's 
book Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others (Cambridge UP, 2001) in which 
a detailed analysis of trust in the authority of others is provided in ch.4. 
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The very notion of 'authority' in philosophy is notoriously 
ambiguous between the authority that someone exercises on 
other people's beliefs and the authority that someone exercises 
on other people's actions5. As Friedman has rightly pointed out: 
"A person may be said to have authority in two distinct senses: for 
one, he may be said to be 'in authority', meaning that he occupies 
some office, position or status which entitles him to make deci-
sions about how other people should behave. But, secondly, a 
person may be said to be 'an authority', meaning that his views or 
utterances are entitled to be believed" [Friedman, 1990, p. 57]. 
In both cases, the appeal to authority calls for an explanation or 
a normative justification of the legitimacy of the authoritative source, 
a legitimacy that must be acknowledged by those who submit to it. 
Still, I think that trust in epistemic authority and in political authori-
ty are two distinct phenomena that deserve a separate treatment. 
As I said above, most accounts of epistemic trust ground its 
legitimacy in the evidential bases we have to assess other peo-
ple's trustworthiness. Motivational accounts in the case of 
knowledge seem desperately unable to avoid the risk of 
credulity and irrationality that accompanies prima facie any a 
priori trust in others as a source of knowledge. 
In what follows, I will briefly sketch evidential vs. motiva-
tional approaches to trust as they are discussed in the social sci-
ences and then try to use this distinction to gain a better under-
standing of epistemic trust. 
Evidential accounts of trust 
A common view of trust in contemporary social science 
reduces it to a set of rational expectations about the likely 
5 For an analysis of this ambiguity, cf. R. B. Friedman (1990) "On the 
Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy" in J. Raz (ed.) Authority, New 
York University Press. 
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behaviour of others in a future relationship of cooperation with 
us. Take the definition that Diego Gambetta gives in his influ-
ential anthology on trust: "Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a 
particular level of the subjective probability with which an 
agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will per-
form a particular action, both before he can monitor such action 
(or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) 
and in a context in which it affects his own action. When we 
say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we im-
plicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action 
that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough 
for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with 
him. Correspondingly, when we say that someone is untrust-
worthy, we imply that that probability is low enough for us to 
refrain from doing so" [Gambetta, 1988, p. 218]. Thus trust is a 
cognitive notion, a set of beliefs or expectations about the com-
mitment of the trusted in behaving in a determinate way in a 
context that is relevant to us. Following the literature, I call 
these analyses reductive and evidential. They are reductive 
accounts because they don't set trust as a primitive notion, but 
reduce it to more fundamental notions such as beliefs and 
expectations. They are evidential because they make trust 
depend on the probabilities we assign to our expectations 
towards other people's actions towards us. I may trust or dis-
trust on the basis of some evidence that I have about someone 
else's future behaviour. As it has been stressed by contempo-
rary literature on trust in social science, trust must be distin-
guished from pure reliance. Trust is an interesting notion in 
social sciences only insofar as it explains the implicit commit-
ment that it imposes on a relationship. If it were just a matter of 
assessing probabilities of another person's behaviour without 
taking the effect of her behaviour on our own actions into 
account, it would not be so different from general inductive 
reasoning. I trust in a certain level of stability of the social world 
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around me. I trust the person that I cross when walking on the 
street not to assault me. This is the minimal level of trust that a 
society should be able to arrange in order to perpetuate. I need 
to rely on some regularities of the social world in order to act. 
But the interest in the notion of trust in the social sciences is that 
it takes into account not only social regularities but also com-
mitments. 
A recent explanation of trust that clearly takes into account 
expectations about other people's commitment - and not sim-
ply regularity - is found in Russell Hardin's analysis of trust as a 
encapsulated interest, that is, trust as belief that it is in the inter-
est of the trusted to attend to the truster's interests in the rele-
vant matter [cf. Hardin 2002]. 
Thus, evidential accounts of social trust try to reduce it to jus-
tified expectations about the objective probability of other peo-
ple's commitments. 
The key aspect of evidential accounts that I would like to 
contrast with motivational accounts is that trust is viewed as a 
cognitive attitude, like knowledge or belief, for which we can 
find a rational justification in terms of the capacity we have to 
read and assess the commitments of others. 
What about evidential accounts of intellectual trust? An evi-
dential theory of intellectual trust assigns probabilities to our 
expectations about our interlocutors' truthfulness on a particu-
lar subject matter. And of course truthfulness is a matter of com-
petence as well as of benevolence. But competence and benev-
olence are very different things. Competence seems to be a 
more objective trait than benevolence: I can trust you on your 
willingness to help me in translating Herodotus even if I don't 
defer to your competence in Ancient Greek. Competence does-
n't depend on your commitment to be trustworthy to me. 
Most evidential accounts of intellectual trust explore the 
dimension of competence more than that of benevolence. The 
epistemological literature on assessing expertise focuses on the 
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cognitive strategies that we can adopt in order to assess the reli-
ability of doctors, lawyers, witnesses, journalists, etc. Alvin 
Goldman argues that there exist "truth-revealing situations"6 in 
which a novice can test the competence of the expert even if 
she doesn't know how the expert has come to collect her evi-
dence. For example, the weather today is a truth-revealing situ-
ation of the expertise of the weather forecast that I read yester-
day in the New York Times. If the NYT weather forecast were 
systematically poorer in predicting the weather than the Yahoo 
weather forecast, I would have evidence to trust the latter more 
than the former, even if I don't have the slightest idea about 
how a weather forecast is produced. That is the commonsense 
practice that we use to calibrate our informants' expertise, even 
if we are novices in their domain of expertise. If my doctor's 
therapy against my stomachache is inefficacious, I am in a truth-
revealing situation to assess her competence. Of course, not 
every domain of expertise admits of truth-revealing situations: 
large areas of the formal sciences such as mathematics or 
physics don't. In these cases, there exist alternative strategies 
that allow us to assess the reliability of the overall social process 
that sustains laymen's epistemic dependence on experts. Such 
strategies have been investigated by various authors, for exam-
ple Philip Kitcher, who defines the overall project of describing 
the strategies of granting expertise to others as the study of the 
organisation of cognitive labour. As he points out: "Once we 
have recognized that individuals form beliefs by relying on 
information supplied by others, there are serious issues about 
the conditions that should be met if the community is to form a 
consensus on a particular issue - questions about the division 
of opinion and of cognitive effort within the community and 
6 Cf. A. Goldman "Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law 
and Society," The Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 113-131. 
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issues about the proper attribution of authority" [Kitcher, 1994, 
114]. For example, I can have methods to track your past 
records within a particular domain and grant you authority on 
the basis of your "earned reputation" in this domain7. Or I can 
grant you authority due to your better epistemic position: I call 
my sister in Milan and she tells me that it is raining there and I 
believe her because I am able to assess her better epistemic 
position about the weather in Milan. These accounts under-
score the rational bases of our trust in other people's epistemic 
authority and appeal to a conceptual framework similar to that 
of the evidential accounts of trust in the social sciences by using 
the language of rational decision theory or microeconomics8. 
Evidential accounts of trust in authority illuminate the rea-
sons why we reliably appeal to experts in specialized domains. 
But, as I said, trust in epistemic authority seems to involve more 
than just the assessment of expertise. We don't always have the 
choice to trust or distrust. The examples that I give at the begin-
ning of this paper show that it is not always a matter of decid-
ing to defer to other people's authority: it just happens that the 
very nature of some of our beliefs is deferential, and that's not 
a phenomenon that seems to be captured by these accounts. 
Motivational accounts of trust 
Many authors in the social sciences and moral philosophy 
claim that evidential accounts fail to provide an appropriate pic-
ture of trust, by appealing only to a set of rational expectations 
about other people's motivations to commit to cooperation. 
7 Kitcher [1992] defines this kind of authority: "earned authority". 
8 Cf. for an example of use of the economics framework A. Goldman and 
M. Shaked [1991] and P. Kitcher [1993] ch.8. 
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Our commitment to trust is not only cognitive, that is, based on 
the degree of our beliefs about the future actions of the trusted. 
Trust also involves a motivational, non-representational dimen-
sion that may depend on our deep moral, emotional or cultur-
al pre-commitments. Thus, in the paper that I have mentioned 
above, Becker speaks of our trust as non-cognitive if it is a dis-
position to be trustful towards persons "independently of our 
beliefs or expectations about their trustworthiness" [p. 50]. In a 
book entitled Authority Richard Sennett defines trust in author-
ity as an emotional commitment. And in a seminal paper, 
Annette Baier defines trust as the accepted vulnerability to 
another's possible but unexpected ill will toward oneself, and 
explores the varieties of moral, emotional and cultural grounds 
on which we accept this vulnerability. Along the same lines, 
Otto Lagerspetz says: "trust is not the fact that one, after calcu-
lating the odds, feels no risk: It is feeling no risk without calcu-
lating the odds" [1998] These accounts try to capture the idea 
that in many circumstances our trust in others cannot be con-
verted into subjective estimates of risk, because the margins of 
ignorance or uncertainty are too broad for such estimates to be 
possible. Also, as Baier points out, "trust can come with no 
beginnings, with gradual as well as sudden beginnings and 
with various degrees of self-consciousness, voluntariness and 
expressness" [Baier, 1986, p. 240]. That is, the child who trusts 
her mother, the patient who trusts her doctor, the novice scien-
tist who trusts the truth of the main results in her field without 
having gone through the details of the proofs, have different 
degrees of control and thus of choice on their trustful attitude. 
As the anthropologist Maurice Bloch says in his explanation of 
the role of deference in rituals: "We are permanently floating in 
a soup of deference" Most of the time we are not aware of the 
reason we have to trust. We simply do so9. 
9 Bloch explains rituals as a collective moment of awareness of the defer-
ence to the tradition. Cf. M. Bloch (2004): "Rituals and Deference", in H. 
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The moral philosophical literature on motivational trust tries 
to establish to what extent such trustful attitudes are morally 
justified. Baier's conclusion is that they are insofar as there are 
minimal reasons to think that the trusted who is exerting her 
authority on us cares about the goods we want her to care 
about. For example, it is justified to trust our partner in the treat-
ment of our child even if we don't approve of or understand her 
actions, if we have reasons to think that she cares for the child. 
A more empirical literature in social psychology and eco-
nomics tries to establish the effects of motivational trust on sta-
bilizing cooperation and reliability in negotiations and in every-
day life. 
What about the epistemic implications of motivational 
accounts? Do they illuminate in any sense our trust in epistemic 
authority? At a first glance, motivational accounts seem better 
equipped to explain a broader spectrum of cases than eviden-
tial accounts do. A motivational dimension seems to be 
involved in the asymmetrical deferential relations of trust in 
epistemic authority that I've tried to suggest in my previous 
examples. Indeed, trust in epistemic authority doesn't seem to 
be a matter of choice in the most straightforward examples: The 
child who trusts her mother when she tells her that she needs 
to breathe air to survive - even if she cannot see air and cannot 
figure out what is the role of oxygen in our survival - doesn't 
have the choice to be skeptical, as well as the patient who is 
told by her doctor that she has contracted a potentially lethal 
disease. Also, we find ourselves committed to trust the intellec-
tual authority of other people just because we are part of the 
same linguistic and epistemic community, because we share 
the same institutions and we acknowledge a "division of cogni-
Whitehouse and J. Laidlaw (eds.) Rituals and Memory: Towards a 
Comparative Anthropology of Religion, Altamira Press, London. 
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tive labour" in our community. But if we accept the principle 
that a certain amount of "default" trust - or spontaneous trust -
is needed to sustain our cognitive life in a social environment, 
how do we avoid the risk of credulity that such a trustful dis-
position seems to imply? And if the motivational trust that sus-
tains our social relations may be based on moral, cultural or 
emotional pre-commitments, what about the pre-commitments 
underlying the motivational trust that sustains our cognitive 
relations? Moral commitments to trust in other people's intellec-
tual authority typically ground the adhesion to the most irra-
tional beliefs. Religious beliefs or allegiance to a guru's 
thoughts are often justified in terms of moral or emotional com-
mitments. But these are exactly the kinds of beliefs that an epis-
temological account of trust should try to exclude in order to 
avoid the risk of gullibility run by a default trustful attitude 
towards the words of others. 
Reidian accounts of epistemic trust 
Another way to argue for the role of motivational trust in 
knowledge acquisition is to see it as an innate disposition to 
accept what other people tell us. And indeed many authors 
have argued that a natural tendency to trust others is the only 
way to justify testimonial knowledge. The locus classicus of this 
position is Thomas Reid's defense of trust in testimony: We are 
justified in believing what other people say because we, as 
humans have a natural disposition to speak the truth and a nat-
ural disposition to accept as true what other people tell us. Reid 
calls these two principles, "that tally with each other"10, the 
Principle of Veracity and the Principle of Credulity. But the 
10 Cf. Reid [1764] Inquiry into the Human Mind, § 24. 
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relationship between these two principles, which Reid consid-
ers self-evident, is far from being clear. The principle of veraci-
ty is not well correlated to truth: It just affirms that people are 
disposed to say what they believe to be true, which does not 
mean that they say what it is actually true11. Thus, an appeal to 
a natural trustful disposition doesn't suffice to justify our epis-
temic trust and protect it from credulity. 
Reid affirms that if we deny any legitimacy, or at least, natu-
ralness to our trust in others, the result would be skepticism. We 
believe "by instinct" what our parents and teachers say long 
before we acquire the capacity to critically judge their compe-
tence. But that is just a way of acknowledging the pervasive-
ness of the lore of inheritance and upbringing in shaping one 
owns' concepts and beliefs without explaining it. It is a fact that 
we are influenced by others, not only in infancy but in the 
acquisition of most of our beliefs. But acknowledging this fact 
is not a sufficient explanation of why we are justified in com-
plying with our trustful tendencies. 
Modern defences of a Reidian epistemology12 appeal to the 
existence of natural language as the material proof that the two 
principles (credulity and veracity) indeed tally with each other: 
most statements in any public language are testimonial and 
most statements are true; if they were not, it is difficult to imag-
ine how a public language could have ever stabilized. [cf. 
Coady, 1992]. The very possibility of a common language pre-
supposes a generally truthful use of speech. 
Tyler Burge relies on the "purely preservative character" of 
linguistic communication to argue that we have an a priori jus-
11 See on this point K. Leherer: "Testimony, Justification and Coherence", 
in Matilal & Chakrabarti (eds.) pp. 51-67. 
12 For an overview of contemporary Reidian epistemology, see R. Foley 
[2001]. 
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tification for relying on what we understand others to be saying. 
Language, as memory, is a medium of content preservation13. 
I have discussed these positions elsewhere14. Here let me just 
mention that, although these positions give us some hints of the 
'passive', non-intentional trust that characterizes our role as 
cognizers in a social community, their appeal to some structur-
al features of language is less convincing in solving the paradox 
of epistemic trust, that is, how it is compatible with intellectual 
autonomy. That is, what concerns us here is: "how intellectual 
autonomy is possible, given what we know about the power of 
one's inheritance and surroundings to shape one's concepts, 
opinions and even the way one reasons?" [Foley, 2001: 128] 
Epistemic trust out of self-trust 
A different line of defense of the legitimacy of trust in others 
has been recently pursued by Richard Foley in his book on 
Intellectual Trust in Oneself and in Others [Cambridge, 2001], 
Foley derives it from the justification we have to trust ourselves. 
We grant a default authority in our intellectual faculties to pro-
vide us with reliable information about the world. This is our 
only way out of skepticism. But if we have this basic trust in our 
intellectual faculties, why should we withhold it from others? 
We acknowledge the influence that others had in shaping our 
thoughts and opinions in the past. If acknowledging this fact 
doesn't prevent us from granting authority to ourselves, it 
should not prevent us from granting authority to others, given 
13 Cf. T. Burge: "Content Preservation", Philosophical Review, 102, pp. 457-
487. 
14 Cf. G. Origgi [2004] "Is Trust an Epistemological Notion?", Episteme, vol. 
1, n. 1, pp. 1-12. 
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that our opinions wouldn't be reliable today if theirs were not 
in the past. And even in cases of the interaction of people from 
different cultures whose influence upon our thinking is poor or 
nonexistent, we can rely on the general fact that our cognitive 
mechanisms are largely similar to extend our self-trust to them 
[cf. Foley 2004, ch. 4]. This strategy of simulation of other minds 
leads Foley to a sort of "modest epistemic universalism" accord-
ing to which "It is trust in myself that creates for me a pre-
sumption in favor of other people's opinions, eve if I know lit-
tle about them"15 [cf. ibidem p. 108]. 
I find Foley's position attractive as it preserves intellectual 
autonomy and ends in justifying just the minimal trust necessary 
to sustain our epistemic life, and avoiding the "deferential 
incontinence" and thus gullibility that is imputed to Reidian 
solutions. But Foley's analysis lacks the motivational dimension 
that I think an explanation of epistemic trust should include in 
order to account for very heterogeneous cases such as deliber-
ate deference to an intellectual authority, passive trust in the 
authority of our cultural heritage and default trust that we grant 
to others in spontaneous conversation. What his account miss-
es is the idea that in many contexts trusting others doesn't seem 
to be depend on what we know or discover about them, as for 
instance that they are similar to us. Rather, trusting others is a 
matter of commitment to their trustworthiness in the social as 
well as in the epistemic cases. One could go further, and sug-
gest that we owe this kind of commitment even to self-trust, 
that is, that the authority on my own mental states does not 
depend on something that I discover about myself. Self-trust is 
the product of a responsible and deliberative commitment 
about the consequences of assuming some beliefs as my 
15 As Foley says, a stronger epistemic universalism would imply that other 
people's opinions are necessarily prima facie credible. Cf. ibidem, p. 107. 
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beliefs. Richard Moran defends this line in his recent book, 
Authority and Estrangement16. According to Moran, this act of 
commitment is constitutive of my self-knowledge. I would not 
expand further, but I think it shows how problematic is to 
ground our trust in authority in self-trust. How can we capture 
the motivational dimension of epistemic trust we need to have 
a full-fledged notion of trust in authority? As we have seen, we 
cannot follow moral/social accounts of trust and ground a moti-
vational account in emotional or moral pre-commitments, 
because this would unavoidably lead to irrationality. Still, 
grounding it in some innate dispositions or deriving it from self-
trust misses the whole point of understanding the nature of our 
commitment to trust in other people's authority. 
In the last section, I will explore a different strategy, and con-
sider one on the most straightforward contexts in which com-
mitment, trust and knowledge bloom together, that is, human 
communication. 
Conversation, trust and communication 
One fundamental fact about the social transmission of 
knowledge that is surprisingly under-exploited in the episte-
mological literature on intellectual authority is that every social 
contagion of beliefs goes through a process of communication 
that ranges from street-level conversation to more institutional-
ized settings of information exchange. Our almost permanent 
immersion in talks and direct or indirect conversations is the 
major source of cognitive vulnerability to other people beliefs 
and reports, even when the exchange is not particularly 
16 Cf. R. Moran [2001] Authority and Estrangement, Princeton University 
Press, especially ch. 2. 
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focused on knowledge acquisition17. Communication is a vol-
untary act. Each time we speak we are intentionally seeking the 
attention of our interlocutors and thus presenting what we have 
to say as potentially relevant for them. Each time we listen, we 
intentionally engage in an interpretation of what has been said, 
and expand cognitive effort in order to make sense of what our 
interlocutor had in mind. In this last section of my paper, I will 
argue that it is the intentional, voluntary character of human 
communication that guarantees our intellectual autonomy even 
in those cases in which our epistemic position obliges us to 
defer to other people's authority. And the making and breaking 
of epistemic trust is related in many ways to our conversational 
practices. 
There are many different styles of discourse that imply dif-
ferent degrees of reciprocal trust. Of course, the set of norms 
and assumptions that we tacitly accept when engaging in intel-
lectual conversation18 are not the same we endorse in a party 
conversation where the common aim we tacitly share with our 
interlocutors is entertaining and social contact. Still, a basic 
reciprocal commitment, I will claim, has to take place in any 
genuine case of communication. And the cognitive dimension 
of this basic commitment has interesting consequences for our 
reciprocal trust. 
Intentional analyses of communication have been a major 
contribution to the philosophy of language and pragmatics in 
17 On the fortuitous character of lot of our knowledge, cf. R. Hardin: "If it 
Rained Knowledge", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 33, pp. 3-24; and 
[2004] "Why Know?' manuscript. Cf. also Jennifer Lackey: "Knowledge is not 
necessarily transmitted via testimony, but testimony can itself generate knowl-
edge" [Jennifer Lackey (1999) "Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission", 
The Philosophical Quarterly, 199, p. 490, vol. 49 n. 197]. 
18 For an analysis of the mutually accepted norms that rule intellectual con-
versations, see P. Pettit and M Smith [1996] "Freedom in Belief and Desire", 
The Journal of Philosophy, 93, 9, pp. 429-449. 
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the last 40 years. We owe to Paul Grice19 the modern pragmatic 
analysis of linguistic interpretation as the reconstruction of the 
speaker's intentions. Simply decoding the linguistic meaning of 
the words conveyed in an act of communication is not enough 
to make sense of what the speaker wanted to tell us. Successful 
communication involves cooperation among interlocutors, 
even when the ultimate aim of one of the parties is to deceive 
the other: without at least a common aim of mutual under-
standing, communication would not be possible. Thus commu-
nication is a much richer and constructive activity than simply 
decoding a linguistic signal. According to Grice, we infer what 
the speaker says on the tacit assumption that she is conforming 
to the same set of rules and maxims that guide our cooperative 
effort to understand each other. Among these maxims, two of 
them are worth considering for the present purposes: one is a 
maxim of quality of the information conveyed: "Do not say 
what you believe to be false" that Grice considers as most 
important. This doesn't mean that the participants in a conver-
sation are actually truthful. But they act as if they were telling 
the truth, that is, they conform to the maxim, otherwise the min-
imal common aim of understanding each other would not be 
realized. So they need to at least pretend to be cooperative. On 
the hearer's side, the presumption that the speaker is conform-
ing to the maxim doesn't imply that the hearer comes automat-
ically to believe what the speaker says. She interprets the 
speaker on the presumption that the speaker is conforming to 
the maxims, and that leads her to infer what she meant, even if, 
later, she may be led to revise her presumption on the basis of 
what she already knows or what she has come to believe in the 
course of the conversation. 
The other maxim that I would like to consider is that of rele-
vance. Contemporary pragmatic theories have developed a 
19 Cf. P. Grice [1957] Meaning, . . . 
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notion of relevance as the key notion that guides our interpre-
tations. For example Sperber and Wilson's pragmatic approach, 
known as Relevance Theory, says that each act of communica-
tion communicates a presumption of its own relevance. A rele-
vant piece of information, in a given context, is one that opti-
mizes the balance between the cognitive effort I have to invest 
to process it and the benefits I gain by entertaining it in my 
mind. A potential communicator presents herself as having 
something to say that is relevant for us, otherwise we would not 
even engage in conversation. Communication is a very special 
case of behavior. It is always intentional and to be successful it 
needs to be recognized as intentional. I don't automatically give 
attention to every cognitive stimulus that is potentially relevant 
for me, but I cannot refrain from allocating at least a minimal 
attention to an overt act of communication that is addressed to 
me, because the very fact that it is addressed to me is a cue that 
it worth attention. The presumption of relevance that accompa-
nies every act of intentional communication is what grounds 
our spontaneous trust in others. I trust a communicator who 
intentionally asks for my attention to convey something that is 
relevant for me, and I adopt a stance of trust that will guide me 
to a relevant interpretation of what she has said (that is, an 
interpretation that satisfies my expectations given what she says 
and what she may assume we are sharing as common ground 
contextual information). In this rich and constructive process of 
building new representations and hypotheses on the presump-
tion that they will be relevant to me, the speaker and the hear-
er are both responsible for the set of thoughts they generate in 
conversation, that is, what Sperber and Wilson call their "mutu-
al cognitive environment". But the hearer doesn't automatically 
accept as true the whole set of common ground thoughts that 
have been activated in the conversation. She may decide to 
entertain them in her mind for the sake of conversation, and 
trust the speaker that this is relevant information for her. Our 
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mutual cognitive environments, that is, the set of hypotheses 
and representations that we activate in our mind when we com-
municate in order to understand each other, do not overlap 
with the set of what we actually believe. In conversation, our 
interior landscape enriches itself with new representations that 
have been created on the presumption of their relevance for us, 
a presumption we are justified in having because we have been 
intentionally addressed by our interlocutor. We trust our inter-
locutor's willingness to share a mutually relevant cognitive 
environment, that is, to build a common ground that maximizes 
understanding and favors the emergence of new, relevant 
thoughts. But our previous knowledge and a more fine-grained 
check of the content communicated can lead us to reject much 
of what has been said. Trusting in relevance of what other peo-
ple say is the cognitive vulnerability that we accept in order to 
activate in our mind new thoughts and hypotheses that are 
shared with our interlocutors. There is never an automatic 
transfer of beliefs from one person's head to another's. The 
"floating of other men's opinions in our brains"20 is mediated by 
a process of interpretation that makes us activate a number of 
hypotheses on the presumption, guided by the hearer, that they 
will be relevant for us. These online thoughts that serve the 
purposes of conversation are not accepted by default as new 
beliefs. They are worth considering, given the trust we have in 
our interlocutors. They may even be worth repeating without 
further checking because of their relevant effects in certain 
conversational contexts. But they can be easily dismissed if 
their probability is too low given what we know about the 
world or what we have come to know about the interlocutor. 
We trust our interlocutors to be relevant enough to be worth 
20 Cf. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. John W. 
Yolton, London 1961, 1, p. 58. 
110 
our attention. Our trust is both fundamental and fragile: it is 
fundamental because I need to trust in other people's willing-
ness to be relevant for me in order to make sense of what they 
are saying. It is fragile because a further check can lead me to 
abandon most of the hypotheses I generated in conversation 
and withdraw credibility from my interlocutor. 
Our mental life is populated by a bric-à-brac of drafty, 
sketchy semi-propositional representations that we need in 
order to sustain our interpretations of the thousands of dis-
courses to which we are permanently exposed. We accept 
some of them as beliefs, we use others in our inferences and we 
throw a lot of them out as pure noise. This doesn't make us 
gullible beings: we trust others to cooperate in generating rele-
vant sets of representations, and we share with them the 
responsibility for these representations. Of course, our epis-
temic strategies vary in the course of our life. The trust of a child 
in the relevance of what her parents say may lead her to auto-
matically believe in the content of what is said, that is, under-
standing and believing may be simultaneous processes in early 
childhood21. As we grow up, we develop strategies of checking 
and filtering information. 
A presumption of trust in other people's willingness to give 
us relevant information is thus the minimal default trust we are 
justified in having towards testimony. This stance of trust leads 
often enough to an epistemic improvement of our cognitive 
life22. 
21 Interesting recent results in developmental psychology show that even 
young children are not gullible and have strategies for filtering information. 
See F. Clément, P. Harris, M. Koening (2004) "The Ontogenesis of Trust", 
Mind&Language, vol. 19, 4, pp. 360-379. 
22 D. Sperber and D. Wilson have explained the details of the correlation 
between relevance and truth in D. Sperber, D. Wilson (2002): "Truthfulness 
and Relevance" Mind, 
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But our efforts at interpretation are not always rewarded. 
Trust in relevance guides our process of interpretation and may 
lead us to invest supplementary effort in trying to make sense 
of what our interlocutor is talking about. It is on the basis of our 
default trust that we often invest too many resources, with only 
the aim of making sense what the other person is talking about. 
Sometimes my supplementary efforts are rewarded, sometimes 
they end up in a too generous interpretation of what I was told. 
The overconfidence people sometimes have in the relevance of 
esoteric discourse depends on the direct proportionality 
between the effort people invest in interpreting others and the 
trust they have of receiving relevant information. Trust in rele-
vance may act as a bias that leads us to over-interpret or exces-
sively rationalize what others say. 
In a beautiful novel by Jerzy Kosinsky, Being There, adapted 
as the perhaps better known film with Peter Sellers, Chance 
Gardiner is a mentally impaired gardener who becomes an heir 
to the throne of a Wall Street tycoon, a presidential policy 
adviser and a media icon just by pronouncing few, enigmatic 
sentences about gardening. 
As a result of a series of fortuitous accidents, Chance finds 
himself living in the house of Mr. Rand, a Wall Street tycoon and 
a close friend of the President of United States. In a dialogue 
with the President visiting Mr. Rand's house, when asked to 
comment about the bad season at Wall Street, Chance says: "In 
a garden, growth has its season. There are spring and summer, 
but there are also fall and winter. And then spring and summer 
again. As long as the roots are not severed all is well and will be 
well" (p. 54). Looking for a relevant interpretation, and trusting 
(in this case mistakenly) in Chance's willingness to be relevant, 
the President interprets it as an important statement about the 
fundamental symmetry between nature and society, and quotes 
him on television the day after. 
We all have experiences of over-trust generated out of an 
over-investment in interpretation. And, conversely, an exces-
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sive investment in interpreting what a person says that proves 
ill-founded may make our withdraw of trust more definitive. 
Trust and comprehension are thus intimately related. An 
epistemology of trust should account for this relation. Our first 
epistemic objective in acquiring knowledge from others is to 
understand what they say and make sense of their thoughts 
within the context of our own. We are never passively infected 
by other people's beliefs: we take the responsibility to interpret 
what they say and share with them a series of commitments on 
the quality of the exchange. The social dimension of knowl-
edge is grounded in our cognitive activity as interpreters, an 
activity we always share with others. 
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6. THE AUTHORITY OF NON-ELECTED AUTHORITIES: 
WHY DO PEOPLE OBEY CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS? 
6.1 Fragestellung 
Contemporary political theory claims that the (legitimate) 
authority of public authorities/officials comes from a simple 
and clear circumstance: citizens have the right to choose the 
individuals who are going to occupy positions of authority, 
and, even more importantly, they have the legal capability to 
fire them and replace them with others, if they find the officials 
to be inadequate in performing their job. This is what the 
Founding Fathers of modern democracy called a "republic" 
(Madison) or a "representative government" (Sieyes). Notice 
that by "authority", in the first sense (Herrschaft), I mean the 
"recognized" competence to impose the choices of a. = the rul-
ing elite upon b. = the members of a political community. By 
authorities, in the second occurrence, I simply mean the ruling 
elites. By legitimate, I refer to the fact that the first authority is 
not imposed simply by force or accepted only because of an 
instinct of self-preservation. 
The essential core of my claim can be summed up in the fol-
lowing way: the legitimacy of the authorities I'm speaking 
about here (the ruling political elite), as well as their claim to 
obedience, finds its origin and rationale in the "electoral princi-
ple". This corresponds with the absence of tenure for those 
who govern, and the dependence of their mandate, and its 
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renewal, on the periodical choice of the governed. This holds 
true at least in the modern or contemporary societies that we 
cali "democratic". Yet, considering that an increasing number of 
important public decisions in most of these democratic soci-
eties are made by authorities who are not elected or, more 
specifically, who are not "accountable to the voters," we can 
and ought to wonder where the legitimacy of those decisions -
and of the agents who take them - comes from. Or, looking at 
the other side of the same coin, we can ask, why do citizens 
(but also the accountable political actors or organs of the state) 
comply with the decisions of authorities they didn't choose and 
with respect to whom they have no direct power of political 
sanction, like recall or non-renewal of the mandate. 
6.2 Analytic of authority 
Independently from the electoral principle that seems to be 
connected with the principle of individual autonomy (a point 
made not very persuasively by Hans Kelsen) or, more convinc-
ingly, with the principle of limited government, it has been 
often remarked (I have Jon Elster's paper in mind here) that cit-
izens' obedience can be explained largely by the habit of obey-
ing [L. Hart], and also by the costs of disobedience, thus by the 
interest in obedience on the part of those who offer it. To this it 
is added that since ob&dientia facit imperante-m [Spinoza], in 
explaining why citizens obey public powers, we can also make 
sense of the authority of those public powers! 
Now the habit of obedience can certainly explain a certain 
amount of compliance behavior towards public authorities. But 
it doesn't explain all cases of compliance, notably the behavior 
of those who are able to disobey; we have numerous examples 
of such subjects in any type of society, and a fortiori in demo-
cratic societies. Regarding their interest, much depends on the 
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meaning we attribute to this polysemic word. Stricto sensu, I 
believe that by interest we often mean the calculus of costs and 
benefits that informs the decision to take an action. Now obe-
dience to a command of a public authority corresponds with 
the interest of the person who obeys, if he has good reason to 
believe that the disobedience will produce a punishment or 
sanction more exacting than the cost of obedience. 
Once we think more seriously about it, I think we can dis-
cover a "paralogism" in this argument: presupposing the exis-
tence of the authority whose existence and raison d'etre we 
claim to be explaining [we find the same problem in the vulgar 
interpretation of Hobbes' political philosophy - it is a different 
point to explain why and under which conditions it may be 
rational to obey an existent authority]. I am troubled by the 
underlying analytical problem here. If we think that authority 
comes from obedience, and we add that obedience (O) 
depends on the ability of the authority (A) to punish those who 
disobey (X), then it is actually this ability (X) that explains the 
authority in the first place, rather than obedience. 
X ^ O ^ A; but X is A or a quality of A; so, it is not O ^ A, 
but X ^ A, and in fact A+X [= the agent or the agency charac-
terized by X] ^ O [ ^ = generates or is the cause of]. 
Let me restate my argument. The authority cannot be both 
the explanandum and the explanans. We cannot explain the 
authority of public authorities by obedience, nor the obedience 
by the existence of an authority which is able to punish and 
reward. It follows that it is this quality of the authority, and not 
the obedience as such, that explains why we obey it. So it 
seems to me that we have to abandon Spinoza's hypothesis 
according to which obwdientia facit imperantem. In any event, 
we ought to abandon it as an explicative hypothesis and look 
for a different one instead. One possibility is that the obedience 
to authority is produced by some automatisms, like habit or 
some even more basic structure. Or, for example, that it is pro-
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duced by the belief in the legitimacy of a given authority. Which 
raises the further question (very likely the question asked by 
Max Weber): what is the content of this belief and where does 
it come from? Also, what are the qualities of A that produce 
obedience and where do they come from? 
Brief historical excursus. In a social or collective context, 
this quality cannot be identified with force tout court, since 
those who command are few and those who obey, multitudes. 
It will be objected that the few may have considerable military 
force at their disposal. But this is still not an answer since we 
have to explain why soldiers obey generals. Here is just one 
example to clarify what I have in mind. At the very beginning 
of the French Revolution, when the Third Estate seceded from 
the Estates General, the Conte d'Artois ordered the army to 
shoot at the representatives of the Third Estate. It did not obey. 
Clearly, some of the "generals" - like Clermont-Tonnerre - did 
not agree with Artois. The example shows that something like 
prestige or persuasion matters more than arms. This is because 
arma silent only in the presence of a recognized authority. 
6.3 Redefining theproblem 
Let me try to qualify the scope of my inquiry. We saw that in 
my field of analysis, contemporary political and constitutional 
theory, the democratic ideology or doctrine answers the ques-
tion, "why do citizens obey political authority?" by saying 
"because of elections", thus making use of such quasi-philo-
sophical paraphernalia as individual autonomy, limitation of 
power, and so on. And, up to a certain point, I believe that this 
works. But this still leaves open the question of why govern-
ments, which have electoral legitimacy and dispose of public 
force, obey constitutional courts, which are neither elected nor 
politically accountable [responsables devant le s u f f r a g e ] and 
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have moreover no independent means for concretely enforcing 
their decisions. Let me pique your attention with a quote. 
Speaking of the American Supreme Court (in his Democracy in 
America, éd. Folio, vol. I, pt. I, ch. 8, p. 234), Tocqueville noted 
that "its power is immense, but it is a power of opinion" [a pou-
voir d'opinion] [which we should translate as a "spiritual 
power"]. The judges of this court - added Tocqueville - "are 
almighty if the people accept to obey the law [their interpreta-
tion of the law]; they have instead no power if the people have 
contempt for it." 
So I'm back to my square one: where does the authority of 
unelected officials come from?! In the case of Bush v. Gore 
(2000), the "pouvoir d'opinion", to speak with Tocqueville, 
went so far in the United States as to choose the president that 
the American citizens should have chosen themselves! I am 
thus going to speak only of the power/authority of these courts. 
Let me start by rejecting the modern myth of the judge who 
limits himself to the mere application of the law, acting like an 
automaton, a machine reproducing "practical" syllogisms, or as 
a sheer "bouche de la loi" [Montesquieu]. I do not actually 
believe that this myth is completely meaningless. But my ques-
tion is somewhat different. I want to reflect on how judges 
decide conflicts by virtue of their own authority and without 
further appeal (think of the function that the German 
Constitution refers to as Organstreit). Like Solomon, such 
judges impose their decision on those who turn to them. This is 
illustrated by the conflict between supreme state organs inside 
a constitutional Rechtstaat or conflicts between the families of 
an ancient city, like the judgment that Homer describes in one 
of the most fascinating scenes of in the Iliad about Achilles' 
shield. 
But we first have to ask the question: "who obeys"? (so, con-
trary to what Hobbes thought, it is not enough to ask quis judi-
cabitur?). When we are dealing with a court, those who obey 
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are the parties to a dispute, who turn to the judge to adjudicate 
the conflict. When we speak of constitutional courts the parties 
may be of a different type. Simplifying a bit, we may have an 
individual asking for the protection of his own rights vis-à-vis a 
decision of a public authority (a statute, an administrative act or 
even a judicial decision); this is the German model of the 
Verfassungsbeschwerde, which is a constitutional complaint or 
"recours direct'. But parties can also be branches of the central 
government or subunits in a federal state, involved in a conflict 
in which they need adjudication. For instance: a region, or a 
Land vs. the central government, the executive vs. the legislative 
branch, or - like in France - the opposition in the Parliament 
against the majority, meaning the government. Once this has 
been clarified, my question - who obeys constitutional courts? 
- can be rephrased in the following way: Why - if we take the 
French case - does the majority accept that its will be bent 
because of the intervention of the CC [constitutional court] on 
the request of the minority? (It would also be interesting to con-
sider cases of non-compliance: Bavaria and the crucifix; the 
Southern states in the US opposing the Warren Court's civil 
rights decisions). 
The legal positivist will answer: because it is written in the 
constitution. And it is perfectly true that the French Constitution 
- to stick to my example - requires the parties to accept the 
decision [ l 'arr e t ] of the Conseil Constitutionnel. But this answer, 
perhaps adequate for a School of Law, is not enough for me. 
One can put forward the argument that an explicit violation of 
the constitution is a "cost" for a political actor, including the 
majority, which derives its powers from the constitution itself. 
But this consideration just reinforces my question. Why did the 
political class introduce this provision (constitutional control) 
into the constitution in the first place? It is easy to suggest, as I 
do elsewhere [Ratio Juris], that constitutional provisions intro-
ducing constitutional adjudication can be considered as an 
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insurance mechanism for those who are defeated in the electoral 
race. This is what Giscard's justice minister, Lecanuet, said in 1974 
when the saisine parlementaire was introduced in France: since 
we are probably going to lose the elections, let's try not to lose 
everything. In fact, the conservatives lost the elections in 1981 and 
the Constitutional Council canceled part of the nationalization 
measures enacted by the socialist government. So, in this context, 
the CC is a mechanism of moderation vis-à-vis the majority. 
In addition to this, I would also like to draw your attention to 
two additional considerations: 1. the constitutional expansion 
or the "constitutionalization" of what we refer to in France as 
"administrative law"; 2. the (possible) way for CCs to justify 
their authority to themselves and to the other actors in the polit-
ical and constitutional system. 
1. The first point is slightly technical and I will be brief. The 
état de droit or stato di diritto - the French and Italian equiva-
lents of the German Rechtstaat - is based on the principle (not 
identical with the electoral principle) that any concerned citizen 
should be allowed to sue a public authority if she thinks that it 
has abused its legal competences. This is one of the paramount 
definitions that Dicey gave of the concept of "rule of law". 
France, as is well known, invented a special jurisdiction to adju-
dicate conflicts between citizens and the state or the public 
administration: the administrative courts and the administrative 
judges. I can't speak here of the fascinating story of this institu-
tion that was invented to protect the public administration and 
ended up protecting, at least sometimes, citizens' rights, both in 
France and on the continent. I just want to recall that post-war 
Germany charged the BVG (the Federal Constitutional Court) 
with the adjudication of conflicts between citizens and the pub-
lic administration having a constitutional rank or dignity. 
To rephrase my original question again (what I'm really try-
ing to do is formulate the right question): why does the state 
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obey a court (lacking in democratic legitimacy), which con-
demns it in favor of a simple, isolated and sometimes weak citi-
zen? I'd like to put forward the following hypothesis: in our sta-
ble democratic societies, the legitimacy originating in the elec-
toral principle is drying up! It played a crucial role during the 
long period beginning on the European continent with the 
French Revolution: a period that can be characterized by the inte-
gration of the members of the society (the citizens) into the state. 
First the middle class, then the working class and then women 
were given the franchise. Electoral legitimacy allows for the 
peaceful rotation of political elites in power as well as the inte-
gration produced by universal suffrage (democrats vs. republi-
cans in Germany during the Vormarz - W. Conze, Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe) and mass political parties. Having attained the 
integration of national citizens (the excluded now are immigrants 
from outside the European Union), political authority (political 
elites) is forced to move forward and grant to the single, isolated 
citizen as such a right to complain. The political elites have to 
concede a recurso de amparo - as the Spaniards call it - a final 
right of appeal against the democratic authority itself. This is an 
appeal in which the constitutional court is the final arbiter. 
This is a way for organized political actors to prevent the loss 
of elections from becoming a radical, crushing defeat; it also 
increases the legitimacy of representative governments, espe-
cially those ashamed of their authoritarian pasts. Thus we can 
see the beginnings of my answer. 
2. Typology of justification. To conclude, I'd like to say a 
few words about the ideology that may justify the power or 
authority of the constitutional court. I'm going to do it using a 
typology based on fragments from the history of ideas and insti-
tutions, the Montesquieu-Coke-Hobbes model. This three-part 
model can likewise be conceived in terms of: the null power, 
expertise, impartiality. 
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The first bit of my triadic model is well known: it produced 
the weakest and yet the most widespread image of the consti-
tutional court. It says that we have to obey the (constitutional 
court) since, like any agency with the judicial function, it has no 
power, and no will. It is nothing but the "mouth of the consti-
tution," articulating practical syllogisms and just enforcing the 
will of the constituent power of the people. It is even possible 
to build a quaint metaphysical theory of this constituent power, 
in which the constitutional court would be its "expression." I 
shall skip all this, even though there are interesting things to 
say, notably concerning the practical, institutional conse-
quences of such an ideology. 
The second figure of the triptych is slightly less known. I 
name it after Sir Edward Coke in honor of the chief justice of the 
Common Law Courts of England at the beginning of the 17th 
century. It was Coke who convinced the Stuart King James I 
that his majesty should not adjudicate all the conflicts: the King 
of England certainly had the sovereign power, but he had not 
the expertise, meaning the knowledge of the laws of his king-
dom, which requires a long study in the Inns of Court. The 
power or the authority of the judge - so said Sir Edward -
comes from this knowledge, competence or expertise. It is 
knowledge, not power, that makes the judge a source of 
authority. After all, professors, doctors, plumbers, generals are 
not chosen by elections. We can choose some of them some-
times in this way, but we cannot thereby make them compe-
tent. In this context, think of the rule introduced by Hans 
Kelsen (and accepted by all contemporary post-authoritarian 
constitutions, with the exception of France), according to 
which only law professors, lawyers and judges, thus only 
experts, can sit on constitutional courts. This provision clearly 
contrasts with the normal democratic ideology, where the pos-
sibility of being popularly elected has nothing to do with a spe-
cial expertise of the representative. 
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Finally, I want to introduce the third masque of the judicial 
authority - actually the oldest one, at least in Western society -
according to the Homeric account: impartiality. It seems that 
there is no better way to produce the authority that the judge 
needs in order to be obeyed than for him to be independent 
from the conflicting parties and "impartial" - super partes - in 
relation to them. This is an impossible challenge and thus an 
illusion, say the realists, who are so smart that they claim to 
show how stupid or at least how naive we are. By "we," I mean 
those who believe in the value of impartiality and its inevitably 
imperfect practicability. 
Surprisingly enough in the genealogy of the impartiality of 
the judicial power, we find a remarkable text of a political 
philosopher who supported the absolute power and opposed 
Sir Edward Coke: Thomas Hobbes. In chapter 26 of his 
Leviathan, he presented a theory of the judicial power that 
rejects the thesis of expertise and derives the judicial authority 
instead from certain MORAL qualities, which are presented in 
the following way: 
"The things that make a good Judge, [...] are, first, A right under-
standing of the principal Law of Nature called Equity; which 
depend[...] not on the reading of other men's Writings, but on the 
goodness of a mans own natural Reason1, [...] Secondly, contempi of 
unnecessary Riches, and Preferments. Thirdly, To be able in judgment 
to divest himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion. 
Fourthly, and lastly, Patience to hear; diligent attention in hearing; 
and memory to retain, digest and a p p l y what he hath heard." 
1 "Though it be true", Hobbes added in the Dialogue, W. Molesworth (ed.), 
English Works, Vol. VI (London, J. Bohn, 1840), p. 14, "that no man is born with 
the use of reason, yet all men may grow up to it as well as lawyers; and when 
they have applied their reason to laws [ . ] may be as fit for and capable of judi-
cature as Sir Edward Coke himself, who whether he had more or less use of 
reason, was not thereby a judge, but because the King made him so" [!]. 
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Impartiality is a challenge, to be sure, but not illusion. At least 
under certain conditions, which do not of course exist every-
where (certainly in China hardly at all and very little in the 
United States). To the objection that "all you need to do to be 
impartial is to look impartial," we can answer, as Dan Sperber 
has called to my attention, that the easiest and least costly way 
to look impartial is to be impartial, at least most of the time. For 
otherwise, since we are not as naive as the realists think, the 
belief in the court's authority loses its function and dissipates. 
Some sort of mix of these three ideologies is what is normal-
ly appealed to in order to establish the authority of the consti-




This volume brings together the papers presented at a confer-
ence held at the Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, March 19-20, 2004. 
The topic of the conference - the concept of authority - lent 
itself particularly well to its multi-disciplinary approach. 
Different forms of authority play decisive roles, and ought to be 
examined not only in the political sphere but also in the areas 
of social relations more generally and education. 
Organized collective life would be impossible without forms 
of authority, however legitimate. It is thus difficult to imagine 
constructing a shared knowledge without thinking critically 
about "authority," even though we simultaneously need it to 
focus our criticism. Without authority, knowledge itself would 
become completely subjective, unstructured, incommunicable 
and unable to build upon itself. 
From the cognitive sciences to political and legal philosophy, the 
subject discussed in this volume remains one of the most fascinat-
ing areas of research and analysis in the humanities. In the interest 
of providing the reader with a wide spectrum of disciplinary per-
spectives, we thought it important to begin with the study of the 
origin of the concept: the auctoritas partum which, together with 
potestas and majestas, capture in the language of the political insti-
tutions of ancient Rome what we now regard vaguely as "power." 
The goal of this volume is to stimulate thought and further study, 
in drawing from the contributions of scholars of diverse cultural and 




1. THE ROMAN NOTION OF AUCTORITAS 
«Auctoritas, non veritas facit legem», reads a famous sentence 
in the Latin version of Thomas Hobbes' «Leviathan». Or, as 
Hobbes said elsewhere, «It is not wisdom but authority that 
makes a law». Hobbes is often quoted by Carl Schmitt, who 
takes this dictum as a basis for his theory that a decision of the 
sovereign originates from a normative void1. Whether Schmitt 
offers an adequate interpretation of Hobbes is, of course, not 
my question and, anyway, beyond my competence. I just want 
to make the point that an understanding of auctoritas as imply-
ing the idea of a top-down command and its forceful imple-
mentation, if necessary, is a far cry from the original Roman 
notion. 
However, it is impossible to give a straightforward definition 
of the Roman term. Its implications have to be inferred from an 
embarrassing variety of usage in legal and literary texts2. Thus, 
the title of my paper should better read: «Roman notions of auc-
toritas», and not: «The Roman notion of auctoritas». 
I should state from the outset that my discussion is an 
exercise in the history of social and political concepts 
1 Compare Martin Rhonheimer, "Autoritas non veritas facit legem". Thomas 
Hobbes, Carl Schmitt und die Idee des Verfassungsstaates, Archiv fur Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie 86, 2000, 484-498. 
2 Compare André Magdelain, De l'"auctoritas patrum" à l'"auctoritas sena-
tus", in: idem, Jus, Imperium, Auctoritas. Études de droit romain, Paris 1990, 
385-403. 
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(«Begriffsgeschichte»)3. It thus seeks to examine the usages of 
the very term auctoritas and to explain its political and social 
connotations; it is not an attempt to define a universally appli-
cable ideal-type of «authority» and then to ask to which social 
and political phenomena in the Roman world it might properly 
be applied. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, German classical philologists in par-
ticular understood auctoritas - in connection with such terms 
as dignitas, honor, gloria, gravitas, fides, pietas, iustitia and 
mos maiorum - as the core of an ensemble of so-called Roman 
virtues that allegedly made up the peculiar national spirit of the 
Romans4. A seminal article on auctoritas by Richard Heinze was 
later republished in a volume of Heinze's collected essays with 
the title, «Vom Geist des Romertums»5. Heinze pointed out that 
3 That means the approach practised in Otto Brunner / Werner Conze / 
Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 8 vls., Stuttgart 1972-
1997; compare Horst Rabe, "Autoritat", ibid., vol. I (1972), 382-406. 
4 Compare the articles collected in Hans Oppermann (ed.), Romertum. 
Ausgewahlte Aufsatze und Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1921 bis 1961, Darmstadt 
1962; idem (ed.), Romische Wertbegriffe, Darmstadt 1967. On Oppermann and 
his ideological stance in the Nazi period compare Jurgen Malitz, Romertum im 
"Dritten Reich": Hans Oppermann, in: Imperium Romanum. Studien zu 
Geschichte und Rezeption. Festschrift fur Karl Christ zum 75. Geburtstag, 
Stuttgart 1998, 519-543. - The Italian equivalent was the cult of romanità in the 
fascist era which included the praise of a new impero allegedly based on the 
Augustan model; its manifestations include the "Mostra Augustea della 
Romanità" and the reconstruction of the Augustus Mausoleum on occasion of 
the 2000th anniversary of Augustus' birthday in 1937. Compare Mariella 
Cagnetta, Il mito di Augusto e la "rivoluzione" fascista, Quaderni di Storia 3, 
1976, 139-181; Friedemann Scriba, Augustus im Schwarzhemd? Die "Mostra 
Augustea della Romanità" in Rom 1937/38, Frankfurt am Main 1995; and vari-
ous articles (in Italian) in: Beat Naf (ed.), Antike und Altertumswissenschaft in 
der Zeit von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus, Mandelbachtal 2001. 
5 Richard Heinze, Auctoritas, Hermes 60, 1925, 348-366, reprinted in: idem, 
Vom Geist des Romertums (1938), 4th ed., Darmstadt 1972, 43-58. Inspired by 
Heinze are works like Joseph C. Plumpe, Wesen und Wirkung der auctoritas 
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there was no Greek equivalent that could properly render the 
Roman term auctoritas6. This stress on Roman «values» was 
partly due to a yearning for a strong state based more on polit-
ical leadership and national unity than on a constitutional sys-
tem, as was the case with the Weimar Republic7. But the special 
interest in auctoritas was also stimulated by the contemporary 
discovery that the first Roman emperor, Augustus, had 
described his position with this very term; I shall come back to 
this point later. 
It seems probable that auctoritas originated in the sphere of 
private law, and is derived from augere, to augment, in the 
sense that the expressed will of certain categories of persons 
needed an approbation by their superiors in order to gain a 
legal quality. Auctoritas patris designated the consent of a pater 
familias to the marriage of his daughter8. Auctoritas tutoris 
meant the guardian's affirmation of a ward's act; only in this 
way did it acquire legal validity9. And the seller of a certain 
good had to take responsibility ( a u c t o r i t a s ) that he was its legal 
owner10. 
In the public sphere, auctoritas is primarily associated with 
the role of the Roman senate. There are various technical mean-
ings, as well as more general ones. Patrum auctoritas depicted 
the patrician senators' ratification of the decisions by the popu-
maiorum bei Cicero, Dissertation Munster 1932; Fritz Furst, Die Bedeutung 
der auctoritas im privaten und òffentlichen Leben der ròmischen Republik, 
Dissertation Marburg 1934. 
6 Heinze, Auctoritas, in: Vom Geist des Romertums, 56. 
7 Heinze, Von der Ursache der GròFe Roms (1921), in: Vom Geist des 
Ròmertums, 9-27. Compare Alessandro Perutelli, Richard Heinze e i 
Wertbegriffe, Quaderni di storia 6, 1977, 51-66. 
8 Compare Max Kaser, Das ròmische Privatrecht, vol. I, Munchen 2nd ed. 
1971, 76. 
9 Compare Kaser, Das ròmische Privatrecht, vol. I, 87. 
10 Compare Kaser, Das ròmische Privatrecht, vol. I, 132. 
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lar assembly concerning legislation and elections of magis-
trates; only thus did the assembly's votes become legally bind-
ing11. The rule applied only to the older type of the popular 
assembly, the comitia centuriata (and the archaic comitia 
curiata), and not to the assemblies of the Roman plebs12. The 
ratification was performed only by the patrician senators, even 
at the time when the senate was already composed of plebeian 
senators as well13. Starting in 339 B.C., the assent was given in 
advance14 and thus did no longer imply an effective control. 
However, we do not really know its original function; whether 
it had been understood as a possible check on the content of 
laws or just an approbation of correct procedure in accordance 
with the rituals of sacral law15; and there is no evidence that the 
assent was denied in an actual case16. That patrum auctoritas 
remained a privilege of patrician senators is one of many fea-
tures of the development of the Roman political system that 
made certain rules obsolete in any practical sense without for-
mally abolishing them17. (In this respect, the parallel with the 
11 Cicero, De republica 2, 56. 
12 Digesta (Pomponius) 1, 2, 2, 12; Gaius, Institutiones 1, 3. 
13 It has often been assumed that since the middle republic this right of ratifi-
cation was transferred to the senate as a whole (compare for example Pierre 
Willems, Le sénat de la république romaine, vol. II, Louvain 1883, 38ff.; Vincenzo 
Mannino, L'auctoritas patrum, Milano 1979) but Cicero, De domo sua 38 is deci-
sive on the point that it remained exclusively with the patrician senators. 
14 The law of 339 applied to legislation; Livius 8, 12, 15; the same proce-
dure was extended to elections by a later law, probably of the third century; 
the exact date is not known; Cicero, Brutus 55. 
15 For an interpretation in the latter sense compare Theodor Mommsen, 
Der Patriciersenat der Republik, in: idem, Romische Forschungen vol. I, 
Berlin 1864, 243f.; Adalberto Giovannini, Auctoritas patrum, Museum 
Helveticum 42, 1985, 28-36. 
16 Theodor Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht (1871-1888), reprinted Graz 
1955, vol. III/2, 1041 with n. 1. 
17 Compare Livius 1, 17, 9 for the survival of the procedure in Augustan 
times. 
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English constitution is obvious; consider in particular the royal 
assent to acts of Parliament which in theory is still necessary, 
even though such assent has not been refused since 1707). 
According to Theodor Mommsen, patrum auctoritas can be 
seen in the light of auctoritas tutoris; the people is considered 
as an assembly of minors who cannot legally act without the 
consent of the fathers18. But the political function would prob-
ably have been aimed more at controlling the magistrates, who 
might initiate legislation, than controlling the people, who 
passed almost any law the magistrates proposed. Anyway, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to derive the further usage of auc-
toritas from this allegedly primary meaning. 
Auctoritaspatrum as a privilege of the patrician members is 
to be distinguished from the auctoritas of the senate as a 
whole. In the later republic, auctoritas senatus had different 
meanings. It could be used alternately with senatus consultum, 
the senate's formal decree19. In a technical sense, it designated 
a resolution of the senate which was passed and even recorded 
in the journal of the senate, but remained invalid because it was 
vetoed by a tribune of the people or because of some proce-
dural irregularity20. Under certain circumstances, referring to 
auctoritas senatus in this sense might imply an exhortation to 
magistrates and citizens to comply nevertheless with the 
expressed will of the senate and to trust in this body's backing 
in the case of ensuing conflicts21. 
That something was done ex auctoritate senatus could 
mean, on the one hand, that the senate supported a particular 
step, for example that magistrates initiated a law to be passed 
18 Mommsen, Ròmisches Staatsrecht, vol. III/2, 1038f. 
19 For example, Cicero, Epistulae as Atticum 1, 16, 2. 
20 Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 1, 2, 4; 8, 8, 4-8; Cassius Dio 55, 3, 5; com-
pare Mommsen, Ròmisches Staatsrecht, vol. I, 281f.; vol. III/2, 997f. 
21 For example, Livius 4, 57, 5. 
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by the popular assembly22; on the other hand it could simply 
mean a delegation of powers, for example to envoys who need-
ed a certain room for negotiations23. 
In most cases, however, auctoritas senatus referred to the 
role of the senate in a more general sense. It meant that the 
magistrates were supposed to present all issues of public 
importance to the senate and then follow the advice given to 
them by the senate24. It is impossible to define whether this 
advice was binding in a de iure or a de facto sense; that corre-
sponds to the general difficulty in defining the relation between 
ius and mos in the sense of a distinct hierarchy of sources of 
law25. Or, as Mommsen put it: «auctoritas as a term which 
evades any strict definition corresponds to the senate's power-
ful position which is very effective on the one hand but cannot 
be defined in legal terms on the other hand. Auctoritas is more 
advice than command but it is advice that one cannot properly 
avoid»26. 
The senate's central position was due to the fact that it con-
sisted of members for life who were admitted to the body after 
having obtained one of the annual magistratures. They repre-
22 For example, Livius 4, 49, 6; 9, 46, 7. Compare in general Jochen 
Bleicken, Lex Publica. Gesetz und Recht in der romischen Republik, Berlin 
1975, 304ff. 
23 For example, Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 1, 19, 2. 
24 Compare [Cicero], Rhetorica adHerennium 4, 47. 
25 Compare Dietmar Schanbacher, Ius und mos: Zum Verhaltnis rechtlicher 
und sozialer Normen, in: Maximilian Braun et alii (eds.), Moribus antiquis res 
stat Romana. Romische Werte und romische Literatur im 3. und 2. Jh. v. Chr., 
Munchen 2000, 353-371. 
26 Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht, vol. III/2, 1034. - Mommsen's posi-
tion was heavily criticized by Wolfgang Kunkel, Magistratische Gewalt und 
Senatsherrschaft, in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt, vol. I/4, 
Berlin 1972, 3-22, who, however, also could not solve the riddle of how to 
adequately define the senate's competence with respect to the magistrates. 
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sented the political and military élite of the republic and dis-
posed of a social power that any individual office-holder could 
not ignore and they guaranteed the continuity of policy despite 
of the permanent change with respect to individual office-hold-
ers. 
And the leading members were, as a rule, scions of families 
that could boast of having provided magistrates for generations. 
As an institution, the senate stood for the continuity of the polit-
ical system over the centuries, from the very beginning. Its legit-
imacy derived from the origins of Rome, thus it could be under-
stood as being grounded in the auctoritas maiorum. This 
authority of the ancestors was invoked in order to argue that a 
peculiar decision had to be taken in accordance with long-
established practice27. 
But the political system had developed over centuries and 
combined an extraordinary stability of its basic structures with 
an astonishing flexibility in adapting to new requirements28. It 
was based on undisputed primordial rules and institutions, new 
regulations based on laws passed at a given time (and some-
times repealed later), decisions of the senate, new practices 
introduced at one time and accepted after they had proved 
appropriate, and on precedents that had been created with 
decisions in disputed cases. The heritage of the ancestors, so 
Cicero once claimed, included their insight that new circum-
stances required the recourse to new measures29. 
In such a system, one could refer neither to the intentions of 
a distinct generation of founding fathers and, of course, nor to 
a constitutional charter they had created30. There was no clear-
27 Cicero, In Verrem 2, 1, 38; 2, 5, 85; Pro Balbo 31. 
28 Livius 4, 4, 1ff. 
29 Cicero, De lege Manilia 60. 
30 See Cicero, De re publica 2, 2 for the contrast between the great Greek 
lawgivers and the Roman development through centuries. 
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cut hierarchy with respect to rules that had originated in differ-
ent times and diverse sources. This can be seen in a passage of 
an oration of Cicero. Here Cicero tries to define the fundamen-
tal features of the constitution. He mentions the sacral laws, the 
competence (potestas) of the magistrates, senatus auctoritas, 
the laws, mos maiorum, the courts and other elements, but he 
can only do this in form of an enumeration31. Mos maiorum, 
and accordingly auctoritas maiorum, were extremely flexible 
concepts that needed authoritative interpretation in peculiar 
instances32. The senate was the only institution that was or 
should be acknowledged as being able to offer such an exege-
sis of the tradition33. That would necessarily imply a certain 
amount of arbitrariness and fiction. That was also due to the fact 
that this tradition was understood as man-made and was not 
ascribed to a transcendental authority - and this seems indeed 
to be a Roman peculiarity34. 
The somewhat fictitious character of this reference to tradi-
tion is also indicated by Cicero. In De Legibus, a tract which 
constituted a mixture of long-established rules and some pro-
grammatic demands for reforms35, he said he would formulate 
the set of rules in an archaic language in order to enhance the 
auctoritas of the rules he put down in a single text36. But his 
31 Cicero, Pro Sestio 98. 
32 Compare Cicero, De legibus 2, 40. 
33 Compare Cicero, Pro Sestio 140. 
34 Compare Ton Hol, Authority, Law and the Roman Experience, in: Viva vox 
iuris Romani. Essays in Honour of Johannes Emil Spruit, Amsterdam 2002, 39-49. 
35 Compare Gustav Adolf Lehmann, Politische Reformvorschlage in der 
Krise der spaten ròmischen Repubik. Cicero De legibus III und Sallusts 
Sendschreiben an Caesar, Meisenheim/Glan 1980; Elizabeth Rawson, The 
Interpretation of Cicero's De legibus, in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der ròmis-
chen Welt, vol. I/4, Berlin 1973, 334-356; Andrew R. Dyck, A Commentary on 
Cicero, De legibus, Ann Arbor 2004. 
36 Cicero, De legibus 2, 18. 
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very attempt to write down a sort of constitutional charter 
demonstrates that in fact the senate was no longer the undis-
puted interpreter of the constitution. That could easily be 
shown in an analysis of the late Republic's constitutional dis-
putes on which I cannot embark here. 
That the senate's authority in a general sense should consti-
tute the cornerstone of the political system is pointed out by 
Cicero, who often associated the senate's authority with its role 
as the institution that really governed the state and that should 
be regarded as the guardian of the constitution37. In De re pub-
lica, Cicero declares that a well-balanced constitution depends 
on the magistrates having enough potestas, the senate enough 
auctoritas and the people enough libertas38. (Cicero also con-
trasted the auctoritas of the senate and the potestas of the peo-
ple39; postestas then stood for the institutionalized competence 
of the popular assemblies which otherwise could also be 
depicted as maiestas). Ideally, the magistrates should execute 
their formal competences in compliance with the senate's 
advice40, the people should follow the senate's lead. To submit 
themselves to the will of a body that represented the collective 
political wisdom of the Romans neither diminishes the role of 
the public officials nor detracts from the people's freedom41. 
That is why Cicero in his political orations would claim that dis-
regarding the senate's authority meant endangering the peo-
ple's liberty42. 
In De Legibus, a fictitious dialogue between himself and his 
younger brother Quintus, Cicero presents Quintus' polemics 
37 Cicero, Pro Sestio 137: The senate as custos rei publicae. 
38 Cicero, De re publica 2, 57; compare 1, 69. 
39 Cicero, De legibus 3, 28. 
40 In this sense they were "in auctoritate senatus"; Mommsen, Staatsrecht 
III/2, 1034, n. 2. 
41 Cicero, De legibus 3, 25. 
42 Cicero, De domo sua 130; Cicero, Philippica 10, 23. 
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against the introduction of the secret ballot, which was in place 
in popular assemblies since the late second century B.C. and 
was praised as an expression of libertas populi43. Quintus 
argues that this procedure had destroyed the auctoritas of the 
ruling élite. Cicero replied that one could not abolish a symbol 
of political freedom, but should allow the citizens to pay 
respect to the authority of the leading citizens by voluntarily 
showing them their voting tablets44. 
The tension between potestas and auctoritas does not only 
apply to the relationship between magistrates and senate but 
also to the performance of magistrates and other leading politi-
cians. Potestas is the competence any incumbent of a public 
office has in his official capacity. A man's auctoritas can be 
seen as deriving from the public office (especially the consul-
ship) that he holds45, but also as a personal quality that he has 
to acquire and maintain, and which under certain circum-
stances can be more effective than the execution of potestas. In 
this sense, the authority of a consul does not only emanate from 
his office, but also depends on his personal conduct and the 
public trust it creates46. Roman magistrates lacked an effective 
enforcement agency, a sort of police apparatus; thus in situa-
tions of public disturbances it was a matter of their personal 
reputation and rhetorical skills whether they were able to 
43 Compare Bruce A. Marshall, Libertas populi. The introduction of secret 
ballot at Rome and its depiction on coinage, Antichthon 31, 1997, 54-72; 
Ursula Hall, Species libertatis: Voting Procedure in the Late Roman Republic, 
in: Michel Austin et alii (eds.), Modus Operandi. Essays in Honour of Geoffrey 
Rickman, London 1998, 15-30. 
44 Cicero, De legibus 3, 34-39. - Montesquieu (De l'Esprit des Lois, Book II, 
chapter 2) shared Quintus' position. - The "voluntarily" open voting reminds 
of the practice in the German Democratic Republic though it was there (and 
elsewhere) surely not inspired by recourse to Roman sources. 
45 Cicero, De lege agraria 1, 24; Pro Rabirio Perduellionis 22. 
46 Cicero, De lege agraria 1, 27; Epistulae ad Atticum 1, 16, 6. 
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enforce their will47. Magistrates who were successful in quelling 
riots by their appearance on the spot were praised for their 
auctoritas48. In 138 B.C. a consul addressed a crowd that 
demanded measures against an increase in corn prices by 
declaring that he understood the public good better than they 
did. The crowd fell silent «paying more regard to his authority 
[auctoritas] than to their own nutriment»49. In 61 B.C. a consul-
designate, who was technically a private person before entering 
his office, was able to make a crowd comply with a decision of 
the senate; Cicero stressed that this person acted in virtue of his 
auctoritas and not a magistrate's potestas50. The same holds 
true for great generals. Pompeius or Caesar enjoyed the loyalty 
of their troops not only due to their formal competence as bear-
ers of a military imperium and their military ability, but because 
of a personal authority that was of much greater importance, at 
least in critical situations51. 
The standing of a senator within the ranks of the senate could 
also be a question of his personal authority. Though all mem-
bers had one vote and the decisions were taken by the majori-
ty of votes, the senate was ordered hierarchically. The senators 
were classified according to the magistrature they had last 
occupied; the former incumbents of the highest office, the ex-
consuls, were asked to give their opinion first, and thus could 
considerably influence the process of decision-making. But 
sometimes members of the lower ranks might attain an impor-
tance that was higher than their status, especially when the top 
47 Compare Wilfried Nippel, Public Order in Ancient Rome, Cambridge 
1995. 
48 Cicero, Pro Sestio 62; Valerius Maximus 7, 5, 2. 
49 Valerius Maximus 3, 7, 3. 
50 Cicero, In Pisonem 8. 
51 Cicero, De lege Manilia 28; Epistulae adAtticum 7, 7, 6. Compare Cornelius 
Nepos, Chabrias 4, 1. 
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ranks shrank from committing themselves in a controversial 
question. Thus Cicero in some cases ascribes a consularis auc-
toritas to members who had not yet reached the ranks of the 
ex-consuls, but made an impact on decisions as if they had 
already done so52. 
In Cicero's writings one can also find references to the auc-
toritas principum53. Those principes were understood as the 
leading citizens who formed the senate's inner circle, especial-
ly the ex-consuls ( though probably not all of them)54. But 
Cicero's insistence on their importance also indicates his per-
ception that during the crisis of the late republic, the senate as 
a body was often divided over questions of fundamental impor-
tance and thus was no longer able to exercise the authority it 
was supposed to55. 
The increasing use of the popular assemblies to achieve deci-
sions against the will of the senate entailed that the rhetorical 
abilities of politicians in addressing crowds would become a 
new source of authority and thus undermine the traditional 
basis of political influence56. Some one hundred and fifty years 
later, Tacitus, looking back to crisis of the late republic, spoke 
of orators who as private persons had been able to influence 
political decisions because of their individual auctoritas57. 
In other spheres of social and political life authority was a 
quality that was ascribed to leading experts in a certain disci-
52 Compare Frank X. Ryan, The Meaning of "consularis auctoritas"in Cicero, 
Mnemosyne 47, 1994, 681-685. 
53 Cicero, De re publica 2, 56; compare De legibus 2, 30. 
54 Compare Matthias Gelzer, Die Nobilitat der ròmischen Republik (1912), 
reprinted in: idem, Kleine Schriften, vol. I, Wiesbaden 1962, 53ff.; Alfred 
Gwoszd, Der Begriff des ròmischen princeps, Dissertation Breslau 1933, 24ff. 
55 For example, Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 1, 18, 3. 
56 Flattering the popular assembly could imply speaking of the auctoritas 
populi Romani in opposition to the opinions of principes as Cicero himself 
had done in 66 B.C.; De legeManilia 64. 
57 Tacitus, Dialogus de oratoribus 36. 
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pline in relation to others of a lesser reputation or with regard 
to laymen. Cicero acknowledged Plato's overarching impor-
tance in philosophy by claiming that he would follow Plato's 
auctoritas even if Plato gave no reasons for his opinion58. Or, 
Quintilianus said that Cicero's statements in court displayed 
such an auctoritas that one would blush to disagree59. In philo-
sophical and rhetorical contexts, however, there are also state-
ments that, in case of a collision between auctoritas and ration-
ality, reason should prevail60. 
The idea that the recognized specialist is not expected to 
base his opinion on arguments which other people would not 
understand anyway is particularly relevant to the role of the 
Roman jurists. In Republican times, the jurists were experts who 
acted not in an official capacity but as private persons, 
«Honoratioren» in the sense of Max Weber. Their authority was 
based on their giving legal advice - free of charge and only ori-
ented to the objective legal situation - to any party who asked 
them, as well as to magistrates and judges61. They gave opin-
ions (responsa) on matters of law, not matters of fact and, as a 
rule, they did this without giving grounds for their position62. 
But judges, who were themselves laymen, based their decisions 
with respect to legally-disputed points on those statements, 
though they were not strictly bound to do so. A problem arose, 
of course, if opposite statements by two jurists were presented. 
58 Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1, 49; compare De o f f i c i i s 2, 10 on the 
authority of philosophers. 
59 Quintilianus, Institutio oratoria 10, 1, 111. 
60 [Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium 4, 4; Cicero, De natura deorum 1, 10; 
Academica 2, 60; De legibus 1, 36f. 
61 Cicero, De oratore 1, 198 and 239; Pro Murena 9. 
62 Seneca, Epistulae ad Lucilium 94, 27; compare Wolfgang Kunkel, 
Herkunft und soziale Stellung der romischen Juristen, Weimar 1952, 282, n. 
597. - Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5th ed., Tubingen 1976, drew 
the comparison with the "fatwa" of Islamic religious authorities. 
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The judge would then have to decide who was the expert with 
the higher reputation63. At the same time, a judgment grounded 
in the auctoritas of a well-known jurist might become a prece-
dent for future decisions64, especially since responsa were no 
longer given orally but were submitted in writing65. In the jury 
courts that decided primarily on political crimes, the outcome 
was ascribed to the respective auctoritas of the speakers who 
acted as counsel for the prosecution and the defence, and also 
to the auctoritas of witnesses on both sides66. 
Responsa were also issued by various bodies of priests - pon-
tifices, augures, haruspices - that were responsible for declar-
ing that a public act was performed in accordance with sacral 
law or, on the contrary, that it was void and should be repeat-
ed. They addressed their advice to the senate (or the magis-
trates), and the senate, as a rule, followed the auctoritas of 
these bodies of specialists67 in taking its decision. This proce-
dure did not diminish the position of senate and officials since 
those experts were themselves members of the ruling élite68 
(though not all priests were senators)69 and since they based 
their advice on citing precedents that were recorded in the files 
of their respective boards70. 
63 Cicero, Pro Caecina 69. 
64 Cicero, Topica 28; Digesta (Papinianus) 1, 1, 7. 
65 Compare Detlef Liebs, Ròmische Rechtsgutachten und "Responsorum 
libri", in: Gregor Vogt-Spira (ed.), Strukturen der Mundlichkeit in der ròmis-
chen Literatur, Tubingen 1990, 83-94. 
66 Cicero, Pro Murena 58f. 
67 Cicero, De haruspicum responsum 14; De divinatione 2, 70; De legibus 
2, 31. 
68 Cicero, De domo sua 1f. 
69 Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 4, 2, 4. 
70 Cicero, De domo sua 33 and 136f.; compare in general Georg Wissowa, 
Religion und Kultus der Ròmer, 2nd ed. 1912, reprinted Munchen 1971, 513-
515; Jerzy Linderski, The Augural Law, in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der 
Ròmischen Welt, vol. II/16, 3, Berlin 1986, 2146-2312. 
26 
Some exceptions notwithstanding, auctoritas in Roman 
Republican usage denoted a socially legitimized power that did 
not amount to binding commands and did not rely on means of 
enforcement. It presumed a likely obedience to social superiors 
(or acknowledged experts) in a society that presupposed a 
hierarchical order in all its segments, an obedience that emanat-
ed from the bottom-up. 
The implications of auctoritas changed with the establish-
ment of a new type of monarchy by Augustus, from 27 B.C. 
onwards. Octavian, the great nephew and (by testament) adop-
tive son of Caesar, had started with an illegal command that was 
later legalized by a decree of the senate71. Since 43 B.C., his 
constitutional position had been based on an Enabling Law (for 
the triumvirate Octavian, Antonius and Lepidus) that was later 
prolonged but then expired72 in 32 B.C. Thereafter his control 
of the state, which surpassed the competence of his annual 
consulship, was based on the constitutional puzzle of a con-
sensus universorum73 which had been expressed by the oath of 
allegiance that the Italians and Western provincials had sworn 
on the eve of the war against Antonius and Cleopatra74. In 
January of the year 27, he declared that, after having restored 
71 In this sense Cicero pleaded in late 44 B.C. that the senate should give 
auctoritas to Octavian lest his then fight against Antonius should no longer be 
based on his private initiative; Cicero, Philippica 3, 5. 
72 For the constitutional niceties compare Klaus Bringmann, Das zweite 
Triumvirat. Bemerkungen zu Mommsens Lehre von der auBerordentlichen 
konstituierenden Gewalt, in: Alte Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte. 
Festschrift Karl Christ, Darmstadt 1988, 22-38; Jochen Bleicken, Zwischen 
Republik und Prinzipat. Zum Charakter des Zweiten Triumvirats, Gottingen 
1990. 
73 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 34, 1; compare Karl-Ernst Petzold, Die 
Bedeutung des Jahres 32 fur die Enstehung des Printipats, Historia 18, 1969, 
334-351. 
74 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 25, 2. 
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the peace and unity of the Roman people, he would give up all 
power except his post as a consul within the year. In return the 
senate asked him to keep in control over the troops stationed in 
provinces which were not yet fully pacified and it conferred a 
corresponding command upon him. And only then did he 
receive, by a resolution of the senate, the honorary title of 
Augustus. This title (and the additional honours that acknowl-
edged his virtues75) gave him a sacral nimbus; its connotations 
and a possible allusion to auctorias are, however, far from 
clear76. 
A key document for the new officiai ideology is the Res 
Gestae Divi Augusti. Old Augustus had ordered that this record 
of his deeds and achievements be publicly displayed as an 
inscription on his Mausoleum at Rome. The original is lost; the 
text has been known since 1555 from a bilingual copy - in Latin 
and Greek - which had been discovered at Ancyra (now the 
Turkish capital). The crucial passage in which Augustus 
described his constitutional position after the so-called restora-
tion of the republic in 27 B.C. had survived only in the Greek 
version. The Greek term axioma was translated by Mommsen 
as dignitas11, which corresponded with Mommsen's theory that 
the principate should be considered like a republican magistra-
ture78. The hierarchy of magistrates corresponded to different 
degrees of dignity. In 1914 and 1924 fragments of another copy 
which had only the Latin text were found in Antiochia, another 
city in modern Anatolia. It turned out that the crucial term must 
75 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 34, 2. 
76 Suetonius, Augustus 7, 2; Ovid, Fasti 1, 607ff.; Cassius Dio 53, 16, 8; com-
pare Dietmar Kienast, Augustus. Prinzeps und Monarch, Darmstadt 1982, 80, 
n. 47; Edwin S. Ramage, The Nature and Purpose of Augustus "Res Gestae", 
Stuttgart 1987, 100ff. 
77 In his edition of the inscription, Berlin 1865; 2nd ed. 1883. 
78 Mommsen, Staatsrecht II/2, 749ff. 
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read auctoritas79. This detection fostered the boom of scholar-
ly works on this concept in the 1920s and 1930s which I had 
mentioned earlier. 
The key sentence now reads: «After this time [that is, the set-
tlement of 27 B.C.] I excelled all in authority [auctoritas], but I 
possessed no more power [potestas] than the others who were 
my colleagues in each magistracy»80. 
Two sentences earlier, Augustus had said that he had «trans-
ferred the republic from my power [potestas] to the dominion 
of the senate and people of Rome»81. We see that, as in 
Republican times, auctoritas is contrasted with potestas82, the 
competence of magistrates; it is the authority of the one and 
only princeps (as Augustus styled himself83) and not of the sen-
ate or of a smaller circle of leading senators. Augustus wanted 
to stress that he no longer had any extra-constitutional power in 
comparison to the other magistrates84 (and contrary to the mos 
maiorum85) and that his dominant position emanated from the 
exercise and acceptance of his auctoritas in a traditional sense. 
This was part of his strategy to present the new system as a 
restoration of the republic86 and to veil his position and leave it 
79 Compare Ernst Schoenbauer, Wesen und Ursprung des ròmischen 
Prinzipats, Zeitschrift fur Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung 47, 1927, 
264-318. 
80 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 34, 3. 
81 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 34, 1. 
82 In 2 B.C., Augustus received the title paterpatriae, father of the father-
land. That he mentions this title at the very end of his Res Gestae underlines 
that he considered it as the highest honour that had been conferred on him. 
A Roman father had auctoritas but also potestas in a legal sense over the 
members of his family. 
83 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 13; 30; 32, 3; compare Tacitus, Annales 1, 9, 5. 
84 That is why he did not accept the offer of a dictatorship in 22 B.C; Res 
Gestae Divi Augusti 5, 1. 
85 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 6, 1. 
86 Compare Velleius Paterculus 2, 89, 3f. (with the rather strange formula-
tion that Augustus restored the auctoritas of the courts and the maiestas of the 
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to others to interpret it87. However, the republic had not known 
a monopoly of auctoritas in the political sphere88. The domina-
tion of one man, who took his decisions behind closed doors 
and with the help of a kitchen cabinet, gives no room for auc-
toritas and consilium, as Cicero had remarked in 44 with 
respect to Caesar89. 
In the case of Augustus, the idea of a voluntary acceptance of 
auctoritas was reduced to a fiction, albeit a pleasant one90, in 
the context of the new political system that he had declared as 
the best possible government91. The emperor was in command 
over the military and over newly created paramilitary forces, he 
disposed of unprecedented competences (as the tribunicia 
potestas for life since 23 B.C.), he was pontifex maximus (since 
12 B.C.) and member of other priestly colleges, he controlled 
the elections of magistrates and the access to the senate, he was 
the initiator of new laws, he disposed of immense financial 
means to exercise patronage over soldiers and urban masses 
alike. The emperors (at least Augustus and his successor 
Tiberius) still used to ask the senate for advice und undertook 
certain measures ex auctoritate senatus92 but the senators must 
senate - maiestas had sometimes been associated with the Roman people, but 
not with the senate). 
87 Compare Wilhelm Weber, Princeps. Studien zur Geschichte des 
Augustus, Stuttgart 1936, 221. 
88 In a letter to Cicero, Brutus wrote in May 43, that Cicero had now 
acquired auctoritas to the highest degree that was tolerable in a free repub-
lic; Cicero, Epistulae ad Brutum 1, 4a (12), 2. 
89 Cicero, De o f f i c i i s 2, 2. 
90 The formulation "was neither wholly true, nor wholly false, but it was 
true enough to be believed by those who had no wish to challenge it", Frank 
E. Adcock, A Note on Res Gestae Divi Augusti 34, 3, Journal of Roman Studies 
4, 1952, 12. 
91 Suetonius, Augustus 28, 2. 
92 Res Gestae Divi Augusti 20, 4; Frontinus, De acquis urbis Romae 104. 
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have felt highly uncomfortable if, in matters of great impor-
tance, they had not been unequivocally instructed as to the 
specific advice that the emperor wanted to hear93. Since every-
body looked attentively to the emperor's instructions94, main-
taining the republican fagade depended on the ruler's self-
restraint. 
It is sometimes claimed in the scholarly literature that the 
Augustan auctoritas constituted a charismatic authority in the 
sense of Max Weber95. But this identification is only partly con-
vincing; it was not assumed that, due to supranatural qualities, 
he was the saviour one needed in a fundamental crisis96; rather, 
the assignment of such qualities followed only after the crisis 
had been overcome, at first with military means and then by a 
constitutional settlement which claimed a return to normality97. 
The sources do not enable us to trace the further develop-
ment of the notion of auctoritas in the post-Augustan princi-
pate. The assumption of some scholars that it was transformed 
into a sort of legal definition of the emperor's position98 is not 
supported by convincing evidence. We know the Enabling Law 
that was passed at the accession to the throne99. It conferred a 
93 See, for example, Tacitus, Annales 1, 74, 5; 2, 35. 
94 Tacitus, Annales 1, 4, 1. 
95 See Fritz Schulz, Prinzipien des ròmischen Rechts, Munchen 1934, 123f. 
96 On Weber's concept of charismatic leadership compare Wilfried Nippel, 
Charisma und Herrschaft, in: idem (ed.), Virtuosen der Macht. Herrschaft und 
Charisma von Perikles bis Mao, Munchen 2000, 7-22 and 281-289. 
97 Admittedly, the case of Augustus is complicated due to the fact that 
Caesar had been officially deified in 42 B.C., henceforth his adoptive son 
could claim to be divi filius. 
98 Anton von Premerstein, Vom Werden und Wesen des Prinzipats, Munchen 
1937; André Magdelain, Auctoritas principis, Paris 1947; compare for criticism 
Wolfgang Kunkel, Review of Magdelain, Zeitschrift fur Rechtsgeschichte. 
Romanistische Abteilung 70, 1953, 437-445; Jean Béranger, Recherches sur 
l'aspect idéologique du principat, Basel 1953, 116ff. 
99 An inscription, detected by Cola di Rienzo in 1347, gives the text of the 
law passed by the popular assembly at the accession of Vespasian in 70 A.D, 
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bundle of competences upon the emperor by popular legisla-
tion. Auctoritas has no place in this legal construction100. In later 
times it was understood that the emperor's will had acquired 
the force of law: «quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem», 
according to the formula recorded in the «Digest»101. 
All in all, it rather seems that auctoritas has lost its emphatic 
connotation. The often used formula, ex auctoritae principis, 
simply meant that a person or a body acted with a mandate of 
the emperor, but did not depict the source of legitimation of the 
emperor himself. 
A special form of delegation was the ius respondendi that 
Augustus created. A select number of jurists was now entitled to 
deliver opinions (responsa) ex auctoritate principis102. Probably, 
it simply meant «with permission of the Emperor» and did not 
imply that the Emperor's authority in an emphatic sense was 
the lex de imperio Vespasiani (in: Michael H. Crawford, ed., Roman Statutes, 
London 1996, vol. I, 549ff.); it refers to similar regulations in favour of former 
emperors since Augustus; however, it is not clear when such an enabling law 
was passed for the first time. 
100 Auctoritas is mentioned in the lex de imperio Vespasiani only in the for-
mulation that the senate could be convened by an order (ex auctoritate) of 
the emperor. 
101 Digesta (Ulpianus) 1, 4, 1 pr. The original meaning of the so-called dis-
cretionary clause of the lex de imperio Vespasiani that the emperor could do 
anything he thought best for the state is disputed since taken literally it would 
undermine the whole construction; perhaps it constituted only a sort of emer-
gency power. - The ambivalence of a construction that seemed to confer 
unlimited power, yet by popular legislation is underlined by the reception in 
later times; on the one hand it could be seen as a legitimation for absolutism, 
on the other hand as an expression of popular sovereignty (as Cola di Rienzo 
wanted to read it). 
102 The criteria for the selection of these privileged jurists are disputed; 
compare for divergent interpretations Wolfgang Kunkel, Das Wesen des ius 
respondendi, Zeitschrift fur Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung 66, 
1948, 423-457; Franz Wieacker, Augustus und die Juristen seiner Zeit, 
Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 37, 1969, 331-349. 
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applied to the jurists' opinion. In any case, the new procedure 
indicates that the social authority of the jurist was no longer 
considered as a sufficient basis for the interpretation and devel-
opment of the law. Augustus was apparently disturbed that 
opposing opinions of jurists shuttered legal security and thus is 
said to have made this decision out of concern about the 
authority of the law (auctoritas iuris)103. This might have led to 
the jurists' opinions having a major importance in the develop-
ment of the law104. But, at least in the second century A.D., such 
a trend was stopped; the importance of the responsa as sources 
of law began to decrease because of the numbers of imperial 
laws, decisions of imperial courts and the instructions the 
emperor gave to his judges in individual cases, which then 
became precedents for future ones. Finally, the authority of 
jurists was stripped of any social dimension by a law of 426 
A.D., which ruled that a judge could only consult the writings 
of five named jurists of the second and early third century, and 
that in case of disagreement, the majority of quotable authors 
should be decisive105. 
In the Roman Empire, the idea of auctoritas was also taken 
over by the church106. We can only follow this development 
with the beginning of a Christian literature in Latin from the late 
103 Digesta (Pomponius) 1, 2, 2, 49. 
104 According to a rule issued by the Emperor Hadrian responsa had the 
force of law if the opinions of jurists agreed; otherwise the judge was free in 
his decision; Gaius, Institutiones 1, 7; however, this rule is far from clear; com-
pare Franz Wieacker, Respondere ex auctoritate principis, in: Satura Roberto 
Feenstra, Fribourg (Suisse) 1985, 71-94. 
105 Codex Theodosianus 1, 4, 3. 
106 Compare Hendrik Wagenvoort / Gerd Tellenbach, "Auctoritas", in: 
Reallexikon fur Antike und Christentum, vol. 1 (1950), 902-909; Karl-Heinrich 
Lutcke, Auctoritas bei Augustin. Mit einer Einleitung zur ròmischen 
Vorgeschichte des Begriffs, Stuttgart 1968; Thomas Gerhard Ring, Auctoritas 
bei Tertullian, Cyprian und Ambrosius, Wurzburg 1975. 
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second-century onwards. Cyprianus, bishop of Carthage in the 
mid-third century, depicted the internal government of the 
church with categories of the Roman political tradition. He 
insisted on the sole decision-making power of the bishops, 
which is why he identified the potestas and auctoritas of a bish-
op. The bishop's auctoritas is an ingredient of the office and 
thus independent of the personal qualities of its incumbent. 
Cyprianus was fixed upon the internal stability of the church in 
view of the great crisis caused by persecutions that undermined 
ecclesiastical structures. In later times, the relationship between 
church and state became a point of issue. In the last decade of 
the fifth century, Pope Gelasius I protested against the emper-
or's interference with church matters by distinguishing between 
two powers - the spiritual authority (auctoritas) of the Roman 
See and the temporal power (potestas) of the Emperor. Though 
this opposition between auctoritas and potestas did not consti-
tute a clear-cut theory in the case of Gelasius107 it would 
become fundamental for the controversies about the relation-
ship of church and state during the Middle Ages. The claim of 
auctoritas for the church was backed by invoking the auctori-
tas of God, Christ and of the Bible. And auctoritas divina could 
also be identified with veritas. 
Thus it was a long and complicated path towards the identi-
fication of sovereign power and authority that Hobbes would 
later propagate. And, of course, neither Hobbes nor Carl 
Schmitt had the final word on this issue of authority. 
107 Compare Wilhelm EnBhn, Auctoritas und Potestas. Die 




2. POLITICAL THEOLOGY: THE AUTHORITY OF GOD 
2.1 Introduction 
There are two theses that are intimately related to the idea of 
authority. One is political theology. It is associated with Carl 
Schmitt. The second is moral theology. It is associated with 
Elizabeth Anscombe (though she never used the expression 
«moral theology»). Political theology is the claim that key 
notions of modern and secular political doctrines are unwit-
tingly moored in theological and teleological world-views. In 
their secularized version, these notions ultimately make no 
sense and thus can be validated only from within the kind of 
theological framework from which they come. «Sovereignty» 
and «Authority» are paradigmatic cases of such key notions. 
Moral theology makes a parallel claim. Key notions in mod-
ern moral doctrines are moored in a theological and teleologi-
cal framework, and depend on it for their meaning. Considered 
from within a modern secular framework, these doctrines have 
lost their significance. «Obligation» and «duty» are paradigmatic 
examples of such notions, as they are anchored in the ancient 
idea of God the law-giver. Without God the law-giver, these 
notions make very little sense. Secular morality is like the 
famous explanation of what is wireless. You know what wire is. 
It is like a dog. And if you pull its tail in Jerusalem, it will bark 
in Rome. Now, wireless works in the same way, but without the 
dog. Morality without God is like wireless without the dog. 
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I hold a moderate version of political and moral theology. On 
my account, authority and sovereignty do have a content which 
stands independently of a religious or theological framework. 
Still, I see these notions as being in the grip of a theological pic-
ture of the world. To be in the grip of a picture is to uncon-
sciously confuse a model of reality with reality itself. There are 
in fact two tiers to the picture of God. On the ground level, the 
idea of the theistic God and the authority of God is in the grip 
of the picture of God as the father or God as the King. But at the 
second tier, the idea of God the almighty creates a model which 
greatly intensifies the ideas of authority and sovereignty as 
models for earthly rulers and states. 
So what I would like to do now is explore an idea of author-
ity as it depicted by a religious picture (note the indefinite arti-
cle). It is just a picture and not the picture. Precisely, it is a pic-
ture of God as the supreme decision-maker, which does not 
also depict Him as a deliberator. I shall call this the decisionist 
picture of God. In this picture, God's authority is based on His 
absolute Will, and is unhindered by any laws and rules, and in 
particular by any laws of morality. The decisionist picture of 
God can also be seen as a fascist picture of God. This is perhaps 
abusive but not inaccurate. «That there must be», in the lan-
guage of the 18th-century jurist Blackstone, «a supreme, irre-
sistible, absolute, and uncontrolled authority, in which the... 
right of sovereignty resides». It is this idea and ideal that I am 
interested in. Pompously put, I am interested in the genealogy 
of authority. 
2.2 Who needs justification of authority? 
Anarchism in political theory has a function comparable to 
the null hypothesis in science. For political theory to justify 
authority, any authority, it should first provide cogent argu-
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ments against the anarchist claim that there is no justification for 
any political authority at all. 
Let me briefly state an anarchist argument against authority. 
A familiar idea, expressed in many different ways, is that you 
can do anything with bayonets except sit on them. Rule by the 
use of brute force («bayonets») is ultimately unstable (Rousseau 
argued that even the strongest man has to sleep and then he is 
vulnerable), hence the need for legitimacy. A legitimate ruler is 
accepted by its subjects and is thus free from having to con-
stantly oversee them. Rulers' pursuit of legitimacy is a manipu-
lative move to reduce the costs of using force; it is based on 
indoctrination rather than persuasion. Legitimacy is the use of 
force by other means. Legitimacy by indoctrination produces 
the belief that the state has authority. But this is not a justifica-
tion, in the sense of demonstrating that this belief is true. 
The anarchist is willing to accept expert authority. Expert 
advice, however, is different from authority based on com-
mand. 
The anarchist argues that authority is a matter of justification 
and that there is no justification for political authority, except 
that your own reasons for acting ultimately coincide with the 
reasons given by the authority in telling you what to do. But 
such justification has the status of expert advice, rather than 
command by political authority. Listening to the anarchist argu-
ment, one may be tempted to adopt Ramsey's philosophical 
strategy: if you see a philosophical dispute that goes on for too 
long without being resolved, see what the opposing sides have 
in common and deny that. 
The decisionist seems to follow Ramsey's strategy. He detects 
that both the anarchist and the believer in authority think that 
the issue between them is the issue of justification - the justifi-
cation of power. The anarchist denies that there is such justifi-
cation and the believer in authority believes that there is such 
justification. The decisionist denies the need for and the impor-
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tance of justification altogether, in the sense of giving reasons 
for the use of power. What really matters to the decisionist is the 
style in which the power is used, rather than the reasons for its 
use. By style, he means for example the ruler's being resolved 
and decisive. Justification by style rather than by content can be 
pretty absurd, as illustrated by the cutting philosophical joke by 
the scholar who summarized Heidegger's lecture, saying «I am 
resolved. I just don't know what on». There is a whole style of 
square jawed politicians who try to assert their authority by 
being decisive about nothing in particular. But what I have in 
mind is something far more sinister. Something casts its shadow 
on the decisionist picture. It is the decisive leader that Schmitt 
and Heidegger had in mind. 
I shall advance my little genealogy of the idea of authority in 
three stages: first, I will examine the authority of God; second, 
the authority of God's messengers; and third the authority 
God's scriptures. 
2.3. The Authority of God 
There seems to be no need to justify God's authority. One 
reason is that this authority is correlated with God's three attrib-
utes. He is omniscient, omnipotent and supremely benevolent. 
What better justification could there be than to obey the com-
mandments of such a perfect being? 
It takes Lucifer, the fiery fallen angel, to find God's attributes 
(especially his benevolence) irritating and to try to assert his 
freedom by rebelling against God's perfection. Lucifer's gesture 
expresses the Augustinian notion of the will, which includes the 
possibility of knowing the good and yet doing evil. Augustine's 
idea was so novel in philosophy and theology because it meant 
that simply recognizing the maximal attributes of God was not 
enough to secure actual acceptance of his reign. 
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But this of course does not mean that the three attributes do 
not provide justification; indeed these three attributes seem 
almost self-explanatory. But the God of the three attributes is 
the God of the philosophers. And the God of the philosophers 
is not the only picture of God that emerges from the scriptures. 
The Gnostic reading of the Bible, particularly of the Old 
Testament and many parts of the New (the parts ascribed to 
Paul), points to a very different interpretation. According to the 
Gnostics, the God of the Bible is a mischievous God who plays 
nasty tricks on us. This wretched God is the world's jailor, who 
keeps us from contacting the true God. The Gnostics did not 
ultimately challenge the authority of God, they only quarreled 
over which God should have it. 
The heretical Gnostic account is interesting in and of itself. 
Yet for our purposes, the important thing to remember is that 
the scriptures that are traditionally meant to provide reasons for 
accepting the authority of God can also be read very different-
ly. The trick lies in switching the light, switching from reading 
the text in the best light to reading it in the worst one. The tra-
ditional reading of the Bible tries to present the God of the 
scriptures in the best light; the Gnostics present God in the 
worst light, and thus provide powerful reasons for subverting 
his authority. So the issue of justifying the authority of God 
depends on the question of how to describe the God whose 
authority we accept. 
Turning now to the God of the philosophers: there is a ten-
sion between two of God's attributes, which should concern us 
with respect to justifying God's authority. There is a tension 
between his omnipotence and his benevolence. Now I am not 
referring to the banal tension between God's omnipotence and 
benevolence on the one hand, and the evil found in world on 
the other. The tension that I have in mind is of a different sort: 
it is how to reconcile God's omnipotence with his benevolence, 
so as to prevent the omnipotent God from being constrained by 
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the good. The decisionist holds that God who is constrained by 
the good is not omnipotent, and hence being constrained by 
the good diminishes God's absolute sovereignty. On the deci-
sionist account, God's absolute authority rests on his absolute 
will, namely, on his capacity to decide the way he wants, 
unhindered by anyone and anything. Any of God's decisions 
may of course be regarded as good by definition. But this is 
uninteresting, because if he had decided to do the opposite, 
that too would have been regarded as good. The goodness of 
his decision is thus independent of its content. God's will is 
beyond good and evil. This chain of thoughts with regard to 
God's omnipotence and sovereignty is what motivates the deci-
sionist picture of God as the One who is supremely capable of 
making decisions which are absolutely unconstrained, and 
specifically unconstrained by moral laws. 
The particular focus of the decisionist picture is anchored in the 
view of both the mind and the body as living phenomena. The 
mind has a psychic force that is exerted on and by its owner to 
bring about things in the world. This force is the will. The will is 
what distinguishes individual personalities. According to the the-
istic view, God has personality without having a body. His will not 
is the most characteristic trait of his personality, not his reason. 
God presides over the world in the same way that the mind pre-
sides over the body. In both cases, the will is what makes the pre-
siding possible. The will is manifested in the faculty of decision, 
but it should regarded as an internal primary force; in the case of 
God, it is the force to determine the world. In this view, the will is 
the ability to start a causal chain that can be ascribed to the indi-
vidual subject of the will. He is the creator of this chain. 
God's force of will is so overpowering that there is no way of 
recognizing it without admiring and thereby surrendering to it. 
Humans have the will to power; God has the power of the will. 
Thus the decisionist picture of God provides God's true answer 
to Job. Admiration should replace justification. 
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According to the decisionist picture, God's will is, paradoxi-
cally, a normative brute force. It is a brute force, in the sense 
that it is a will that can bring about things without being con-
strained by any antecedent reasons, since acting for reasons 
means that independent reasons have power over God and 
thus undermine God's absolute authority. But God who exer-
cises brute force arbitrarily may have mere coercive power over 
us but not the legitimacy needed for authority. It may be pru-
dent to obey his will but there is no duty to do so. So the deci-
sionist fantasy also wants us to ascribe a normative character to 
God's will, and feel a sense of duty in bowing down to it. The 
decisionist wants to depict God the father and not the 
Godfather. Whereas God the Godfather is a brute force with no 
normative quality, God the father is a brute force which also has 
a normative character. God's will, though ultimately arbitrary, is 
not necessarily despotic or mischievous. It can be a benign will, 
like the one we meet in the forgiving God: the act of forgive-
ness or amnesty is a benevolent act of a sovereign, which is not 
justified by reasons of law. It is rather a gratuitous act of grace 
that the sovereign is free to enact. God the father is a forgiving 
god and not a ferocious oriental despotic god, at least not by 
temperament. He is the benevolent manifestation of the deci-
sionistic image of God. But God's authority does not hinge on 
his benevolence. God's benevolence is a bonus, not a condition 
of his authority. 
Carl Schmitt drew an interesting analogy: «the exception in 
jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology» (Political 
Theology, p. 36). The point of this analogy is that it is precisely 
when the laws fail to constrain the sovereign that he manifests 
his full power to decide and hence his authority. Miracles man-
ifest the sovereignty of God. He can bend the laws of nature to 
his will and thereby create exceptions to the law. For political 
ruler, it is in the cases of exceptions to the laws, as in times of 
war and states of emergency, when nothing constrains the will 
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of the sovereign and his power and authority are exerted in full. 
This explains why fascists thrive on crisis situations of emer-
gency and why war plays such key role in their thinking. It is 
not the mere fascination with the excitement of war which is at 
the center of the fascist picture of politics. It is also the fascina-
tion with authority. It is in war and emergency crises that unre-
strained and unconstrained decisionism flourishes, and the 
authority of the sovereign is on full display. But this benighted 
picture of the sovereign acting outside the law can just as easi-
ly be a benign picture of giving amnesty in which the sovereign 
also acts outside the law. 
We may well argue that the human capacity to decide upon 
an action is a capacity to act for reasons. It follows that the idea 
of God as a being with a will should also have been based on 
his capacity to act for reasons - a higher reason to be sure but 
reasons all the same. Acting for reasons as a manifestation of 
the will is very much played down in the fascist picture of God, 
as it is in the secular fascist picture of man. The God of hosts as 
the supreme commander in the cosmic struggle is the best 
exemplar of the will that, in the fascist picture, commands 
respect. Respect here means submission of human will to this 
overpowering force. Submission of human will does not mean 
the annihilation of human wants. On the contrary, the more one 
is inclined to do A the more value is attached to one's not doing 
it. A famous rabbinical dictum says «I should not say that I do 
not want pork. I do, but what can I do when my father in heav-
en commands me not to» (Sifra, Kedusihm). It is God's inexpli-
cable will against individual will, and his is stronger. 
Authority lies not in Reason but in the power to take impor-
tant decisions. The authority of God is based on his matchless 
power to decide. The corresponding secular principle of the 
authority of the big decider is terribly grim. It is the 
Fuhrerprinzip that grounds the absolute authority of the leader 
in his charismatic power as a resolute decider. The fascist pic-
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ture of God is far from being the most common picture of God, 
nor is it the only one. But it would be excessively apologetic to 
deny its existence. This picture takes the idea of the absolute 
authority and sovereignty of God as the key concepts in depict-
ing God as the king of kings - the one true king, who is also the 
lord of hosts.There is another picture of God, which I shall call 
the feudal picture. The feudal picture casts the lord's authority, 
and the loyalty owed to him, as earned by favors that he or his 
ancestors bestowed on his vassals or their ancestors. Here, 
authority and loyalty are based on gratefulness. 
In a similar vein, Judaism teaches that each and every human 
being should be grateful to God for the gift of creation, and thus 
obey his will. Jews also have a special obligation of gratefulness 
for being delivered from Egypt, «the house of slavery». The jus-
tification of feudal authority is based not on present or future 
benefits, but on past ones. In the feudal picture of God, God is 
both a father and a king, and his authority is both paternal and 
royal. The father's authority is earned by his giving us our lives. 
He is our progenitor. In the case of a king, it is usually due to 
his or his ancestors providing protection when it was most 
needed. 
The feudal picture of God does find the need to justify his 
authority. His authority is not self-explanatory. But giving life is 
a good justification for recognizing authority, while acting 
against the will of the one who gave us life is being ungrateful 
in the extreme. 
There are two trends in political philosophy: one is interest-
ed in political power as the main feature of political life, the 
other in the justification of political power. The first trend tries 
to avoid the project of justification, but it doesn't altogether. 
One such justification in the decisionist picture is that stable 
political power produces stability and order. Stability and order, 
the negation of anarchy, is a good justification of power. The 
decisionist picture, though downplaying the need to justify 
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power, tacitly assumes justification due to stability and order. 
This justification takes the form of justification by protection, 
which it partly shares with the feudal justification. 
What the decisionist and feudal pictures share can be termed 
the protectionist model of authority. Authority is justified if it 
can provide effective protection for its subjects. The idea of 
God as the best protector of his servants is consistent with this 
picture. The political theology of «security philosophers» such 
as Hobbes is very much in the grip of this picture. Security 
philosophers put a premium on securing life rather than on 
securing the good life. Security is the only goal worth pursing 
in politics. Any power that can secure life is thereby authorita-
tive. 
Protection is manifested in order and stability. Any order and 
stability can justify the power which is effectively capable of 
imposing it. The content of that stable order is, however, imma-
terial to the justification of the authority. We should judge use 
of power by the Sicilian mafia in the same way as we judge the 
Spanish government's use of power - by the protection it pro-
vides. When Carl Schmitt addresses Hobbes' protectionist 
Leviathan as the expression of a kindred decisionist soul, he 
endlessly quotes Hobbes' saying: «auctoritas, non veritas». This 
is the essence of the political order. The essence of auctoritas 
is order, not moral order but any order, be it in heaven or on 
earth. 
So far we have encountered three justifications for the 
authority of God. All were rooted in rather unflattering pictures: 
the fascist picture based on sheer decisionism, the feudal pic-
ture based on gratefulness and the protectionist («mafia») pic-
ture based on protection. These three pictures, and their corre-
sponding justifications for the authority of God, are by no 
means the most common ones, but it would be a mistake to 
view them as merely eccentric. 
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2.4. The Authority of the Messenger 
The word of God is conveyed by a messenger, a prophet. 
How to distinguish the true messenger from a false one was a 
major concern of the Bible. The messenger is not a mere post-
man, nothing but a vehicle for transmitting the word of God. 
The most interesting contemporary issue of a messenger's 
authority centers on the prophetic authority of Muhammad. In 
one sense, he is as close to God's postman as anyone can be, 
since Islam makes the strong claim that Muhammad received a 
book, the Koran, filled with both words and meanings. But 
Muhammad's authority cuts much deeper than that of a passive, 
though divine, messenger. In one important sense Muhammad 
is more like Jesus than Moses; he is not only a messenger but 
he is the message as well. 
Unlike Jesus, the Prophet Muhammad does not have two 
natures, a human and a Divine one. Islam regards imputing 
God's nature to anyone and anything as idolatry. The Prophet 
is no exception. But the prophet does have two personae: the 
human and the prophetic. He is fallible as a human, but in his 
prophetic mode, he is infallible in both words and deeds. 
So apart from the Koran, a book conveying the word of God, 
Muhammad's deeds and words, as told by an authentic tradition 
(sunnat al- nabi), are another source of authority in Islam. 
Even the word of God in the Koran can only be understood in 
the light of the Sunna. In the case of the Koran, there is both 
phonetic fanaticism and meaning fanaticism. Both the words 
and the meanings are given by heaven. But in the case of the 
holy stories about Muhammed (hadith), the meaning - the con-
tent of the stories - is constant, but there is no phonetic fanati-
cism with regard to the wording. This differential wording does 
not however detract from the normative force of an authentic 
story about the life of Muhammad in Sunni Islam. In Shi'a Islam 
this status of authority is transferred in part to the messianic 
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Imams. Imitation of Muhammad is not just a pedagogical ideal 
of imitating the life of a perfect human being. Muhammad led a 
normative existence. His life has normative force commanding 
how Muslims ought to lead their lives. His life is a source of 
authoritative commandments and not just a fountain of good 
advice. This amounts to a strong doctrine of the infallibility of 
the Prophet and his God-like authority. 
What does all this have to do with the picture of religious 
decisionism? A great deal, I believe. Islam's two authentic 
sources of authority, Koran and Sunnat al nabi, can create the 
impression that decisionism does not hold with respect to 
Islam, since decisionism assumes that the unity of the will of 
God is the only legitimate authority. However this impression is 
wrong. The Prophet as a prophet has no independent will of his 
own. Muhammad is a Muslim, meaning one who totally surren-
ders his will to the will of God. 
This point calls for further elucidation. The ultimate sin in Islam, 
as in Judaism, is the sin of idolatry. In Islam, idolatry does not mean 
the sin of replacing God (Allah) with another (false) god, but rather 
giving God a partner. To view the Prophet as a partner to God is a 
terrible blasphemy. This does not mean that God has no servants 
in his heavenly court - the angels are such servants. What distin-
guish a servant from a partner is that he has no will of his own. The 
great Islamic teacher Al-Gazzali (d. 1111) expressed this point 
forcefully: «though men, genii, angels and devils might conspire 
together either to put one simple atom in motion, or cause it to 
cease its motion, without His will and approbation, they would not 
able to do so». This holds true for the prophet as well. As I claim, 
Muhammad's life is part of God's message, as much as it is the 
revealed word of God to Muhammad. Hence the authentic stories 
about his life are authoritative stories that express God's will 
through the medium of Muhammad's life. 
On this account, the authority of Muhammad does not under-
mine the decisionist picture of Allah but in fact reinforces it. 
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But the dialectic here is more complicated. Radical political 
Islam, which plays up Muhammad's authority, especially in 
political matters, seems to turn quickly from admiration of the 
prophet to his deification. Modern radical Islamic movements 
(both conservative and reformist) appealed to the two original 
sources of authority, the Koran and the Sunnat al-nabi, to chal-
lenge the authority of the four schools which dominated Islam 
for hundreds of years. They were even called the people of the 
Koran and the people of the Hadith. There was actually much 
tension between these two movements, but they had a com-
mon enemy in the classical law (taqlid), and its learned estab-
lishment, the Ulma. Thus, in the name of authenticity triumph-
ing over a corrupt tradition, political Islam is aiming towards 
something like Muhammad's direct rule over the pristine com-
munity of the early days. In doing so, its exponents tend to 
regard the Sunnat al-nabi as the primary source of authority. 
Though Islamists in no way seek to undermine the authority of 
God, their privileging of the Sunnat al-nabi does create a dual-
ity of authority, a duality that they themselves would find 
shocking. 
Let me address a question that hovers over my whole discus-
sion and is very much at the center of Islamic thinking. 
If, according to the decisionist picture, justification is not the 
ground for accepting authority, what is? 
Let's look first at the motives for human acceptance of God's 
authority. This is an important religious issue, specifically rela-
tive merits and demerits of accepting God's authority out or 
love or out of fear. Joseph Raz has insightful things to say about 
the meaning of accepting God's authority out of love. The lover 
who wants to have the same taste in music as her beloved is not 
just trying instrumentally to ingratiate herself but instead to be 
one with him. 
The decisionist picture of religion seeks something else: a 
fusion of fear and love for the veneration of God and the 
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acceptance of his authority. The fusion of love and fear is what 
creates ambivalence, according to Freud's account; first, 
towards the primal despotic father and then towards God the 
Father. The decisionist is not interested in deep psychology but 
in effective submission; the combination of the two works best 
for obtaining submission. Stalin made even his admirers shiver, 
but many also sobbed bitterly at his funeral. For the decisionist, 
the combination of tremors of fear and tears of love is just about 
right. The decisionist picture of God has strong hold on politi-
cal Islam. 
It is directed against another source of authority in Islam, the 
legalistic authority of the four schools of Islamic law. As a mat-
ter of fact, this source of authority was most influential in shap-
ing religious life in the Islamic world. Of course this legalistic 
source of authority presents itself as derived from the Koran 
and the Sunna, but it is in fact an independent source of author-
ity. 
2.5. The Authority of the Scriptures 
For most religious thinkers, God's authority is so obvious that 
it does not call for any justification. God is posited as the self-
justified authority, and other authorities are justified by their 
relation to the authority of God. Though the authority of God 
does not pose a problem for many thinkers, what counts as the 
authoritative Word of God still does. The word of God is author-
itative. But who decides what the word of God is? Politically, 
the authority to determine what is the authoritative word of 
God is far more relevant than God's authority to begin with. 
How does the authority of the word of God fit in with the 
decisionist picture of God? Let me redraw the outlines of the 
decisionist picture. God is a personality with no body. The main 
trait of his personality is his will. It is his will and not his reason 
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that counts, because reason does not individuate a personality. 
Reason in principle is shared by all. 
The will of God is the individuating principle of God's per-
sonality. The will individuates personality in the same way that 
matter rather than form individuates substances in Aristotelian 
metaphysics. Matter is corrupt, so it cannot be imputed to God. 
The immaterial will is thus supposed to do the trick of marking 
God's uniqueness. The will of God is the unifying principle of 
his complicated personality. It is a simple will. This is the basic 
view of the decisionist picture of God. 
The will of God is expressed by his commands more than by 
anything else that he says and does. To be a believer is to 
accept his authority and obey his command. To be a true ser-
vant of God is to achieve the highest religious status. Moses and 
Muhammad were such servants indeed, or even slaves. To carry 
out the will of God is to obey his command, and to obey his 
command requires an interpretation of his words. There are 
about 6000 verses in the Koran, but only 200 of them are con-
veyed by imperative sentences. By command, I understand 
roughly what Hobbes says: «Does this or Does not this, without 
expecting any other reason than, the Will of him that says it». 
God is a super commander. But commands call for understand-
ing, an understanding not of the reasons for the command, but 
an understanding of what to do to execute them. Commands 
may be baffling. One reason is that they are not always linguis-
tically marked by imperative moods. The epitome of the bibli-
cal law is the Ten Commandments, which are for the most part 
marked by the imperative mood of «you shall not» (kill, steal, 
covet etc.). But then it is generally accepted that «I am the Lord» 
is the first commandment and this is given in an indicative state-
ment and does not look like a command. For it to be a com-
mand it should already presuppose the authority of God to 
command. But to believe in God and accept his authority is 
what the first commandment commands. Roughly speaking 
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Judaism and Islam are action-centered religions, consistent with 
the decisionist picture of authority as expressed in commands. 
Christianity, by contrast, is more of a belief-centered religion 
(Man is justified by faith). 
The prophet Muhammad was the first to coin the very useful 
expression «people of the book». He meant Jews and Christians. 
Muslims, through their messenger Muhammad, join this book 
club too. The idea is that all these religions, unlike the religions 
of the heathens, are based in scripture. Jews and Christians are 
entitled to protection under Islamic rule for the very fact that 
they are people of the book. Being people of the book does not 
mean that there is primacy of the written word of God over the 
spoken word. Indeed, for religious purposes, hearing is more 
important than seeing. Faith after all is, in the language of the 
famous eleventh chapter of Hebrews, «the conviction of things 
not seen». But whether the scriptures were handed over as a 
book or were reveled by a spoken word (and were committed 
in writing by prophets), there are written canonical texts at the 
center of each of the three religions. The authority to determine 
the canon is important to the understanding of religious and 
political authority. An excellent account of canonization in 
Judaism can be found in Moshe Halbertal's «People of the 
Book». 
Who the people of the Book are can be a highly contestable 
matter. Heretics swear in the name of the holy books that they 
and only they are the «true» people of the book. One may argue 
that in some peculiar way «the Book» is even more important to 
heretics and fundamentalists than to the orthodoxy. Appeal to 
the book is a way to offset the authority of the orthodoxy that 
counts in fact more on «living traditions» than on the book itself. 
Paradoxically put, «the people of the book» are the fundamen-
talists and the heretics who try to undermine traditional reli-
gious and political authorities by direct appeal to the authority 
of the book. 
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What, according to the decisionist picture of God, is the right 
interpretation of the scripture? Right interpretation is the inter-
pretation that gets God's intentions right. But this is easier said 
than explained. 
The influential literary theory of the «intentional fallacy» holds 
that literary interpretation should not pursue the author's inten-
tion, but should instead be based on the shared linguistic mean-
ings of the words. Various arguments are advanced to promote 
the idea of «the intentional fallacy», including a denial of first 
person authority over her own words. 
For the decisionist picture, God's authority over his own 
words is of great moment. It ties in with another religious pic-
ture of God - the creator picture or the creator fallacy. 
According to this picture, only the creator fully knows what he 
created. The potter knows everything there is to know about 
his products and the carpenter knows everything about the 
tables and cupboards that she produces. God as the creator of 
the world is the sole being that knows the world. Stories origi-
nating in Prague exposed the creator picture as a creator falla-
cy. First the old story about the Golem and then the new story 
about the Robots. In both stories, the creator lost control over 
his products. It is this loss of control over one's artifacts that 
shaped the modern sensibility of not understanding the world 
we created around ourselves. In any case, God is the author of 
his world. He created the world and handed down a book 
based on his creation (though in Islam there is a doctrine of the 
eternity of the Koran), so he is in the best position to know 
everything about the meanings of his words. Moreover he is not 
constrained by the plain meanings of the words. He is the sov-
ereign. This last claim is actually untenable, since the only the-
ory of meaning that goes with such account is the Humpty 
Dumpty theory: «when I use a word it means just what I choose 
it to mean». Remember how Humpty Dumpty famously turns 
«glory» into «a nice knock down argument». 
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The decisionist picture of interpretation is pushed into a 
Humpty Dumpty position. There is no glory in this account and 
it is nothing but a knock down argument against God's com-
manding his creatures to obey his will in whatever language he 
pleases. The point is that a decisive and deciding God who 
exerts his authority by commanding his creatures should make 
sure that they understand him. And this can be done if and only 
if God speaks in the language of his creatures, which puts many 
strictures on what he can and cannot say. The decisionist can 
ignore morality but not linguistics. Human understanding is a 
constraint upon the way God understands himself, even when 
God is trying to be a decisionist God who is unconstrained by 
morality. 
The decisionist picture of God may not be a coherent picture 
- a great deal hinges on how we understand God's omnipo-
tence - but this does not stop it from being an influential pic-




3. TRUST IN AUTHORITY 
Here is a list of the main points I shall make in what follows: 
- that authority can be practical or theoretical and it can be 
personal or impersonal; 
- that there are two formative models of personal authority: 
paternalistic authority v. expert authority, and that these 
models inform/affect the case of impersonal (or institu-
tional) authority; 
- that trust in an institution is not a necessary condition for 
sustaining its authority; 
- that distrust, by contrast, plays a significant role in eroding 
the authority of institutions, especially if it is widespread 
and if there is common knowledge of this; 
- that despotic regimes do not need to worry about distrust: 
they rely on bayonets and on fear; 
- that democracies need to worry about institutional distrust; 
- that distrust in institutional authority can arise when the 
institution is seen as partial or corrupt; 
- that distrust in institutional authority can also arise when it 
is seen as non-expert, as lacking special knowledge. 
"Familiarity breeds distrust." 
«In God we trust», proclaims the American dollar. The God in 
whom we trust is the supreme authority. Does this imply that 
God is the only authority - that only in God we trust? Bumper 
stickers in Israel proclaim: «We have no trust except in our heav-
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enly father». This is more helpful: it says explicitly that only in 
God do we trust. It is also helpful in another respect. It explic-
itly equates God with the father. 
Is trust in God to be understood on the model of trusting 
daddy? Or does God come first? 
The question in turn relates to what is the formative picture 
that has a primary hold on us: is it our trust in God, such that 
trust in daddy is a derivative of it, or is it the other way around? 
God is omniscient; but then, «daddy knows best». Knowing 
all or knowing best surely affects our trust in either one. But 
their superior knowledge is not sufficient. They also have to be 
competent in order for us to trust them; they have to be able to 
deliver. Well, God is not only omniscient, he is also omnipotent. 
Daddy may not be - but for the small child he is. And there is 
also a third requirement. It has to do with benevolence. God is 
all-good, as well as omniscient and omnipotent. As for daddy, 
his "knowing best" should be construed as not only knowing 
most but also as always knowing what is best for me. 
Daddy wants and aims at my well-being. 
Defining authority as the power to make decisions for others, 
God and the father are models of authority. They are models 
both of theoretical (doxastic, epistemic) authority and of practi-
cal authority. Theoretical authority tells you what to believe, 
practical authority tells you what to do. If I am on the receiving 
end of some authority, it is not the case that the authority mere-
ly supplies me with additional reasons for believing that p or for 
doing x. Rather, it gives me exclusionary reasons (in Raz's 
sense) for belief or for action, reasons that are supposed to 
trump all other reasons. It is practical authority that I want to 
explore in the main bulk of this paper. 
Still, I shall have something to say, at the end, about a specific 
historical example of a peculiar theoretical-religious authority: I 
shall present the case of the Teacher of Righteousness of the 
Dead Sea sect and the unique genre of pesharim that came to 
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light among the Dead Sea scrolls. This literary genre is associat-
ed with a special kind of authority exerted by the Teacher, and 
by the texts that he is believed to have authored. 
3.1 Paternalistic Authority 
Regardless of who is the primary model and who the derivative, 
both God and the father exemplify what we may term personal 
authority. Contrasted with personal authority is impersonal author-
ity, which is vested, typically, in a regime or in its institutions and 
agencies (such as the police or the courts). Personal authority on 
the model of God or the father is paternalistic. It knows what is best 
for you, and it wants what is best for you. Or at least this is what you 
believe - or, sometimes, this is what the authority will make you 
believe. Furthermore, personal authority makes decisions on your 
behalf. You should trust this authority and comply with it. 
The particular paternalistic pattern of authority involves a rela-
tion of near-ownership. The believer "belongs" to God in much the 
same way that the child belongs to his or her father. This property 
relation is supposed, in and of itself, to account for the authority 
exerted by the owner upon the owned. But the ownership here is 
of a special kind. God and the father own their children qua their 
makers or creators. The authority of makers over their creations 
supposedly derives from the notion that the maker qua maker 
knows his creation - his child - best, and hence that the maker also 
knows what is best for his child, and that he wants it. 
Personal authority may be paternalistic in an even wider sense 
than is exemplified by God and the father. The authority of the feu-
dal lord over his vassals is an example. It, too, is based on owner-
ship relations. But here the lord owns his vassals in the sense that 
they are his property, not in the sense that he is their creator and 
maker. Further away still from the model of God and father is the 
authority exercised, for example, by a plantation owner or a sweat-
55 
shop boss over his workers, or by a tyrant over his people (think 
of a Peron-type or a Papa Doc-type tyrant). Here there is no own-
ership, strictly speaking, but rather pure subjection. 
Such authority relations need not be paternalistic, but they can 
be. And inasmuch as these authority relations are paternalistic there 
seems to be a conscious effort on the part of the "pater" to style 
them on the father model. Typical of such authority relations is the 
constant invocation of the family metaphor: the workers/subjects 
are like children; the boss is like their father. It is clearly in the inter-
est of the boss to use this metaphor and to have his subordinates 
internalize it. He would want them to believe that he cares about 
them and that he knows what is best for them, and therefore they 
should expect him to tell them what to do. Their role is to be grate-
ful and to obey. The father's authority over his children is natural 
and its legitimacy is not questioned. By exploiting the family 
metaphor, the idea is that the naturalness and legitimacy of the 
father's authority will carry over smoothly to the relationship 
between master and subordinates, thus assuring their obedience. 
In authority relations that are modeled, whether narrowly or 
broadly, on the paternalistic father/child relationship, trust in 
the authority is implicit and taken for granted. Of course, such 
trust is not always justified and it can be betrayed. Gods may 
fail. The phenomenon of a father who betrays the trust of his 
children by exploiting or abusing them is both familiar and 
abhorrent to us, regardless of historical period and social con-
text. In contrast, the exploitation and abuse of subordinates by 
their masters and rulers, say in feudal or early modern times, is 
commonplace and almost to be expected. There is much to 
explore here, regarding the psychological mechanisms that 
connect fear of a despotic-paternalistic authority with trustful 
obedience to it. The first link in the putative causal chain is from 
fear to obedience. This is straightforward. The second more 
complex link is from obedience to trust, via the machinations of 
the dependence relation and of both cognitive and emotional 
dissonance. I shall not pursue these issues here. 
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3.2 Expert Authority 
In addition to personal authority relations that are paternalis-
tic there are also non-paternalistic relations of personal author-
ity. These are mostly exercised by experts. Expert authority is 
the second formative model of authority, at the opposite pole 
of the father/God model. 
We defer to experts in a variety of domains and we let them 
control, to some extent, what we believe and what we do. The 
tax consultant, the doctor, the home decorator are authorities 
for us by virtue of their special knowledge and professionalism. 
They generally know better, and in some cases they know best, 
and so we take their word for it. 
But is not the source of paternalistic authority precisely this, 
namely that it knows best - or at least that it is supposed to know 
best? So how is personal authority of the expert variety different 
from personal authority of the paternalistic variety? Well, in the first 
place let us recall that «daddy knows best» was only one element 
in what constitutes the paternalistic authority of the father. In addi-
tion to knowledge (or omniscience, in the case of God) there were 
also the elements of competence (or omnipotence, in the case of 
God), of benevolence, and of proprietorship. These additional ele-
ments are not constitutive of authority relations of the expert kind. 
On the other hand, the element of knowledge - of special knowl-
edge - is dominant in the case of authority exercised by experts. 
Secondly, expert authority relations are contractual in nature, 
and are typically entered into voluntarily. They are also limited in 
scope: they concern the patient's knee operation, the customer's 
tax returns or the client's plan to build an attic. Paternalistic 
authority relations, in contrast, are non-voluntary and they tend 
to be of a wide, sometimes all-encompassing scope. The child 
defers to the father in just about everything, and so does the vas-
sal to his lord and the subject to the tyrant. But the essential point 
of difference seems to be this. The paternalistic authority is per-
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sonal in the strict sense of being de dicto and non-substitutable. 
This particular person is my father and as such my fatherly 
authority, while the authority exerted upon me by my doctor or 
by the dean of my faculty is ex o f f i c i o , qua my doctor or my dean, 
regardless of who the actual person is who happens to sit in that 
particular chair. What this involves is something neither entirely 
impersonal nor strictly personal. It is in their social roles or capac-
ities that my doctor or my dean can exert authority over me. Last 
year it may have been a different doctor, next year the dean will 
be replaced: the persons exercising this kind of personal author-
ity are in this sense substitutable. 
The status of what expert authorities tell us to do is different 
from the status of what paternalistic authorities tell us to do: it is 
more in the nature of advice, not command. The price for non-
compliance is not external punishment but rather, at worst, having 
to live with the consequences of wrong decisions. Still, in both 
cases noncompliance involves a disutility of one sort or another, 
which has to be taken into account in one's overall practical delib-
eration. Trust in expert authority differs markedly from trust in 
paternalistic authority. It depends on the extent to which the 
authority is believed to possess expert knowledge relevant to the 
situation at hand, and it is limited to the domain of that expert 
knowledge. We usually turn to expert authority voluntarily, and 
we usually turn to the authority we judge to be best and most 
trustworthy, subject to some obvious constraints such as access, 
financial resources, time etc. We will normally not turn to an expert 
authority who we have prima facie reasons to distrust. Whether or 
not the experts turn out to justify the trust bestowed on them is a 
different matter.Expert authority, as mentioned before, is not limit-
ed to practical matters of how to act and what to do. 
Expert authority can also be theoretical. We may turn to experts 
in order to know what to believe. Einstein is an authority for us in 
matters of physics and Stephen Jay Gould in maters of paleontol-
ogy. As for the Pope or the Lubavicher Rebbe, well, they are cer-
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tainly authorities for many people in matters of belief (even though 
I hesitate in referring to them as strictly theoretical authorities). I 
note in passing that religious authorities function not only as 
authorities for what to believe but often also as authorities for what 
to do and how to do it. In Judaism, the practical facet of the reli-
gious authority is especially pronounced, the rabbi being expect-
ed to issue halakhic decrees on every aspect of daily life. 
3.3 The Matrix 
The discussion until now concerned two models of personal 
authority. This will serve me as scaffolding for my main con-
cern, which is impersonal authority within a democratic frame-
work. But before continuing, let me pause for a moment and 
consider the following classificatory schema: 




God, Pope, rabbi, 
lord, tyrant "eminence" 
personal 
authority [Teacher of 
Righteousness? - see 
last section] 
non-paternalist: 









(courts, police etc.) 
the Church 
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The discussion thus far belongs mostly in the upper left and 
upper right cells of this matrix, comprising the paternalist and 
the non-paternalist models of personal authority - both practi-
cal and theoretical. I want now to turn to impersonal authority 
of the practical kind (the lower left cell). I want to look at insti-
tutions that have some control over what we do, and to focus 
on the question of trust in such institutional authorities. In par-
ticular, I want to ask whether the authority of institutions 
depends on our trusting them. Basically I shall argue for an 
asymmetry thesis. Namely, that the question of trust does not 
really come up with regard to institutional authority: it is distrust 
that counts. The relevant question to ask is when does trust in 
the authority of institutions in a democracy break down, and 
what are the consequences. 
An etymological digression: the New Collegiate Dictionary 
lists several distinct meanings for the word "authority". It has 
the «power to influence or command thought, opinion, or 
behavior». Using the terminology used here, this is both theo-
retical and practical authority. Also: «person in command; 
specif: government; a governmental agency or corporation, as 
in "the transit authority"» - namely, personal and institutional 
authority. In addition, the dictionary includes: «an individual 
cited or appealed to as an expert». The dictionary does not stop 
here, however. Among the further entries we find: «a citation 
used in defense or support; the source from which the citation 
is drawn; testimony; grounds, warrant». These latter meanings 
reflect the fact that the word "authority" comes from "author" 
(Latin: auctor), meaning «promoter, originator, author; source». 
Now in Hebrew the word for authority (samchut) does not 
derive from authorship. But it does turn up revealing connec-
tions. The three-letter root for authority is "s-m-ch". And when 
we check the various Hebrew words that derive from this root, 
we find (inter alia): support, lean against, rely on and have 
confidence in; accreditation and certification; to back or to sup-
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port by evidence; reference and documentation; an expert; per-
mission, right and power. Some of these cognates will turn up 
in what follows. 
3.4 Trust in Institu,tional Authority 
It is taken to be a necessary condition of a well-functioning 
democracy that its citizens trust its institutional authorities. 
Social institutions are sometimes seen as trust mediators. In 
modern mass democracies, in contrast to the intimate city-states 
of ancient times, no level of general interpersonal familiarity 
and trust can be assumed. As a result, an important role of insti-
tutions is to facilitate social transactions by essentially replacing 
the need for personal trust among citizens. Consider, for exam-
ple, the role of legally binding contracts as a replacement for 
promises. On the other hand, once institutions are in place, in 
order for them to fulfill their role as trust substitutes it is often 
supposed that citizens need to trust them. So, for example, in 
order for contracts between individuals to work it is commonly 
said that the individuals need to have trust in the country's legal 
system and in its enforcement mechanisms. 
A number of writers seem to diagnose a malaise in many con-
temporary democracies, where a general decline in the degree 
of trust in institutional authorities is observed. This relates to 
both public and private institutions. There is substantial evi-
dence, for example, that institutional trust in the US has been 
declining for several decades - in federal government, univer-
sities, medical institutions and journalism, as well as in several 
major private companies. These finding are alarming if the 
authority of an institution is directly linked to its ability to func-
tion properly, and if its ability to function properly depends in 
no small measure upon the public's trust in it. 
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According to another view, the authority of representative 
democracy goes hand in hand with a modicum of distrust. «A 
certain amount of distrust», says Hardin, «may be useful to a 
society or government. Certainly, large, modern democracies 
work better if we can be sure that there are professional dis-
trusters or cynics or skeptics, people who act as watchdogs, 
raise alarms, or provide contrary information». A quick com-
ment on this is that a skeptical attitude is not quite the same as 
distrust, and while skepticism may be healthy, distrust may be 
detrimental to the authority of an institution. 
Still, how threatening to a democracy are various forms and 
degrees of distrust in its institutional authorities? Or we could 
ask, how healthy are they? And is the distrust that one is talking 
about when arguing that it is threatening the same as the dis-
trust assumed when arguing that it is healthy? 
I recently had occasion to come up with a detailed analysis 
of the notion of personal trust. 
It says, roughly, that I trust you when I believe that you have 
the right intentions toward me. This is a personal, intention-
based account of trust. It requires that for me to trust X, I need 
to entertain certain beliefs about X's intentions, and about what 
motivates those intentions. Since it is to persons, not institu-
tions, that we attribute intentions and motivations, the analysis 
does not carry over smoothly to the notion of trust in institu-
tions. 
It is often the person who is the figurehead of an institution 
that embodies for us the institution as a whole. Roderick 
Kramer cites a speculation that «people may use the behavior of 
institutional leaders as reference points [for gauging their basic 
beliefs - ] when appraising the trustworthiness of society's insti-
tutions in general. In other words, people may draw general 
inferences about institutional trust from the behavior of highly 
visible role models». If this is so, then the question of trust in an 
institutional authority translates into trust in personal authority 
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- of a paternalist, expert, or any other kind. The question of 
trust in the authority of the police, say, or the Supreme Court, is 
translated into the question of trust in the authority of the com-
missioner of police or the chief justice - and is thus ultimately 
unpacked in terms of people's beliefs about the intentions and 
motivations of these personae. 
When no such personification of the institution takes place, I 
believe that talk of trusting an institution is loose talk. It usual-
ly amounts to no more than one's reliance on the institution or 
one's degree of confidence in its competence and performance. 
This can typically be expressed in the probability one assigns to 
the institution's doing such-and-such. A caveat here is that only 
when the goals of the institution accord with our interests do 
we tend to say, in this loose sense, that we trust the institution. 
Or at any rate this is the case when the institutional goals do not 
outright conflict with ours. When there is such conflict, we are 
unlikely to feel or to say that we trust the institution in question. 
Indeed, it is possible for me to have confident expectations that 
an institution will do exactly what it is supposed to do, and to 
distrust it for that reason, when what it is supposed to do is 
against my interests. 
But more specifically and more crucially, talk of trusting an 
institution is generally to be construed in terms of our degree of 
confidence that the institution will continue to pursue its set 
goals and to achieve them regardless of who staffs the institu-
tion. There is a principle of substitutability at work here. 
Invoking the idea of substitutability raises the question of 
what it is that remains constant over the substitution. In the case 
at hand, when we express trust in an institution we express our 
belief that, even if the present officeholders in that institution 
were to be replaced with others, the performance of the insti-
tution would remain more or less the same. In other words, so-
called trust in an institution is tantamount to a belief in the 
impersonality of its performance, in addition to the belief that 
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its goals are compatible with our interests. In contrast, when I 
trust other individuals, I expect their behavior toward me to be 
entirely personal: I expect their behavior to reflect the fact that 
it is I who am affected by it, not just anyone, and that it is pre-
cisely because it is me that they behave the way they do. But 
when I say I trust an institution, I expect its behavior toward me 
to be impersonal: I expect its rulings and decisions to be unaf-
fected by whether it is I or anyone relevantly similar who stands 
to be affected by those rulings and decisions. 
3.5 Distrust of Institutional Authority - Partiality 
Having said something about what trusting an institution may 
be construed to mean, I now want to consider distrust of insti-
tutions. I believe that there is an important asymmetry here. 
Distrust adversely affects the authority of institutions more than 
trust positively affects it. I also claim that, in the case of distrust 
of institutions, we do attribute intentions and motivations to the 
institutions themselves, and not just to their figureheads. 
Consider, for example, the case of the ultra-Orthodox in 
Israel, who in recent years have expressed their growing dis-
trust of the Israeli Supreme Court. Consider also the case of the 
Arab Israeli minority, many of whose members have in recent 
years come to lose whatever trust they had in the Israeli police. 
In expressing their distrust of the respective institutions, these 
people are conveying something other than a mere factual pre-
diction that the Court or the police will act against their inter-
ests. Their distrust has a surplus element that goes beyond 
expressing non-reliance or a low degree of confidence in the 
performance of the institutions. These communities want also 
to be understood as imputing intentions to the people who staff 
the respective institutions. 
What intentions can these be, given that there is no personal 
acquaintance and there are no personal relations between the 
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individuals involved? Fundamentally, I think that the question 
of our distrust of an institution boils down to our belief in the 
unfairness of the institution - and to the ancillary belief that the 
unfairness works against our own interests. When an institution 
faces a crisis of trust, which is at the same time a crisis of author-
ity and legitimacy, this means that social groups in need of 
recourse to that institution suspect it of operating in an unfair 
manner, a manner that goes against their interests qua members 
of those social groups. More specifically, in many cases this 
means that the members of the social groups in question tend 
to impute discriminatory intentions quite generally to the office-
holders of the institution, at all levels of the institutional hierar-
chy - for example, to all the judges or to all policemen and 
policewomen. Such imputed discriminatory intentions may be 
racist, sexist, homophobic, anti-Semitic or antireligious ones. 
The flip side of imputed discriminatory intentions that make 
some people distrust an institution, is that the very same insti-
tution may become highly favored by people with other, 
opposing, interests. In a city where the police favor the Mafia, 
or let's say the Sunni Muslims, it may be expected that the gen-
eral citizenry will distrust the police. Can we say that the mem-
bers of the Mafia, or of the Sunni segment of the population, 
trust the police? Well, they sure do, in some sense. But their 
trust in the police is in the personal sense of trust, not in the 
institutional sense that is premised on impersonality and substi-
tutability. The trust of these groups in the (favoritistic) police is 
"bad" trust, if you will: it is the kind of trust that actually serves 
to undermine the authority of the police with the population at 
large. 
The Mafia's trust in the police cannot be the trust that we 
value when we reflect upon the authority exerted by institu-
tions in a healthy democracy and, in particular, upon the role of 
trust in it. The Mafia's trust is a perversion of the trust in institu-
tions that is claimed to be required in order for mass democra-
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cy to work. It undermines rather than enhances the authority of 
the police as far as the general public is concerned. A necessary 
condition for trust in an institutional authority worthy of its 
name is confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the insti-
tution. When this condition is fulfilled - or, at any rate, when 
this condition is not flagrantly violated - no personal intentions 
are imputed to the officeholders of the institution; the principle 
of substitutability holds. 
The point, then, is that in contrast to the case of trust in insti-
tutional authorities, distrust of institutional authorities does 
involve the imputing of intentions. It involves a shared belief 
among groups of citizens about the personal intentions of the 
institution's officeholders. These intentions are taken to be 
operative while the officeholders are executing their official 
duties. The typical belief here is that the officeholders are 
infected with discriminatory intentions against members of the 
relevant groups and that these intentions generally result in 
unfair practices. The unfair practices are believed to adversely 
affect the interests of the people who belong to those groups. 
Schematically put, the putative chain of events here is this. 
Belief in discriminatory intentions leads to distrust. When this is 
true for an increasing number of individuals, a threshold is 
crossed and the authority of the institution is eroded. This in 
turn leads to increasing noncompliance. When all of this not 
only happens, but is also generally known to happen, tipping 
phenomena and cascades are likely to occur and to amplify the 
effects. 
The likely result: a breakdown of trust in the authority of the 
institution in question. 
When this chain of events is generalized across institutions or 
governmental agencies, indignation may spread and threaten 
the authority of the regime. 
Institutional distrust may also emerge when there is wide-
spread belief that the institution is corrupt. David Hume sug-
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gests that institutions should be designed in such a way that 
they would work well even if, in his well-known phrase, they 
were staffed by knaves. 
Should the design fail, however, or should the level of the 
knaves' corruption pass a certain threshold, the institution qua 
institution may be perceived as corrupt. Here, too, people's atti-
tude toward the institution turns in an essential way on their 
beliefs about the personal motives of the institution's office-
holders at its various hierarchical levels. Once the officials' per-
sonal motives become suspect - as, for example, when there is 
a shared belief that they are open to bribes - then distrust in the 
institution qua institution spreads and its authority is eroded. 
A difference may be noted between cases in which the ero-
sion of an institution's authority is due to a distrust that relates 
to partiality and discrimination, and cases in which it is due to 
a distrust that relates to corruption. The first case of discrimina-
tion-related distrust tends to be a case of group distrust, based 
on membership in groups defined by race, gender, ethnic ori-
gin, sexual orientation, and so forth - as in the examples cited 
above of the Israeli Arabs or ultra-Orthodox. The second case 
of corruption-related distrust tends to be a case of class distrust. 
Here the institution is taken to operate in such a way that the 
rich who can afford to bribe get away with things that the poor 
cannot get away with (think of driving violations in the case of 
the police, or tax evasions in the case of the IRS). The two kinds 
of institutional distrust may of course overlap, and there may be 
various intermediate cases too. I leave the question open as to 
which kind of distrust is more detrimental to institutional 
authority and, ultimately, to the stability of the regime. 
So: what we ordinarily mean by saying that we trust an insti-
tution is best captured in terms of the high degree of confidence 
with which we can predict the future steps or decisions that the 
institution will take. This can often be cast in terms of our con-
fident prediction that the institution will be pursuing its goals. 
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Also, when we say that we trust an institution we expect the 
institution to be impersonal, whereas in trusting an individual 
we expect his or her attitude toward us to be entirely personal. 
Distrusting an institution, in contrast, is not a matter of confi-
dent predictions, and it involves the attribution of intentions. It 
boils down to our belief that the intentions of the officeholders 
of the institution are discriminatory (or profit-seeking), and that 
the institution is consequently unfair (or corrupt) in ways that 
work against our interests. 
3.6 Distrust of Institutional Authority - Familiarity 
Ben-Gurion, the mythical and authoritative founding father 
of the state of Israel and its first prime minister, is often quoted 
as having said in the 1950s something like the following: «Every 
Hebrew mother shall know that when she sends her son to 
enlist in the Israel Defense Forces she is entrusting him to the 
very best commanding officers». (I do not think Ben-Gurion 
said «son or daughter» as he should have.). This was meant to 
instill and to inspire in the general Israeli population a high 
degree of trust in the country's newly formed armed forces, to 
the ranks of which there was - and still is - a general duty of 
conscription. 
In promising that the young soldiers would be the charges of 
«the best» officers, Ben-Gurion was making the case, among 
other things, that these officers are responsible professionals, 
that «they know what they are doing». The self-righteousness of 
Ben-Gurion's statement notwithstanding, I read it as an attempt 
to base the people's trust in the authority of the army, at least in 
part, on the attribution to its officers of some relevant expertise, 
of some sort of special knowledge. (I say "in part"' because 
there is surely an additional, moral aspect to be read into Ben-
Gurion's statement.) 
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In the early decades, the army did indeed command a high 
degree of respect in the Israeli population and enjoyed its con-
siderable trust. The trust has eroded over the years, however. I 
believe that this is only partly due to the less-than-exemplary 
performance of the Israeli armed forces in recent years. My 
claim is that, in comparison with the past, when parents send 
their children to become soldiers today they trust the army less 
because they know the army better. In contrast with parents of 
the previous generation, today's parents have themselves 
served in this army, and precisely because they are more famil-
iar with it, they are more suspicious and less trustful of it. The 
halo and the mystique are gone; the attitude that is summed up 
in the phrase «they know things we don't: who are we to pass 
judgment?» no longer prevails. In other words, familiarity may 
breed distrust. 
In a despotic regime, like Stalin's or Saddam's, it is relatively 
easy to maintain distance between the ruler and the ruled and 
it is relatively easy to shroud the regime with a halo of omnis-
cience and omnipotence. Authority in such regimes is sustained 
first and foremost by fear. It is also sustained by the particular 
kind of trust that is induced by fear from a ruler who is per-
ceived as all-knowing. But in democracies things are different. 
Most state agencies or institutions in democracies are in prin-
ciple supposed to be transparent, accessible and familiar. So 
long as no widespread suspicions of impartiality and unfairness 
give rise to distrust in an institution, the effectiveness and 
authority of the institution can be sustained. Think, for exam-
ple, of the police or the income-tax authorities in most liberal 
democracies. Alternatively, the effectiveness and authority of 
an institution can be sustained so long as the institution suc-
ceeds in maintaining a reputation for possessing professional, 
special or expert knowledge in the relevant area of its activity. 
Think, for example, of the Supreme Court, the Federal Reserve 
Bank or the MI-5. We should note, however, that these special-
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knowledge institutions are also less transparent and accessible 
than the institutions of the first category. 
There seems indeed to be some delicate balance or tradeoff 
between fairness and impartiality on the one hand, and expert-
ise on the other, with regard to the degree of trust in an insti-
tution. After all, in a democracy many governmental ministries 
and agencies are staffed by elected officials who may be 
replaced at the next election and who are not, strictly speak-
ing, professionals in what they do. Still, if the way an agency 
conducts itself and carries out its duties is perceived as fair, this 
appears to compensate to some degree for the lack of expert-
ise or special knowledge. The paradox, however, is that the 
more transparent, accessible and familiar the institutions in a 
democracy are, the less they are able to maintain the sem-
blance of expert knowledge and to fend off suspicion and dis-
trust. 
In sum: despotic authorities do not need to inspire trust; fear 
will do well enough for them. Still, to the extent that a despot-
ic ruler fashions himself on the model of the «father of the 
nation», he may inspire the peculiar sort of unquestioning trust 
that is associated with paternalistic authority. In democracies, 
paternalistic trust is by and large unavailable. 
Some institutions in a democracy, like the court or the central 
bank, derive their authority from their claim to expertise; they 
inspire trust inasmuch as they are thought to possess special, 
expert knowledge. But in general the authority of a democratic 
regime and its institutions relies less on trust than on the per-
ceived legitimacy of the authority and the proper and generally 
fair functioning of its institutions. What democratic authority is 
vulnerable to and cannot afford is the spread of distrust. I have 
tried to sketch some of the possible sources and causes of such 
distrust. The spread of distrust may lead to growing indignation, 
and significant indignation may undermine the authority of the 
regime and threaten its stability. 
70 
3.7 Theoretical/Doxastic Authority: Pesharim 
Going back to the promissory note given at the outset, I now 
want to briefly present a rather special case of religious author-
ity. This comes out of the discovery of the Dead Sea scrolls in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Among the sectarian scrolls found at the Dead Sea site of 
Qumran, several texts constitute a separate genre, referred to as 
pesharim (sing: pesher). The word pesher means interpretation, 
and in the pesharim scrolls selected biblical texts are applied to 
the contemporary sectarian setting of the second and first cen-
tury BCE by means of a special literary technique of interpreta-
tion. 
A pesher takes a biblical composition, usually one of the 
twelve Minor Prophets, as a starting point. (Thus the longest, 
most important and best-known pesharim found at Qumran are 
Pesher Habakkuk and Pesher Nahum.) It proceeds, first, with a 
direct and explicit citation from the biblical text (the lemma), 
then an introductory formula such as «its pesher is upon...», and 
then an application of the text to a contemporary reality outside 
of its original biblical context. The selected text to be interpret-
ed is typically of an eschatological prophetic nature, and the 
interpretation is typically historical, not theological. It offers a 
typological version of the history of the sect itself, regarding its 
own «Historia Sacra». 
Here is an example, from Pesher Habakkuk (col. V, 8-12): 
«Why do you stare, traitors, and maintain your silence when a 
wicked person consumes someone more upright than himself? 
[Hab. 1. 13] Its interpretation is upon the House of Absalom 
[Alexander Janaeus's younger brother] and the members of his 
council, who kept silent at the time of the reproach of the 
Teacher of Righteousness, and did not help him against the Man 
of Lies, who rejected the Law in the midst of their whole 
Community». 
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The Qumran community saw biblical prophecy as coded 
messages, which might only be unraveled by a specially 
endowed and divinely inspired individual. The author of the 
pesher, most often the Teacher of Righteousness who was the 
leader (and possibly the founder) of the Qumran community, 
deciphers the coded biblical messages and reveals their «true 
meaning» to the members of his community. In this way the 
author becomes a theoretical authority to the members of his 
community: he instructs them about what they are to believe 
about their reality. (However, the modern reader is «often chal-
lenged to identify the historical realities reflected in the allu-
sions found in these interpretations», which are themselves usu-
ally couched in veiled terms such as «the Man of Lies» cited 
above.) 
In fact, the Hebrew word pesher is related to the root of p-t-
r, meaning solution, release or unbinding (pitaron) - which, in 
antiquity, specifically came to denote the unraveling of dreams. 
Biblical prophecy, then, is here regarded as analogous to a 
dream whose mysteriously encoded message is in need of 
decoding. And just as biblical prophecy is divinely revealed, so 
too is its act of interpretation. It is not the power of scholarly 
study (or of psychoanalytical training, for that matter) that 
makes the pesher possible: in this respect the pesher differs from 
ordinary, scholarly interpretative endeavor (or midrash). 
Nor is it mere charisma that enables the leader to come up 
with the pesher. It is by divine revelation that the author of the 
pesher becomes the authoritative decoder of the Holy 
Scriptures, themselves divinely revealed. Revelation legitimizes 
the authority of the pesharim. 
The literary genre of the pesharim is unique to the corpus of 
the Dead Sea scrolls. The authority of the leader of the sect, the 
Teacher of Righteousness, is also unique. It is an intermediary 
case, between the authority of the prophets on the one hand 
and the sages on the other: it partakes of both the prophets' 
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divine inspiration and the sages' interpretative skills. The mes-
sages of the Teacher are political, and his authority extends to 
interpreting for the members of his congregation the concrete 
political reality in which they live. He is their authority regard-
ing how they are to see the world and what they are to believe. 
The worldview of the Dead Sea sectarians, like that of so 
many other religious and political sects, is Manichean. It is «we» 
v. «them», or «sons of light» v. «sons of darkness». The latter is 
indeed the name of one of the more famous Dead Sea scrolls, 
but it is also an apt epitaph for a mood and for a worldview typ-
ical of sects and various isolated extremist groups, ancient and 
contemporary. Questions relating to the nature of the authority 
of the leaders of such religious and political sects are therefore 
relevant, even urgent. 
In a noteworthy twist on the scroll community, there are 
sects around us today - like «Esh Ha-Torah» (in California) and 
others - who return to the idea of looking to the bible for 
encoded messages. The latter-day equivalent to the Teacher of 
Righteousness, the figure endowed with the capacity and 
authority to reveal the secret messages, seems therefore to be 
the mathematician-statistician. For certain groups of people, 
then, computer science may be on its way to replace divine 
inspiration as the ultimate source of authority. 
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Jon Elster 
4. NOTES ON AUTHORITY AND COMPLIANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
The ideas of power and of authority (as I understand them) 
differ in several ways. Only individuals have power, whereas 
authority can be an attribute of norms and institutions as well as 
of individuals. The power of an individual rests on his ability 
make others act in accordance with his desires by means of 
intentional action directed to that end. Authority, when vested 
in an individual, rests on the ability to inspire following rather 
than on the ability to overcome resistance. Jesus had no power, 
but certainly authority. Hitler had both power and authority 
(«working towards Hitler»). Stalin had power but no authority. 
Authority, when vested in norms and institutions, rests on mate-
rial sanctions and on a broad spectrum of emotional reactions. 
Power as well as authority may induce compliance. The main 
topic of the present paper is to examine the mechanisms sus-
taining compliance. I begin in Section II by discussing how 
powerful and resourceful individuals deploy threats and prom-
ises to make others act in accordance with their desires, and 
why these efforts are sometimes counterproductive. The rest of 
the paper is devoted to compliance with authority. In Section III 
I discuss how the wishes of an authoritative figure may induce 
compliance even in the absence of (explicit or implicit) threats 
and promises. In Section IV I consider the authority of unwrit-
ten rules: social norms and conventions. Section V moves on to 
consider the authority of written rules: laws and constitutions. 
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4.2 Threats and promises 
Power operates through incentive schemes, based on threats 
and promises. Considering first the use of threats, the standard 
view is that people comply with threats when ( i) they believe 
the threat will be carried out if they don't comply and (ii) they 
prefer complying to the execution of the threat. This statement 
is ambiguous, however, in that it does not distinguish between 
pre-threat and post-threat preferences. According to what psy-
chologists describe as "reactance" (Brehm, 1966), or what John 
Roemer (1985) cites as «the psychology of tyranny», threats may 
in fact have a dual effect. A threat raises the costs of non-com-
pliance, but can also change the preferences of the person 
being threatened by making him more willing to suffer these 
costs. When during World War II German occupiers threatened 
to kill ten nationals for every German who was killed, the threat 
(and even more its implementation) often seems to have rein-
forced hatred of the Germans and induced more rather than 
fewer killings of Germans. In Palestine today, much seems to 
indicate that Israeli reprisals are counterproductive for the same 
reason. Similarly, efforts to make workers make an effort by 
punishing substandard performance often backfire (Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000). 
Even when threats leave preferences unchanged, so that (ii) 
above is true, they may still fail to induce compliance, viz. if (i) 
is false. To be effective, threats have to be credible. An agent 
who is both all-powerful and (believed by the target to be) all-
rational may find that he is powerless, since his threat to pun-
ish non-compliers may not be credible. Credibility may thus be 
enhanced if the target believes the agent to be irrational 
(Schelling, 1956). It may also be enhanced if the target is irra-
tional, due to lack of ability to engage in the kind of reasoning 
(«backwards induction») that is needed to perceive that a given 
threat lacks credibility (Camerer, 2003). Credibility may also be 
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enhanced by rational precommitment, such as burning one's 
bridges or one's ships (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991). Reputation 
effects are also important. 
Promises, to be effective, must have the same properties: 
they must leave preferences unaffected and they must be cred-
ible. The first condition is not always satisfied: promises may 
induce preference changes that work against the desires of the 
promiser. There is evidence that children who are rewarded for 
good grades lose interest in schoolwork and that incentive 
schemes in the workplace are similarly counter productive 
(Kohn, 1993). The same is true about participating in family 
household work. The child who has been praised or rewarded 
for doing something nice has learned that the only reason to 
continue being nice is to get something for it. When there is no 
longer a goody to be gained, there is no reason for the child to 
continue helping. Rewards, in other words, can induce a shift 
from autonomous to instrumental motivations. 
The credibility of promises (unlike that of threats) can be 
enhanced by enlisting the law as a precommitment device. By 
writing a legally enforceable contract I can persuade other people 
that I will not renege on my promise to share the profits of a joint 
venture with them. If this technology is unavailable, reputation 
effects can be very robust in sustaining the credibility of promises. 
These may be combined with another piece of precommitment 
technology, as when I take pains to make my promise known to 
the largest possible audience. It remains likely, nevertheless, that 
many promises, that if believed and kept would benefit both par-
ties, would not be credible and hence are not made. 
4.3 Wishes 
To comply with someone's wish is to do what that person 
desires you to do, assuming (i) that the action in question is not 
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what you would have done anyway (and ignoring cases in 
which the other's wish serves as a tiebreaker), and (ii) that there 
is no implicit or explicit threat or promise. There are several 
subcases, all of which are frequently observed in the sphere of 
family relations. When you love the other person, it follows 
almost by definition that you want to satisfy his or her desires. 
If you respect the other, you may take him or her as an author-
ity concerning the appropriate object of desire. If you are in 
fear and awe of the other, you may comply to avoid disap-
proval or punishment. Although in this last case compliance is 
motivated by the prospect of the negative consequences of 
non-compliance, by assumption these are not embodied in 
explicit or implicit threats. 
To comply with a wish, you first have to know what it is. One 
way of learning it is by the other telling you. But to express a 
wish may easily induce guilt in the other. (Examples are «I wish 
you wouldn't work so often in the evenings» or «I wish you'd 
visit your grandparents more often».) Guilt easily turns into 
anger at the person who makes one feel guilty. The anger can 
easily make one refuse to comply with the wish. Expressing 
wishes may therefore, as the expression of threats and promis-
es, work against the purpose of the speaker. Because people 
know this, their wishes may remain unstated. Because people 
know this, they may try to guess what the other might wish. 
Outside the family and a circle of close friends, this aspect of 
wish-compliance is probably insignificant. 
Charismatic authority rests on all the attitudes enumerated 
above: love, respect, fear and awe. The mix of attitudes may 
vary, from Jesus to Hitler, but typically all are present to some 
extent. A charismatic leader does not stoop to making threats or 
promises, although he may well issue warnings and make it 
known that good performance will be rewarded. Rewards and 
punishments are backward-looking and merit-based, not part 
of a forward-looking incentive scheme. The leader is also quite 
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ready to make his wishes known; in fact, he is expected to do 
so. Compliance in this context takes the form of discipleship. 
Although the relation of a charismatic leader to the disciples is 
one of authority, relations among the disciples tend to rest on 
power, with regulation of access to the leader being the most 
important power base. 
Wish-compliance, in the cases discussed so far, rests on pre-
existing and intensely personal attitudes in the complier. Trust 
offers a more impersonal mechanism for generating wish-com-
pliance. As often understood, trust must rest on a prior belief 
that the other person is in fact trustworthy. Trustworthiness may 
also emerge endogenously, however, through the interaction 
itself. Montaigne (1991, pp. 1078-79), wrote that «When I am on 
my travels, whoever has my purse has full charge of it without 
supervision. He could cheat me just as well if I kept accounts, 
and, unless he is a devil, by such reckless trust I oblige him to 
be honest». To meet distrust with distrust and trust with trust 
seems to be a general propensity of human nature, as shown in 
many experiments with «Trust Games» (Camerer, 2003). 
4.4 Unwritten rules: norms and conventions 
The authority of individuals is a tangible, incontestable 
causal fact. The authority of norms, laws and so on seems more 
obscure. We may want to distinguish between written and 
unwritten injunctions to act or to refrain from acting. Written 
documents, by themselves, have no causal efficacy, whence the 
pejorative phrase «parchment barriers» that is sometimes used 
about laws and constitutions. To produce an effect they have to 
be the object of specific desires and beliefs of the citizens. 
Unwritten norms and conventions, which exist only in the 
minds of individuals, may be causally efficacious by virtue of 
affecting their desires or beliefs. 
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Given that beliefs and desires can lend causal efficacy to writ-
ten and unwritten injunctions, why use the term "authority" to 
describe this fact? My answer is that people often comply with 
rules and norms for the reasons sketched in the first paragraph 
of Section III. They perceive them as supra-individual social 
facts which command attitudes of love, respect, fear and awe. 
This perception is not the only reason for compliance, as we 
shall see, but I believe it is virtually always one component of 
the individual's response and often the most important one. In 
the rare cases where it its absent, the authority of the rule is 
diminished. 
I shall distinguish between two kinds of unwritten rules, 
social norms and conventions, the former being sustained by 
desires and the latter by beliefs. Social norms, as I understand 
them, are non-consequentialist injunctions to act or to refrain 
from acting (Elster, 1999, Ch.III.2). Examples include norms 
against behavior «contrary to nature» (incest, cannibalism), 
norms of etiquette, norms of revenge, work norms, and many 
others. Their causal efficacy is due in part to the material sanc-
tions to which norm-violators are subject, and in part to the 
powerful emotions of shame (in the norm-violator) and con-
tempt (in observers of the violation). Often, the most important 
aspect of the material sanctions is the cost of sanctioning to the 
sanctioner, since the intensity of his emotional reactions can be 
inferred from how much he is willing to give up in order to 
punish the norm-violator (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). 
In many cases, social norms are utterly arbitrary, yet are 
experienced as having the weight and authority of objective 
principles. I do not perceive the person who comments on my 
improper attire at a dinner party as an interfering busybody, but 
as the authoritative vehicle of a social judgment. This is the psy-
chological grain of truth in the Durkheimian thesis that norms 
are social facts. The perceived objectivity of norms has, to be 
sure, no foundation in reality. «What kind of Good can it be, 
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which was honoured yesterday but not today and which 
becomes a crime when you cross a river? What kind of truth can 
be limited by a range of mountains, becoming a lie for the 
world on the other side?» (Montaigne, 1991, p. 653). Yet the per-
ception that norms possess some kind of objectivity contributes 
essentially to their immense motivating power. 
The idea of a convention can be taken in two ways. On the 
one hand, conventions can be coordination equilibria, based 
on expectations about other people's behavior. The often-cited 
example of driving on the right or the left side of the road is 
misleading in that this behavior is also sustained by the fear of 
legal sanctions. A better example is the Australian and South 
Korean convention of walking on the left side of the sidewalk. 
If everyone expects everybody to act in this way, the comic 
sidewalk ballets that occur in cultures lacking a firm convention 
in this respect will not occur. Yet even this example is not per-
fect. In theory, conventions are sustained merely by the annoy-
ing consequences incurred by anyone who deviates from them. 
In practice, as shown by the sidewalk example, they may also 
be sustained by disapproving remarks by victims of unilateral 
deviations («Watch where you're going»). Even when not 
backed up by legal norms, conventions tend to be reinforced 
by social norms. There are exceptions, such as the Norwegian 
convention that we all parade in the streets on May 17th, the 
national holiday. If I don't show up, my absence will only have 
a marginal effect on the pleasure others derive from the occa-
sion. Moreover, since others have no way of knowing that I 
wasn't there, they will not express disapproval of my absence. 
Although my expectation that others will show up is often 
enough to make me show up too, the element of authority gen-
erated by the normative expectations of others towards me is 
lacking. 
On the other hand, there are constitutional conventions, that 
is, unwritten constitutional norms. In several countries, includ-
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ing Norway and Canada, there is an unwritten convention to 
the effect that the government must step down if it loses the 
support of parliament. In Canada, there is even a convention 
regulating what should be done if the government violates that 
convention: the Governor General who is normally (conven-
tionally in fact) lacking in discretionary powers would have to 
step in to dismiss the Government (Heard, 1991). I doubt 
whether anyone knows what would happen in a similar situa-
tion in Norway. To use a phrase coined by Paul Veyne (1976, p. 
279), any politicians who might be tempted to violate the con-
vention are probably deterred by a mix of «precise fear of dif-
fuse sanctions» and «diffuse fear of precise sanctions». Also, the 
normative authority of the democratic system may be such that 
the issue does not even arise in their minds. 
Other conventions do not have the same degree of intrinsic 
authority, partly because they do not have a democratic pedi-
gree and partly because they are constantly «open to challenge 
on the basis of fresh arguments about the precedents that 
allegedly support them» (Marshall, 2003, p. 39). An example is 
the convention that the British Prime Minister must always be a 
member of the House of Commons. Constitutional conventions 
of this weaker sort are sustained mainly by the fear of political 
sanctions, such as revolution or electoral losses. The sustaining 
mechanism is entirely different from that underlying coordina-
tion equilibria. Whereas the latter can be represented as nor-
mal-form games that model the costs of unilateral deviation, the 
stability of constitutional conventions must be represented by 
extensive-form games that model the risk of retaliation. 
4.5 Written rules: laws and constitutions 
Compliance with laws depends both on their authoritative 
character and on the expected punishment for non-compli-
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ance. (It may be worth mentioning that citizens are never 
rewarded for complying with the laws.) For those who believe 
that punishment is the only aspect that matters, there is no dif-
ference between a fine and a price. While this view may be 
approximately true of parking tickets and other minor offenses, 
it cannot claim general validity. It presupposes not only that 
people subject to the law have no respect for it, but also that 
they are shameless in the sense of being unaffected by what 
others think about them. Or perhaps the view simply presup-
poses that others don't care about what their fellow citizens do, 
as long as they pay the price for wrongdoing stipulated in the 
law. In either version, the view is self-evidently absurd. Almost 
everybody would prefer spending a month in hospital to 
spending a month in jail. 
The authority or majesty of the law depends on its impartial-
ity (equality before the law) and on its procedural pedigree. In 
principle at least, it applies to all and is adopted by a system 
(majority voting) that is approved by all. Up to a point, the 
majesty of the law and the fear of stigma induce people to com-
ply with laws they do not agree with, over and above the 
degree of compliance that may be induced by fear of legal sanc-
tions. Beyond that point, substantive objections can undermine 
compliance. Many people think that the ban on using marijua-
na is sufficiently unjustified to justify non-compliance. Lack of 
majesty, e.g. because of procedural irregularities, may also 
reduce compliance. My willingness to comply with a tax code 
that imposes a heavy burden on me might evaporate if I learn 
that it was adopted to favor special interests rather than the 
public interest. Draconian sentencing regulations («Three 
strikes and you're out») may also undermine the respect for the 
law, leaving nothing but deterrence in its place. As in the case 
of threats, the net effect on behavior may be indeterminate. 
Civil disobedience is a special case of non-compliance. 
Whereas most law violators try to keep their violations secret, 
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to avoid punishment, it is an important part of the ethics of civil 
disobedience that it should be public and that the non-compli-
ers should accept punishment. In this case, the aim of non-com-
pliance is to change the law rather than to get away with vio-
lating it. 
Whereas laws regulate the behavior of individuals, constitu-
tions regulate the behavior of the state and its institutions. At 
least, this is true of the Anglo-American tradition. In the 
Continental tradition, some constitutions enumerate individual 
duties as well as rights against the state. Also, in this tradition 
some constitutions protect the rights of individuals against 
other individuals. Here I focus on the (parts of) constitutions 
that regulate the behavior of state institutions. 
Some acts of non-compliance with the constitution are indu-
bitably so. In 1962 it was clear to all that de Gaulle was in non-
compliance with the 1958 constitution when he had the direct 
election of the President approved by referendum. (To be sure, 
his defenders, including the tame chairman of the Constitutional 
Council, wove a web of words to justify his action, but nobody 
was taken in.) The result of the non-compliance was that the 
constitution was changed, by a constitutional convention, to 
accommodate the practice. 
Often it is not obvious whether a given action constitutes 
non-compliance with the constitution. The US constitution does 
not mention the right to privacy, which was the ground for the 
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade that the state of Texas 
was in non-compliance with the constitution when it banned 
abortion. In such cases, which are very frequent, compliance or 
non-compliance simply means conformity or non-conformity 
with the Court's interpretation of the constitution, that is, with 
the reading preferred by at least five out of nine members of the 
Court. 
An action may comply with the letter of the law but not with 
its spirit. Hitler's rise to power did not rest on violations of the 
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constitution, but of a clever exploitation of its weaknesses. The 
breakdown of Weimar Germany occurred through the opera-
tion of two separate clauses in the constitution, which had not 
been considered in conjunction by the framers. By Article 48, 
the President could assume dictatorial powers, subject to an 
overrule by parliament which was supposed to prevent abuses. 
By Article 25, however, he could dissolve parliament and hence 
remove this check on his power. Each of the two clauses by 
itself might not confer a great deal of power on the President, 
but their combination did. This being said, the idea of «comply-
ing with the spirit of the constitution» is very nebulous. In the 
following, I restrict myself to determinants of compliance in the 
more literal sense. 
Compliance with «the constitution» can mean two things. 
First, framers might want their successors to comply with the 
very document they create. Second, they might want them to 
comply with the constitution that is in force at any given time, 
assuming that it derives from the original one by a series of 
changes each of which has taken place by the rules of the con-
stitution in force at the time of that change. If the framers are 
motivated by the first goal, they will write very stringent amend-
ment clauses into the constitution. That strategy may, however, 
induce non-compliance rather than compliance, for two distinct 
reasons. First, the successors might react to the very idea of 
being bound, because of something like a reactance mecha-
nism (Tocqueville, 1990, p. 181; Bryce, 1980, p. 56). Second, 
and more important, they will not comply with an unamend-
able constitution if it turns into a suicide pact, to use a phrase 
of Justice Robert Jackson. Farsighted framers, therefore, will 
aim at the second goal and make the constitution somewhat dif-
ficult, but not too difficult, to amend. 
Although ease of amendment makes compliance more like-
ly, it does not make it certain. Even if constitutional amend-
ments were as easy to pass as ordinary laws, there might still be 
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groups who, being unable to change the constitution, would 
rather overthrow it than abide by it. When this doesn't happen, 
why doesn't it? A common explanation of political stability is 
that the system is in an equilibrium where no actor or coalition 
can improve its (expected and discounted) material rewards by 
non-compliance. In my opinion, this explanation is worthless. 
In well-functioning democracies, the issue doesn't arise. Heads 
of state, chiefs of the armed forces and party leaders are not 
constantly recalculating whether to comply with the constitu-
tion. There is no equilibrium because the beliefs and prefer-
ences in terms of which it would be defined simply don't exist, 
that is, have no subjective reality. 
In ill-functioning democracies, where such calculations may 
be made, they are shrouded in radical uncertainty. Equilibrium 
explanations assume that the actors have well-defined beliefs 
(or subjective probabilities) about each other's behavior as well 
as other matters, such as their support in the population. They 
also assume that the actors have stable preferences with well-
defined trade-offs among different objectives. We know, how-
ever, from theories of bounded rationality and from behavioral 
economics that these assumptions are fictions. Standard 
assumptions about time discounting, too, are extremely fragile. 
Theories of coalition-formation are so numerous that none of 
them can be trusted. In any case, treating collective actors as if 
they were individuals raises problems of aggregation that, as 
we know, can be insurmountable. 
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Gloria Origgi 
5. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO TRUST IN EPISTEMIC 
AUTHORITY? 
"There must be a minimal degree of trust in communication for 
language and action to be more than stabs in the dark" 
Sissela Bok, Lying 
"Mais qu'y a-t-il donc de sipérilleux dans le fait que les gens 
parlent, et leurs discours indéfiniment prolifèrent?" 
Michel Foucault, L'ordre du discours 
"I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human 
authority, and then I found some things confirmed or disconfirmed 
by my own experience" 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty 
Consider this case. At high-school in Italy many years ago I 
heard my teacher of Latin say: "Cicero's prose is full of synec-
doches"1. I had a vague idea of what a synecdoche was, and 
had ignored until then that one could characterize Cicero's writ-
1 This example is a reformulation of a Francois Recanati's example in his 
paper: "Can We Believe What We Do Not Understand?" Mind and Language, 
1997, that I have discussed at length in another paper: "Croire sans compren-
dre", Cahiers de Philosophie de l'Universite de Caen, 2000. The problem of 
deferential beliefs was originally raised by Dan Sperber in a series of papers: 
"Apparent Irrational Beliefs", "Intuitive and Reflexive Beliefs" Mind and 
Language, 1997. 
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ing in this way. Nevertheless, I relied on my teacher's intellectu-
al authority to acquire the belief that Cicero's prose is full of 
synecdoches, and today have a more precise idea of what my 
teacher was talking about. Was I justified in any sense in uncriti-
cally accepting that pronouncement by deferring to my teacher's 
authority? Let us have a closer look at the example. Many things 
were going on in this apparently trivial case of belief acquisition. 
I was sitting in a classroom, aware of being in a social institution 
- school - dedicated to knowledge transmission, and I had been 
properly instructed to believe what people say in school. While 
listening to the teacher, I was simultaneously learning a fact, that 
Cicero's prose was full of synecdoches, and acquiring a linguistic 
concept, that is, the word "synecdoche" (or, if not acquiring it, at 
least acquiring a rule about its appropriate use, or, better, enrich-
ing its meaning). I was learning a fact and learning a language 
meaning at the same time. My reliance on Italian educational 
institutions was strong enough to accept this on pure deferential 
bases. Or consider another example. I was born in Milan on 
February 8, 1967. I believe this is true because the office of Vital 
Records in the Milan Municipal Building registered a few days 
after that date the testimony of my father or my mother that I was 
indeed born on the 8th of February in a hospital in Milan, and 
delivered a birth certificate with this date on it. This fact concerns 
me, and of course I was present, but I can access it only through 
this complex, institution-mediated form of indirect testimony. 
Or else: I know that smoking causes cancer, I've been told 
this and it was enough relevant information to make me quit 
cigarettes 10 years ago. I don't have the slightest idea of the 
physiological process that a smoker's body undergoes from 
inhaling smoke to developing a cellular process that ends in 
cancer. Nevertheless, the partial character of my understanding 
of what it really means that smoke causes cancer doesn't stop 
me from declaring it in conversations and governing my behav-
ior according to this belief. 
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Our cognitive life is pervaded with partially understood, 
poorly justified, beliefs. The greater part of our knowledge is 
acquired from other's people spoken or written words. The 
floating of other people's words in our minds is the price we 
pay for thinking. Traditional epistemology warns us of the risks 
of uncritically relying on other people's authority in acquiring 
new beliefs. One could view the overall project of classical 
epistemology - from Plato to the contemporary rationalist per-
spectives on knowledge - as a normative enterprise aiming at 
protecting us from credulity and ill-founded opinions. Various 
criteria, rules and principles on how to conduct our mind have 
been put forward as a guarantee to preserve the autonomy and 
freedom of thought necessary for the acquisition of knowledge. 
Just as an example, a great part of Locke's Essay concerning 
Human Understanding is an attempt to establish principles for 
the regulation of opinions, stated in terms of obligations on 
one's own "epistemic conduct", that strengthen our intellectual 
autonomy. According to Locke, four major sources of false 
opinions threaten our mind: 
I. Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evi-
dent, but doubtful and false, taken up for principles 
II. Received hypotheses 
III. Predominant passions or inclinations 
IV. Authority 
(Locke, Essay, Book 4, XX, 7) 
Reliance on other people's authority is thus viewed as a 
major threat to the cognitive autonomy that distinguishes us as 
rational thinkers. Exposure to received beliefs increases our risk 
of being "infected by falsity", the worst danger, against which 
the overall epistemological enterprise was built. 
Yet, the massive trust of others that permeates our cognitive 
life calls for an epistemic treatment, and has become a central 
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issue in contemporary debates in philosophy of knowledge and 
social epistemology. A number of approaches have been put 
forward in order to account for the epistemic reliability of the 
"division of cognitive labour" so typical in contemporary, infor-
mation-dense societies. 
Most analyses that have been recently proposed in social 
epistemology concentrate on the evidential grounds for trusting 
in other people's authority: trusting someone's authority on a 
given matter means assessing her trustworthiness on that mat-
ter. Trustworthiness depends on both competence and benev-
olence. In order to assess other people's trustworthiness one 
needs evidential criteria of their competence and their benevo-
lence. For example, a scientist who trusts in the authority of a 
colleague on a certain experimental data grounds her judgment 
in her knowledge of her colleague's track record in that scien-
tific domain (such as the number of publications in the relevant 
reviews of the domain, or the number of patents, etc.) plus the 
beliefs that she is self-interested in being truthful for the sake of 
their future collaborative work2. Yet, this "reductionist" analysis, 
which I will detail later, misses some central intuitions about the 
presumptive character of our trust in others and its motivation-
al dimension. Trust in testimony has a spontaneous dimension 
that doesn't seem to be based on a rational assessment of other 
people's truthfulness. Also, an evidential analysis of epistemic 
authority doesn't account for cases of partial understanding, as 
in the examples above, in which the overt asymmetry between 
the epistemic position of the authoritative source and the inter-
locutors is such that it cannot be treated by appealing to evi-
dential criteria only. Here, my aim is to explore some treatments 
2 Another possible rational motivation to be trustworthy in the case of sci-
ence is the high cost of cheating in the scientific community and the fear of 
risking permanent exclusion (see M. Blais [1987]). 
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of the more familiar notion of trust in the social sciences, moral 
and political philosophy in order to understand to what extent 
the notion of epistemic trust may be illuminated by these analy-
ses. I will contrast evidential vs. motivational analyses in the 
social sciences and claim that motivational analyses can find 
their places in an epistemology of trust. Motivational analyses 
have often been described as non-cognitive. Take, for instance 
Lawrence Becker's distinction between cognitive vs. non cog-
nitive treatments on trust: "Trust is 'cognitive' if it is fundamen-
tally a matter of our beliefs or expectations about others' trust-
worthiness; it is non-cognitive if it is fundamentally a matter of 
our having trustful attitudes, affects, emotions, or motivational 
structures [...] To say that we trust others in a non-cognitive way 
is to say that we are disposed to be trustful of them independ-
ently of our beliefs or expectations about their trustworthiness" 
[Becker 1996, 44, 60]3. I will oppose this distinction by arguing 
that in the case of epistemic trust a motivational analysis of trust 
can be cognitive, that is, it can shed some light on our mental 
processes of acquisition of beliefs and knowledge. In particular, 
I will try to ground the cognitive bases of our epistemic trust in 
our communicative practices. My purpose here is to explore a 
broader notion of epistemic trust, one that could account for 
what is common in cases as different as the blind trust of the 
patient in her doctor, the trust needed in collaborative intellec-
tual work and the everyday trust needed to sustain our ordinary 
conversations. 
Intellectual trust is a central question of contemporary epis-
temological concerns. Yet, most of the debate surrounding this 
3 It is interesting to notice that Becker liquidates much of the recent debate 
around the epistemic role of motivational trust by introducing credulity, as the 
disposition to believe what another person says and to banish skeptical 
thoughts, and reliance, as a disposition to depend upon other people in some 
respects (pp. 45-46), both of them that lie outside the reach of a rational moti-
vation to accept other people's intellectual authority. 
93 
notion fails to provide a proper analysis of the notion and only 
superficially connects it to the parallel social, political and 
moral treatments of trust. The result is a lack of explanatory 
power of this notion in epistemology. One often has the feeling 
that talking about trust in epistemology is just a way of evoking 
the need to varnish our study of knowledge with some moral 
and social considerations4. My belief is that intellectual trust 
deserves more attention, and its intricate relation with the 
notion of trust in use in the social sciences needs to be better 
disentangled. 
On the other hand, sociological and moral theories of trust in 
authority fail to make the distinction between epistemic vs. 
political authority and present themselves as simultaneously 
accounting for the two concepts. 
There are some obvious parallels between the notion of epis-
temic trust and that of social and political trust. Trust in author-
ity poses a similar puzzle in both cases. How can someone - an 
institution or an individual - legitimately impose her/its will on 
other people and have a right to rule over their conduct? How 
is this compatible with freedom and autonomy? And why 
should we trust an authority to impose upon us a duty to obey 
for our own good? 
Much ink has been spilled on this apparent paradoxical relation 
between trust in authority and freedom. And of course an equiv-
alent puzzle can be reformulated in the case of intellectual trust: 
how can it ever be rational to surrender our reason and accept 
what another person says on the basis that she is saying this? What 
does it mean to grant intellectual authority to other people? 
4 Take for example Hardwig's analysis in his paper: "The Role of Trust in 
Knowledge". There are exceptions to this criticism, as for example R. Foley's 
book Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others (Cambridge UP, 2001) in which 
a detailed analysis of trust in the authority of others is provided in ch.4. 
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The very notion of 'authority' in philosophy is notoriously 
ambiguous between the authority that someone exercises on 
other people's beliefs and the authority that someone exercises 
on other people's actions5. As Friedman has rightly pointed out: 
"A person may be said to have authority in two distinct senses: for 
one, he may be said to be 'in authority', meaning that he occupies 
some office, position or status which entitles him to make deci-
sions about how other people should behave. But, secondly, a 
person may be said to be 'an authority', meaning that his views or 
utterances are entitled to be believed" [Friedman, 1990, p. 57]. 
In both cases, the appeal to authority calls for an explanation or 
a normative justification of the legitimacy of the authoritative source, 
a legitimacy that must be acknowledged by those who submit to it. 
Still, I think that trust in epistemic authority and in political authori-
ty are two distinct phenomena that deserve a separate treatment. 
As I said above, most accounts of epistemic trust ground its 
legitimacy in the evidential bases we have to assess other peo-
ple's trustworthiness. Motivational accounts in the case of 
knowledge seem desperately unable to avoid the risk of 
credulity and irrationality that accompanies prima facie any a 
priori trust in others as a source of knowledge. 
In what follows, I will briefly sketch evidential vs. motiva-
tional approaches to trust as they are discussed in the social sci-
ences and then try to use this distinction to gain a better under-
standing of epistemic trust. 
Evidential accounts of trust 
A common view of trust in contemporary social science 
reduces it to a set of rational expectations about the likely 
5 For an analysis of this ambiguity, cf. R. B. Friedman (1990) "On the 
Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy" in J. Raz (ed.) Authority, New 
York University Press. 
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behaviour of others in a future relationship of cooperation with 
us. Take the definition that Diego Gambetta gives in his influ-
ential anthology on trust: "Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a 
particular level of the subjective probability with which an 
agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will per-
form a particular action, both before he can monitor such action 
(or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) 
and in a context in which it affects his own action. When we 
say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we im-
plicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action 
that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough 
for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with 
him. Correspondingly, when we say that someone is untrust-
worthy, we imply that that probability is low enough for us to 
refrain from doing so" [Gambetta, 1988, p. 218]. Thus trust is a 
cognitive notion, a set of beliefs or expectations about the com-
mitment of the trusted in behaving in a determinate way in a 
context that is relevant to us. Following the literature, I call 
these analyses reductive and evidential. They are reductive 
accounts because they don't set trust as a primitive notion, but 
reduce it to more fundamental notions such as beliefs and 
expectations. They are evidential because they make trust 
depend on the probabilities we assign to our expectations 
towards other people's actions towards us. I may trust or dis-
trust on the basis of some evidence that I have about someone 
else's future behaviour. As it has been stressed by contempo-
rary literature on trust in social science, trust must be distin-
guished from pure reliance. Trust is an interesting notion in 
social sciences only insofar as it explains the implicit commit-
ment that it imposes on a relationship. If it were just a matter of 
assessing probabilities of another person's behaviour without 
taking the effect of her behaviour on our own actions into 
account, it would not be so different from general inductive 
reasoning. I trust in a certain level of stability of the social world 
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around me. I trust the person that I cross when walking on the 
street not to assault me. This is the minimal level of trust that a 
society should be able to arrange in order to perpetuate. I need 
to rely on some regularities of the social world in order to act. 
But the interest in the notion of trust in the social sciences is that 
it takes into account not only social regularities but also com-
mitments. 
A recent explanation of trust that clearly takes into account 
expectations about other people's commitment - and not sim-
ply regularity - is found in Russell Hardin's analysis of trust as a 
encapsulated interest, that is, trust as belief that it is in the inter-
est of the trusted to attend to the truster's interests in the rele-
vant matter [cf. Hardin 2002]. 
Thus, evidential accounts of social trust try to reduce it to jus-
tified expectations about the objective probability of other peo-
ple's commitments. 
The key aspect of evidential accounts that I would like to 
contrast with motivational accounts is that trust is viewed as a 
cognitive attitude, like knowledge or belief, for which we can 
find a rational justification in terms of the capacity we have to 
read and assess the commitments of others. 
What about evidential accounts of intellectual trust? An evi-
dential theory of intellectual trust assigns probabilities to our 
expectations about our interlocutors' truthfulness on a particu-
lar subject matter. And of course truthfulness is a matter of com-
petence as well as of benevolence. But competence and benev-
olence are very different things. Competence seems to be a 
more objective trait than benevolence: I can trust you on your 
willingness to help me in translating Herodotus even if I don't 
defer to your competence in Ancient Greek. Competence does-
n't depend on your commitment to be trustworthy to me. 
Most evidential accounts of intellectual trust explore the 
dimension of competence more than that of benevolence. The 
epistemological literature on assessing expertise focuses on the 
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cognitive strategies that we can adopt in order to assess the reli-
ability of doctors, lawyers, witnesses, journalists, etc. Alvin 
Goldman argues that there exist "truth-revealing situations"6 in 
which a novice can test the competence of the expert even if 
she doesn't know how the expert has come to collect her evi-
dence. For example, the weather today is a truth-revealing situ-
ation of the expertise of the weather forecast that I read yester-
day in the New York Times. If the NYT weather forecast were 
systematically poorer in predicting the weather than the Yahoo 
weather forecast, I would have evidence to trust the latter more 
than the former, even if I don't have the slightest idea about 
how a weather forecast is produced. That is the commonsense 
practice that we use to calibrate our informants' expertise, even 
if we are novices in their domain of expertise. If my doctor's 
therapy against my stomachache is inefficacious, I am in a truth-
revealing situation to assess her competence. Of course, not 
every domain of expertise admits of truth-revealing situations: 
large areas of the formal sciences such as mathematics or 
physics don't. In these cases, there exist alternative strategies 
that allow us to assess the reliability of the overall social process 
that sustains laymen's epistemic dependence on experts. Such 
strategies have been investigated by various authors, for exam-
ple Philip Kitcher, who defines the overall project of describing 
the strategies of granting expertise to others as the study of the 
organisation of cognitive labour. As he points out: "Once we 
have recognized that individuals form beliefs by relying on 
information supplied by others, there are serious issues about 
the conditions that should be met if the community is to form a 
consensus on a particular issue - questions about the division 
of opinion and of cognitive effort within the community and 
6 Cf. A. Goldman "Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law 
and Society," The Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 113-131. 
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issues about the proper attribution of authority" [Kitcher, 1994, 
114]. For example, I can have methods to track your past 
records within a particular domain and grant you authority on 
the basis of your "earned reputation" in this domain7. Or I can 
grant you authority due to your better epistemic position: I call 
my sister in Milan and she tells me that it is raining there and I 
believe her because I am able to assess her better epistemic 
position about the weather in Milan. These accounts under-
score the rational bases of our trust in other people's epistemic 
authority and appeal to a conceptual framework similar to that 
of the evidential accounts of trust in the social sciences by using 
the language of rational decision theory or microeconomics8. 
Evidential accounts of trust in authority illuminate the rea-
sons why we reliably appeal to experts in specialized domains. 
But, as I said, trust in epistemic authority seems to involve more 
than just the assessment of expertise. We don't always have the 
choice to trust or distrust. The examples that I give at the begin-
ning of this paper show that it is not always a matter of decid-
ing to defer to other people's authority: it just happens that the 
very nature of some of our beliefs is deferential, and that's not 
a phenomenon that seems to be captured by these accounts. 
Motivational accounts of trust 
Many authors in the social sciences and moral philosophy 
claim that evidential accounts fail to provide an appropriate pic-
ture of trust, by appealing only to a set of rational expectations 
about other people's motivations to commit to cooperation. 
7 Kitcher [1992] defines this kind of authority: "earned authority". 
8 Cf. for an example of use of the economics framework A. Goldman and 
M. Shaked [1991] and P. Kitcher [1993] ch.8. 
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Our commitment to trust is not only cognitive, that is, based on 
the degree of our beliefs about the future actions of the trusted. 
Trust also involves a motivational, non-representational dimen-
sion that may depend on our deep moral, emotional or cultur-
al pre-commitments. Thus, in the paper that I have mentioned 
above, Becker speaks of our trust as non-cognitive if it is a dis-
position to be trustful towards persons "independently of our 
beliefs or expectations about their trustworthiness" [p. 50]. In a 
book entitled Authority Richard Sennett defines trust in author-
ity as an emotional commitment. And in a seminal paper, 
Annette Baier defines trust as the accepted vulnerability to 
another's possible but unexpected ill will toward oneself, and 
explores the varieties of moral, emotional and cultural grounds 
on which we accept this vulnerability. Along the same lines, 
Otto Lagerspetz says: "trust is not the fact that one, after calcu-
lating the odds, feels no risk: It is feeling no risk without calcu-
lating the odds" [1998] These accounts try to capture the idea 
that in many circumstances our trust in others cannot be con-
verted into subjective estimates of risk, because the margins of 
ignorance or uncertainty are too broad for such estimates to be 
possible. Also, as Baier points out, "trust can come with no 
beginnings, with gradual as well as sudden beginnings and 
with various degrees of self-consciousness, voluntariness and 
expressness" [Baier, 1986, p. 240]. That is, the child who trusts 
her mother, the patient who trusts her doctor, the novice scien-
tist who trusts the truth of the main results in her field without 
having gone through the details of the proofs, have different 
degrees of control and thus of choice on their trustful attitude. 
As the anthropologist Maurice Bloch says in his explanation of 
the role of deference in rituals: "We are permanently floating in 
a soup of deference" Most of the time we are not aware of the 
reason we have to trust. We simply do so9. 
9 Bloch explains rituals as a collective moment of awareness of the defer-
ence to the tradition. Cf. M. Bloch (2004): "Rituals and Deference", in H. 
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The moral philosophical literature on motivational trust tries 
to establish to what extent such trustful attitudes are morally 
justified. Baier's conclusion is that they are insofar as there are 
minimal reasons to think that the trusted who is exerting her 
authority on us cares about the goods we want her to care 
about. For example, it is justified to trust our partner in the treat-
ment of our child even if we don't approve of or understand her 
actions, if we have reasons to think that she cares for the child. 
A more empirical literature in social psychology and eco-
nomics tries to establish the effects of motivational trust on sta-
bilizing cooperation and reliability in negotiations and in every-
day life. 
What about the epistemic implications of motivational 
accounts? Do they illuminate in any sense our trust in epistemic 
authority? At a first glance, motivational accounts seem better 
equipped to explain a broader spectrum of cases than eviden-
tial accounts do. A motivational dimension seems to be 
involved in the asymmetrical deferential relations of trust in 
epistemic authority that I've tried to suggest in my previous 
examples. Indeed, trust in epistemic authority doesn't seem to 
be a matter of choice in the most straightforward examples: The 
child who trusts her mother when she tells her that she needs 
to breathe air to survive - even if she cannot see air and cannot 
figure out what is the role of oxygen in our survival - doesn't 
have the choice to be skeptical, as well as the patient who is 
told by her doctor that she has contracted a potentially lethal 
disease. Also, we find ourselves committed to trust the intellec-
tual authority of other people just because we are part of the 
same linguistic and epistemic community, because we share 
the same institutions and we acknowledge a "division of cogni-
Whitehouse and J. Laidlaw (eds.) Rituals and Memory: Towards a 
Comparative Anthropology of Religion, Altamira Press, London. 
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tive labour" in our community. But if we accept the principle 
that a certain amount of "default" trust - or spontaneous trust -
is needed to sustain our cognitive life in a social environment, 
how do we avoid the risk of credulity that such a trustful dis-
position seems to imply? And if the motivational trust that sus-
tains our social relations may be based on moral, cultural or 
emotional pre-commitments, what about the pre-commitments 
underlying the motivational trust that sustains our cognitive 
relations? Moral commitments to trust in other people's intellec-
tual authority typically ground the adhesion to the most irra-
tional beliefs. Religious beliefs or allegiance to a guru's 
thoughts are often justified in terms of moral or emotional com-
mitments. But these are exactly the kinds of beliefs that an epis-
temological account of trust should try to exclude in order to 
avoid the risk of gullibility run by a default trustful attitude 
towards the words of others. 
Reidian accounts of epistemic trust 
Another way to argue for the role of motivational trust in 
knowledge acquisition is to see it as an innate disposition to 
accept what other people tell us. And indeed many authors 
have argued that a natural tendency to trust others is the only 
way to justify testimonial knowledge. The locus classicus of this 
position is Thomas Reid's defense of trust in testimony: We are 
justified in believing what other people say because we, as 
humans have a natural disposition to speak the truth and a nat-
ural disposition to accept as true what other people tell us. Reid 
calls these two principles, "that tally with each other"10, the 
Principle of Veracity and the Principle of Credulity. But the 
10 Cf. Reid [1764] Inquiry into the Human Mind, § 24. 
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relationship between these two principles, which Reid consid-
ers self-evident, is far from being clear. The principle of veraci-
ty is not well correlated to truth: It just affirms that people are 
disposed to say what they believe to be true, which does not 
mean that they say what it is actually true11. Thus, an appeal to 
a natural trustful disposition doesn't suffice to justify our epis-
temic trust and protect it from credulity. 
Reid affirms that if we deny any legitimacy, or at least, natu-
ralness to our trust in others, the result would be skepticism. We 
believe "by instinct" what our parents and teachers say long 
before we acquire the capacity to critically judge their compe-
tence. But that is just a way of acknowledging the pervasive-
ness of the lore of inheritance and upbringing in shaping one 
owns' concepts and beliefs without explaining it. It is a fact that 
we are influenced by others, not only in infancy but in the 
acquisition of most of our beliefs. But acknowledging this fact 
is not a sufficient explanation of why we are justified in com-
plying with our trustful tendencies. 
Modern defences of a Reidian epistemology12 appeal to the 
existence of natural language as the material proof that the two 
principles (credulity and veracity) indeed tally with each other: 
most statements in any public language are testimonial and 
most statements are true; if they were not, it is difficult to imag-
ine how a public language could have ever stabilized. [cf. 
Coady, 1992]. The very possibility of a common language pre-
supposes a generally truthful use of speech. 
Tyler Burge relies on the "purely preservative character" of 
linguistic communication to argue that we have an a priori jus-
11 See on this point K. Leherer: "Testimony, Justification and Coherence", 
in Matilal & Chakrabarti (eds.) pp. 51-67. 
12 For an overview of contemporary Reidian epistemology, see R. Foley 
[2001]. 
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tification for relying on what we understand others to be saying. 
Language, as memory, is a medium of content preservation13. 
I have discussed these positions elsewhere14. Here let me just 
mention that, although these positions give us some hints of the 
'passive', non-intentional trust that characterizes our role as 
cognizers in a social community, their appeal to some structur-
al features of language is less convincing in solving the paradox 
of epistemic trust, that is, how it is compatible with intellectual 
autonomy. That is, what concerns us here is: "how intellectual 
autonomy is possible, given what we know about the power of 
one's inheritance and surroundings to shape one's concepts, 
opinions and even the way one reasons?" [Foley, 2001: 128] 
Epistemic trust out of self-trust 
A different line of defense of the legitimacy of trust in others 
has been recently pursued by Richard Foley in his book on 
Intellectual Trust in Oneself and in Others [Cambridge, 2001]. 
Foley derives it from the justification we have to trust ourselves. 
We grant a default authority in our intellectual faculties to pro-
vide us with reliable information about the world. This is our 
only way out of skepticism. But if we have this basic trust in our 
intellectual faculties, why should we withhold it from others? 
We acknowledge the influence that others had in shaping our 
thoughts and opinions in the past. If acknowledging this fact 
doesn't prevent us from granting authority to ourselves, it 
should not prevent us from granting authority to others, given 
13 Cf. T. Burge: "Content Preservation", Philosophical Review, 102, pp. 457-
487. 
14 Cf. G. Origgi [2004] "Is Trust an Epistemological Notion?", Episteme, vol. 
1, n. 1, pp. 1-12. 
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that our opinions wouldn't be reliable today if theirs were not 
in the past. And even in cases of the interaction of people from 
different cultures whose influence upon our thinking is poor or 
nonexistent, we can rely on the general fact that our cognitive 
mechanisms are largely similar to extend our self-trust to them 
[cf. Foley 2004, ch. 4]. This strategy of simulation of other minds 
leads Foley to a sort of "modest epistemic universalism" accord-
ing to which "It is trust in myself that creates for me a pre-
sumption in favor of other people's opinions, eve if I know lit-
tle about them"15 [cf. ibidem p. 108]. 
I find Foley's position attractive as it preserves intellectual 
autonomy and ends in justifying just the minimal trust necessary 
to sustain our epistemic life, and avoiding the "deferential 
incontinence" and thus gullibility that is imputed to Reidian 
solutions. But Foley's analysis lacks the motivational dimension 
that I think an explanation of epistemic trust should include in 
order to account for very heterogeneous cases such as deliber-
ate deference to an intellectual authority, passive trust in the 
authority of our cultural heritage and default trust that we grant 
to others in spontaneous conversation. What his account miss-
es is the idea that in many contexts trusting others doesn't seem 
to be depend on what we know or discover about them, as for 
instance that they are similar to us. Rather, trusting others is a 
matter of commitment to their trustworthiness in the social as 
well as in the epistemic cases. One could go further, and sug-
gest that we owe this kind of commitment even to self-trust, 
that is, that the authority on my own mental states does not 
depend on something that I discover about myself. Self-trust is 
the product of a responsible and deliberative commitment 
about the consequences of assuming some beliefs as my 
15 As Foley says, a stronger epistemic universalism would imply that other 
people's opinions are necessarily prima f a c e credible. Cf. ibidem, p. 107. 
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beliefs. Richard Moran defends this line in his recent book, 
Authority and Estrangement16. According to Moran, this act of 
commitment is constitutive of my self-knowledge. I would not 
expand further, but I think it shows how problematic is to 
ground our trust in authority in self-trust. How can we capture 
the motivational dimension of epistemic trust we need to have 
a full-fledged notion of trust in authority? As we have seen, we 
cannot follow moral/social accounts of trust and ground a moti-
vational account in emotional or moral pre-commitments, 
because this would unavoidably lead to irrationality. Still, 
grounding it in some innate dispositions or deriving it from self-
trust misses the whole point of understanding the nature of our 
commitment to trust in other people's authority. 
In the last section, I will explore a different strategy, and con-
sider one on the most straightforward contexts in which com-
mitment, trust and knowledge bloom together, that is, human 
communication. 
Conversation, trust and communication 
One fundamental fact about the social transmission of 
knowledge that is surprisingly under-exploited in the episte-
mological literature on intellectual authority is that every social 
contagion of beliefs goes through a process of communication 
that ranges from street-level conversation to more institutional-
ized settings of information exchange. Our almost permanent 
immersion in talks and direct or indirect conversations is the 
major source of cognitive vulnerability to other people beliefs 
and reports, even when the exchange is not particularly 
16 Cf. R. Moran [2001] Authority and Estrangement, Princeton University 
Press, especially ch. 2. 
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focused on knowledge acquisition17. Communication is a vol-
untary act. Each time we speak we are intentionally seeking the 
attention of our interlocutors and thus presenting what we have 
to say as potentially relevant for them. Each time we listen, we 
intentionally engage in an interpretation of what has been said, 
and expand cognitive effort in order to make sense of what our 
interlocutor had in mind. In this last section of my paper, I will 
argue that it is the intentional, voluntary character of human 
communication that guarantees our intellectual autonomy even 
in those cases in which our epistemic position obliges us to 
defer to other people's authority. And the making and breaking 
of epistemic trust is related in many ways to our conversational 
practices. 
There are many different styles of discourse that imply dif-
ferent degrees of reciprocal trust. Of course, the set of norms 
and assumptions that we tacitly accept when engaging in intel-
lectual conversation18 are not the same we endorse in a party 
conversation where the common aim we tacitly share with our 
interlocutors is entertaining and social contact. Still, a basic 
reciprocal commitment, I will claim, has to take place in any 
genuine case of communication. And the cognitive dimension 
of this basic commitment has interesting consequences for our 
reciprocal trust. 
Intentional analyses of communication have been a major 
contribution to the philosophy of language and pragmatics in 
17 On the fortuitous character of lot of our knowledge, cf. R. Hardin: "If it 
Rained Knowledge", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 33, pp. 3-24; and 
[2004] "Why Know?' manuscript. Cf. also Jennifer Lackey: "Knowledge is not 
necessarily transmitted via testimony, but testimony can itself generate knowl-
edge" [Jennifer Lackey (1999) "Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission", 
The Philosophical Quarterly, 199, p. 490, vol. 49 n. 197]. 
18 For an analysis of the mutually accepted norms that rule intellectual con-
versations, see P. Pettit and M Smith [1996] "Freedom in Belief and Desire", 
The Journal of Philosophy, 93, 9, pp. 429-449. 
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the last 40 years. We owe to Paul Grice19 the modern pragmatic 
analysis of linguistic interpretation as the reconstruction of the 
speaker's intentions. Simply decoding the linguistic meaning of 
the words conveyed in an act of communication is not enough 
to make sense of what the speaker wanted to tell us. Successful 
communication involves cooperation among interlocutors, 
even when the ultimate aim of one of the parties is to deceive 
the other: without at least a common aim of mutual under-
standing, communication would not be possible. Thus commu-
nication is a much richer and constructive activity than simply 
decoding a linguistic signal. According to Grice, we infer what 
the speaker says on the tacit assumption that she is conforming 
to the same set of rules and maxims that guide our cooperative 
effort to understand each other. Among these maxims, two of 
them are worth considering for the present purposes: one is a 
maxim of quality of the information conveyed: "Do not say 
what you believe to be false" that Grice considers as most 
important. This doesn't mean that the participants in a conver-
sation are actually truthful. But they act as if they were telling 
the truth, that is, they conform to the maxim, otherwise the min-
imal common aim of understanding each other would not be 
realized. So they need to at least pretend to be cooperative. On 
the hearer's side, the presumption that the speaker is conform-
ing to the maxim doesn't imply that the hearer comes automat-
ically to believe what the speaker says. She interprets the 
speaker on the presumption that the speaker is conforming to 
the maxims, and that leads her to infer what she meant, even if, 
later, she may be led to revise her presumption on the basis of 
what she already knows or what she has come to believe in the 
course of the conversation. 
The other maxim that I would like to consider is that of rele-
vance. Contemporary pragmatic theories have developed a 
19 Cf. P. Grice [1957] Meaning, . . . 
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notion of relevance as the key notion that guides our interpre-
tations. For example Sperber and Wilson's pragmatic approach, 
known as Relevance Theory, says that each act of communica-
tion communicates a presumption of its own relevance. A rele-
vant piece of information, in a given context, is one that opti-
mizes the balance between the cognitive effort I have to invest 
to process it and the benefits I gain by entertaining it in my 
mind. A potential communicator presents herself as having 
something to say that is relevant for us, otherwise we would not 
even engage in conversation. Communication is a very special 
case of behavior. It is always intentional and to be successful it 
needs to be recognized as intentional. I don't automatically give 
attention to every cognitive stimulus that is potentially relevant 
for me, but I cannot refrain from allocating at least a minimal 
attention to an overt act of communication that is addressed to 
me, because the very fact that it is addressed to me is a cue that 
it worth attention. The presumption of relevance that accompa-
nies every act of intentional communication is what grounds 
our spontaneous trust in others. I trust a communicator who 
intentionally asks for my attention to convey something that is 
relevant for me, and I adopt a stance of trust that will guide me 
to a relevant interpretation of what she has said (that is, an 
interpretation that satisfies my expectations given what she says 
and what she may assume we are sharing as common ground 
contextual information). In this rich and constructive process of 
building new representations and hypotheses on the presump-
tion that they will be relevant to me, the speaker and the hear-
er are both responsible for the set of thoughts they generate in 
conversation, that is, what Sperber and Wilson call their "mutu-
al cognitive environment". But the hearer doesn't automatically 
accept as true the whole set of common ground thoughts that 
have been activated in the conversation. She may decide to 
entertain them in her mind for the sake of conversation, and 
trust the speaker that this is relevant information for her. Our 
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mutual cognitive environments, that is, the set of hypotheses 
and representations that we activate in our mind when we com-
municate in order to understand each other, do not overlap 
with the set of what we actually believe. In conversation, our 
interior landscape enriches itself with new representations that 
have been created on the presumption of their relevance for us, 
a presumption we are justified in having because we have been 
intentionally addressed by our interlocutor. We trust our inter-
locutor's willingness to share a mutually relevant cognitive 
environment, that is, to build a common ground that maximizes 
understanding and favors the emergence of new, relevant 
thoughts. But our previous knowledge and a more fine-grained 
check of the content communicated can lead us to reject much 
of what has been said. Trusting in relevance of what other peo-
ple say is the cognitive vulnerability that we accept in order to 
activate in our mind new thoughts and hypotheses that are 
shared with our interlocutors. There is never an automatic 
transfer of beliefs from one person's head to another's. The 
"floating of other men's opinions in our brains"20 is mediated by 
a process of interpretation that makes us activate a number of 
hypotheses on the presumption, guided by the hearer, that they 
will be relevant for us. These online thoughts that serve the 
purposes of conversation are not accepted by default as new 
beliefs. They are worth considering, given the trust we have in 
our interlocutors. They may even be worth repeating without 
further checking because of their relevant effects in certain 
conversational contexts. But they can be easily dismissed if 
their probability is too low given what we know about the 
world or what we have come to know about the interlocutor. 
We trust our interlocutors to be relevant enough to be worth 
20 Cf. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. John W. 
Yolton, London 1961, 1, p. 58. 
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our attention. Our trust is both fundamental and fragile: it is 
fundamental because I need to trust in other people's willing-
ness to be relevant for me in order to make sense of what they 
are saying. It is fragile because a further check can lead me to 
abandon most of the hypotheses I generated in conversation 
and withdraw credibility from my interlocutor. 
Our mental life is populated by a bric-à-brac of drafty, 
sketchy semi-propositional representations that we need in 
order to sustain our interpretations of the thousands of dis-
courses to which we are permanently exposed. We accept 
some of them as beliefs, we use others in our inferences and we 
throw a lot of them out as pure noise. This doesn't make us 
gullible beings: we trust others to cooperate in generating rele-
vant sets of representations, and we share with them the 
responsibility for these representations. Of course, our epis-
temic strategies vary in the course of our life. The trust of a child 
in the relevance of what her parents say may lead her to auto-
matically believe in the content of what is said, that is, under-
standing and believing may be simultaneous processes in early 
childhood21. As we grow up, we develop strategies of checking 
and filtering information. 
A presumption of trust in other people's willingness to give 
us relevant information is thus the minimal default trust we are 
justified in having towards testimony. This stance of trust leads 
often enough to an epistemic improvement of our cognitive 
life22. 
21 Interesting recent results in developmental psychology show that even 
young children are not gullible and have strategies for filtering information. 
See F. Clément, P. Harris, M. Koening (2004) "The Ontogenesis of Trust", 
Mind&Language, vol. 19, 4, pp. 360-379. 
22 D. Sperber and D. Wilson have explained the details of the correlation 
between relevance and truth in D. Sperber, D. Wilson (2002): "Truthfulness 
and Relevance" Mind, 
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But our efforts at interpretation are not always rewarded. 
Trust in relevance guides our process of interpretation and may 
lead us to invest supplementary effort in trying to make sense 
of what our interlocutor is talking about. It is on the basis of our 
default trust that we often invest too many resources, with only 
the aim of making sense what the other person is talking about. 
Sometimes my supplementary efforts are rewarded, sometimes 
they end up in a too generous interpretation of what I was told. 
The overconfidence people sometimes have in the relevance of 
esoteric discourse depends on the direct proportionality 
between the effort people invest in interpreting others and the 
trust they have of receiving relevant information. Trust in rele-
vance may act as a bias that leads us to over-interpret or exces-
sively rationalize what others say. 
In a beautiful novel by Jerzy Kosinsky, Being There, adapted 
as the perhaps better known film with Peter Sellers, Chance 
Gardiner is a mentally impaired gardener who becomes an heir 
to the throne of a Wall Street tycoon, a presidential policy 
adviser and a media icon just by pronouncing few, enigmatic 
sentences about gardening. 
As a result of a series of fortuitous accidents, Chance finds 
himself living in the house of Mr. Rand, a Wall Street tycoon and 
a close friend of the President of United States. In a dialogue 
with the President visiting Mr. Rand's house, when asked to 
comment about the bad season at Wall Street, Chance says: "In 
a garden, growth has its season. There are spring and summer, 
but there are also fall and winter. And then spring and summer 
again. As long as the roots are not severed all is well and will be 
well" (p. 54). Looking for a relevant interpretation, and trusting 
(in this case mistakenly) in Chance's willingness to be relevant, 
the President interprets it as an important statement about the 
fundamental symmetry between nature and society, and quotes 
him on television the day after. 
We all have experiences of over-trust generated out of an 
over-investment in interpretation. And, conversely, an exces-
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sive investment in interpreting what a person says that proves 
ill-founded may make our withdraw of trust more definitive. 
Trust and comprehension are thus intimately related. An 
epistemology of trust should account for this relation. Our first 
epistemic objective in acquiring knowledge from others is to 
understand what they say and make sense of their thoughts 
within the context of our own. We are never passively infected 
by other people's beliefs: we take the responsibility to interpret 
what they say and share with them a series of commitments on 
the quality of the exchange. The social dimension of knowl-
edge is grounded in our cognitive activity as interpreters, an 
activity we always share with others. 
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Pasquale Pasquino 
6. THE AUTHORITY OF NON-ELECTED AUTHORITIES: 
WHY DO PEOPLE OBEY CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS? 
6.1 Fragestellung 
Contemporary political theory claims that the (legitimate) 
authority of public authorities/officials comes from a simple 
and clear circumstance: citizens have the right to choose the 
individuals who are going to occupy positions of authority, 
and, even more importantly, they have the legal capability to 
fire them and replace them with others, if they find the officials 
to be inadequate in performing their job. This is what the 
Founding Fathers of modern democracy called a "republic" 
(Madison) or a "representative government" (Sieyes). Notice 
that by "authority", in the first sense (Herrschaft), I mean the 
"recognized" competence to impose the choices of a. = the rul-
ing elite upon b. = the members of a political community. By 
authorities, in the second occurrence, I simply mean the ruling 
elites. By legitimate, I refer to the fact that the first authority is 
not imposed simply by force or accepted only because of an 
instinct of self-preservation. 
The essential core of my claim can be summed up in the fol-
lowing way: the legitimacy of the authorities I'm speaking 
about here (the ruling political elite), as well as their claim to 
obedience, finds its origin and rationale in the "electoral princi-
ple". This corresponds with the absence of tenure for those 
who govern, and the dependence of their mandate, and its 
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renewal, on the periodical choice of the governed. This holds 
true at least in the modern or contemporary societies that we 
cali "democratic". Yet, considering that an increasing number of 
important public decisions in most of these democratic soci-
eties are made by authorities who are not elected or, more 
specifically, who are not "accountable to the voters," we can 
and ought to wonder where the legitimacy of those decisions -
and of the agents who take them - comes from. Or, looking at 
the other side of the same coin, we can ask, why do citizens 
(but also the accountable political actors or organs of the state) 
comply with the decisions of authorities they didn't choose and 
with respect to whom they have no direct power of political 
sanction, like recall or non-renewal of the mandate. 
6.2 Analytic of authority 
Independently from the electoral principle that seems to be 
connected with the principle of individual autonomy (a point 
made not very persuasively by Hans Kelsen) or, more convinc-
ingly, with the principle of limited government, it has been 
often remarked (I have Jon Elster's paper in mind here) that cit-
izens' obedience can be explained largely by the habit of obey-
ing [L. Hart], and also by the costs of disobedience, thus by the 
interest in obedience on the part of those who offer it. To this it 
is added that since obcwdientia facit imperante-m [Spinoza], in 
explaining why citizens obey public powers, we can also make 
sense of the authority of those public powers! 
Now the habit of obedience can certainly explain a certain 
amount of compliance behavior towards public authorities. But 
it doesn't explain all cases of compliance, notably the behavior 
of those who are able to disobey; we have numerous examples 
of such subjects in any type of society, and a fortiori in demo-
cratic societies. Regarding their interest, much depends on the 
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meaning we attribute to this polysemic word. Stricto sensu, I 
believe that by interest we often mean the calculus of costs and 
benefits that informs the decision to take an action. Now obe-
dience to a command of a public authority corresponds with 
the interest of the person who obeys, if he has good reason to 
believe that the disobedience will produce a punishment or 
sanction more exacting than the cost of obedience. 
Once we think more seriously about it, I think we can dis-
cover a "paralogism" in this argument: presupposing the exis-
tence of the authority whose existence and raison d'etre we 
claim to be explaining [we find the same problem in the vulgar 
interpretation of Hobbes' political philosophy - it is a different 
point to explain why and under which conditions it may be 
rational to obey an existent authority]. I am troubled by the 
underlying analytical problem here. If we think that authority 
comes from obedience, and we add that obedience (O) 
depends on the ability of the authority (A) to punish those who 
disobey (X), then it is actually this ability (X) that explains the 
authority in the first place, rather than obedience. 
X ^ O ^ A; but X is A or a quality of A; so, it is not O ^ A, 
but X ^ A, and in fact A+X [= the agent or the agency charac-
terized by X] ^ O [ ^ = generates or is the cause of]. 
Let me restate my argument. The authority cannot be both 
the explanandum and the explanans. We cannot explain the 
authority of public authorities by obedience, nor the obedience 
by the existence of an authority which is able to punish and 
reward. It follows that it is this quality of the authority, and not 
the obedience as such, that explains why we obey it. So it 
seems to me that we have to abandon Spinoza's hypothesis 
according to which obwdientia facit imperantem. In any event, 
we ought to abandon it as an explicative hypothesis and look 
for a different one instead. One possibility is that the obedience 
to authority is produced by some automatisms, like habit or 
some even more basic structure. Or, for example, that it is pro-
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duced by the belief in the legitimacy of a given authority. Which 
raises the further question (very likely the question asked by 
Max Weber): what is the content of this belief and where does 
it come from? Also, what are the qualities of A that produce 
obedience and where do they come from? 
Brief historical excursus. In a social or collective context, 
this quality cannot be identified with force tout court, since 
those who command are few and those who obey, multitudes. 
It will be objected that the few may have considerable military 
force at their disposal. But this is still not an answer since we 
have to explain why soldiers obey generals. Here is just one 
example to clarify what I have in mind. At the very beginning 
of the French Revolution, when the Third Estate seceded from 
the Estates General, the Conte d'Artois ordered the army to 
shoot at the representatives of the Third Estate. It did not obey. 
Clearly, some of the "generals" - like Clermont-Tonnerre - did 
not agree with Artois. The example shows that something like 
prestige or persuasion matters more than arms. This is because 
arma silent only in the presence of a recognized authority. 
6.3 Redefining theproblem 
Let me try to qualify the scope of my inquiry. We saw that in 
my field of analysis, contemporary political and constitutional 
theory, the democratic ideology or doctrine answers the ques-
tion, "why do citizens obey political authority?" by saying 
"because of elections", thus making use of such quasi-philo-
sophical paraphernalia as individual autonomy, limitation of 
power, and so on. And, up to a certain point, I believe that this 
works. But this still leaves open the question of why govern-
ments, which have electoral legitimacy and dispose of public 
force, obey constitutional courts, which are neither elected nor 
politically accountable [responsables devant le s u f f r a g e ] and 
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have moreover no independent means for concretely enforcing 
their decisions. Let me pique your attention with a quote. 
Speaking of the American Supreme Court (in his Democracy in 
America, éd. Folio, vol. I, pt. I, ch. 8, p. 234), Tocqueville noted 
that "its power is immense, but it is a power of opinion" [a pou-
voir d'opinion] [which we should translate as a "spiritual 
power"]. The judges of this court - added Tocqueville - "are 
almighty if the people accept to obey the law [their interpreta-
tion of the law]; they have instead no power if the people have 
contempt for it." 
So I'm back to my square one: where does the authority of 
unelected officials come from?! In the case of Bush v. Gore 
(2000), the "pouvoir d'opinion", to speak with Tocqueville, 
went so far in the United States as to choose the president that 
the American citizens should have chosen themselves! I am 
thus going to speak only of the power/authority of these courts. 
Let me start by rejecting the modern myth of the judge who 
limits himself to the mere application of the law, acting like an 
automaton, a machine reproducing "practical" syllogisms, or as 
a sheer "bouche de la loi" [Montesquieu]. I do not actually 
believe that this myth is completely meaningless. But my ques-
tion is somewhat different. I want to reflect on how judges 
decide conflicts by virtue of their own authority and without 
further appeal (think of the function that the German 
Constitution refers to as Organstreit). Like Solomon, such 
judges impose their decision on those who turn to them. This is 
illustrated by the conflict between supreme state organs inside 
a constitutional Rechtstaat or conflicts between the families of 
an ancient city, like the judgment that Homer describes in one 
of the most fascinating scenes of in the Iliad about Achilles' 
shield. 
But we first have to ask the question: "who obeys"? (so, con-
trary to what Hobbes thought, it is not enough to ask quis judi-
cabitur?). When we are dealing with a court, those who obey 
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are the parties to a dispute, who turn to the judge to adjudicate 
the conflict. When we speak of constitutional courts the parties 
may be of a different type. Simplifying a bit, we may have an 
individual asking for the protection of his own rights vis-à-vis a 
decision of a public authority (a statute, an administrative act or 
even a judicial decision); this is the German model of the 
Verfassungsbeschwerde, which is a constitutional complaint or 
"recours direct". But parties can also be branches of the central 
government or subunits in a federal state, involved in a conflict 
in which they need adjudication. For instance: a region, or a 
Land vs. the central government, the executive vs. the legislative 
branch, or - like in France - the opposition in the Parliament 
against the majority, meaning the government. Once this has 
been clarified, my question - who obeys constitutional courts? 
- can be rephrased in the following way: Why - if we take the 
French case - does the majority accept that its will be bent 
because of the intervention of the CC [constitutional court] on 
the request of the minority? (It would also be interesting to con-
sider cases of non-compliance: Bavaria and the crucifix; the 
Southern states in the US opposing the Warren Court's civil 
rights decisions). 
The legal positivist will answer: because it is written in the 
constitution. And it is perfectly true that the French Constitution 
- to stick to my example - requires the parties to accept the 
decision [ l 'arr e t ] of the Conseil Constitutionnel. But this answer, 
perhaps adequate for a School of Law, is not enough for me. 
One can put forward the argument that an explicit violation of 
the constitution is a "cost" for a political actor, including the 
majority, which derives its powers from the constitution itself. 
But this consideration just reinforces my question. Why did the 
political class introduce this provision (constitutional control) 
into the constitution in the first place? It is easy to suggest, as I 
do elsewhere [Ratio Juris], that constitutional provisions intro-
ducing constitutional adjudication can be considered as an 
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insurance mechanism for those who are defeated in the electoral 
race. This is what Giscard's justice minister, Lecanuet, said in 1974 
when the saisine parlementaire was introduced in France: since 
we are probably going to lose the elections, let's try not to lose 
everything. In fact, the conservatives lost the elections in 1981 and 
the Constitutional Council canceled part of the nationalization 
measures enacted by the socialist government. So, in this context, 
the CC is a mechanism of moderation vis-à-vis the majority. 
In addition to this, I would also like to draw your attention to 
two additional considerations: 1. the constitutional expansion 
or the "constitutionalization" of what we refer to in France as 
"administrative law"; 2. the (possible) way for CCs to justify 
their authority to themselves and to the other actors in the polit-
ical and constitutional system. 
1. The first point is slightly technical and I will be brief. The 
état de droit or stato di diritto - the French and Italian equiva-
lents of the German Rechtstaat - is based on the principle (not 
identical with the electoral principle) that any concerned citizen 
should be allowed to sue a public authority if she thinks that it 
has abused its legal competences. This is one of the paramount 
definitions that Dicey gave of the concept of "rule of law". 
France, as is well known, invented a special jurisdiction to adju-
dicate conflicts between citizens and the state or the public 
administration: the administrative courts and the administrative 
judges. I can't speak here of the fascinating story of this institu-
tion that was invented to protect the public administration and 
ended up protecting, at least sometimes, citizens' rights, both in 
France and on the continent. I just want to recall that post-war 
Germany charged the BVG (the Federal Constitutional Court) 
with the adjudication of conflicts between citizens and the pub-
lic administration having a constitutional rank or dignity. 
To rephrase my original question again (what I'm really try-
ing to do is formulate the right question): why does the state 
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obey a court (lacking in democratic legitimacy), which con-
demns it in favor of a simple, isolated and sometimes weak citi-
zen? I'd like to put forward the following hypothesis: in our sta-
ble democratic societies, the legitimacy originating in the elec-
toral principle is drying up! It played a crucial role during the 
long period beginning on the European continent with the 
French Revolution: a period that can be characterized by the inte-
gration of the members of the society (the citizens) into the state. 
First the middle class, then the working class and then women 
were given the franchise. Electoral legitimacy allows for the 
peaceful rotation of political elites in power as well as the inte-
gration produced by universal suffrage (democrats vs. republi-
cans in Germany during the Vormarz - W. Conze, Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe) and mass political parties. Having attained the 
integration of national citizens (the excluded now are immigrants 
from outside the European Union), political authority (political 
elites) is forced to move forward and grant to the single, isolated 
citizen as such a right to complain. The political elites have to 
concede a recurso de amparo - as the Spaniards call it - a final 
right of appeal against the democratic authority itself. This is an 
appeal in which the constitutional court is the final arbiter. 
This is a way for organized political actors to prevent the loss 
of elections from becoming a radical, crushing defeat; it also 
increases the legitimacy of representative governments, espe-
cially those ashamed of their authoritarian pasts. Thus we can 
see the beginnings of my answer. 
2. Typology of justification. To conclude, I'd like to say a 
few words about the ideology that may justify the power or 
authority of the constitutional court. I'm going to do it using a 
typology based on fragments from the history of ideas and insti-
tutions, the Montesquieu-Coke-Hobbes model. This three-part 
model can likewise be conceived in terms of: the null power, 
expertise, impartiality. 
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The first bit of my triadic model is well known: it produced 
the weakest and yet the most widespread image of the consti-
tutional court. It says that we have to obey the (constitutional 
court) since, like any agency with the judicial function, it has no 
power, and no will. It is nothing but the "mouth of the consti-
tution," articulating practical syllogisms and just enforcing the 
will of the constituent power of the people. It is even possible 
to build a quaint metaphysical theory of this constituent power, 
in which the constitutional court would be its "expression." I 
shall skip all this, even though there are interesting things to 
say, notably concerning the practical, institutional conse-
quences of such an ideology. 
The second figure of the triptych is slightly less known. I 
name it after Sir Edward Coke in honor of the chief justice of the 
Common Law Courts of England at the beginning of the 17th 
century. It was Coke who convinced the Stuart King James I 
that his majesty should not adjudicate all the conflicts: the King 
of England certainly had the sovereign power, but he had not 
the expertise, meaning the knowledge of the laws of his king-
dom, which requires a long study in the Inns of Court. The 
power or the authority of the judge - so said Sir Edward -
comes from this knowledge, competence or expertise. It is 
knowledge, not power, that makes the judge a source of 
authority. After all, professors, doctors, plumbers, generals are 
not chosen by elections. We can choose some of them some-
times in this way, but we cannot thereby make them compe-
tent. In this context, think of the rule introduced by Hans 
Kelsen (and accepted by all contemporary post-authoritarian 
constitutions, with the exception of France), according to 
which only law professors, lawyers and judges, thus only 
experts, can sit on constitutional courts. This provision clearly 
contrasts with the normal democratic ideology, where the pos-
sibility of being popularly elected has nothing to do with a spe-
cial expertise of the representative. 
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Finally, I want to introduce the third masque of the judicial 
authority - actually the oldest one, at least in Western society -
according to the Homeric account: impartiality. It seems that 
there is no better way to produce the authority that the judge 
needs in order to be obeyed than for him to be independent 
from the conflicting parties and "impartial" - super partes - in 
relation to them. This is an impossible challenge and thus an 
illusion, say the realists, who are so smart that they claim to 
show how stupid or at least how naive we are. By "we," I mean 
those who believe in the value of impartiality and its inevitably 
imperfect practicability. 
Surprisingly enough in the genealogy of the impartiality of 
the judicial power, we find a remarkable text of a political 
philosopher who supported the absolute power and opposed 
Sir Edward Coke: Thomas Hobbes. In chapter 26 of his 
Leviathan, he presented a theory of the judicial power that 
rejects the thesis of expertise and derives the judicial authority 
instead from certain MORAL qualities, which are presented in 
the following way: 
"The things that make a good Judge, [...] are, first, A right under-
standing of the principal Law of Nature called Equity; which 
depend[...] not on the reading of other men's Writings, but on the 
goodness of a mans own natural Reason1, [...] Secondly, contempt of 
unnecessary Riches, and Preferments. Thirdly, To be able in judgment 
to divest himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion. 
Fourthly, and lastly, Patience to hear; diligent attention in hearing; 
and memory to retain, digest and a p p l y what he hath heard." 
1 "Though it be true", Hobbes added in the Dialogue, W. Molesworth (ed.), 
English Works, Vol. VI (London, J. Bohn, 1840), p. 14, "that no man is born with 
the use of reason, yet all men may grow up to it as well as lawyers; and when 
they have appiied their reason to laws [ . ] may be as fit for and capabie of judi-
cature as Sir Edward Coke himself, who whether he had more or less use of 
reason, was not thereby a judge, but because the King made him so" [!]. 
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Impartiality is a challenge, to be sure, but not illusion. At least 
under certain conditions, which do not of course exist every-
where (certainly in China hardly at all and very little in the 
United States). To the objection that "all you need to do to be 
impartial is to look impartial," we can answer, as Dan Sperber 
has called to my attention, that the easiest and least costly way 
to look impartial is to be impartial, at least most of the time. For 
otherwise, since we are not as naive as the realists think, the 
belief in the court's authority loses its function and dissipates. 
Some sort of mix of these three ideologies is what is normal-
ly appealed to in order to establish the authority of the consti-




7. THE GURU EFFECT 
Obscurity of expression is considered a flaw. Not so, howev-
er, in the speech or writing of intellectual gurus1. It is not just 
that insufficiently competent readers refrain, as they should, 
from passing judgment on what they don't understand. All too 
often, what readers do is judge profound what they have failed 
to grasp. Obscurity inspires awe, a fact I have been only too 
aware of, living as I have been in the Paris of Sartre, Lacan, 
Derrida and other famously hard to interpret maitres à penser. 
Here I try to explain this "guru effect." 
7.1 Believing and trusting 
There are two ways of holding beliefs in one's mind. Holding 
a belief may be experienced - to the extent that it is experi-
enced at all - as plain awareness of a fact, without awareness of 
reasons to take it to be a fact. So are held most of our ordinary 
beliefs. They are delivered by our spontaneous cognitive 
processes, the reliability of which we take for granted without 
examination. I believe that it is sunny because I see that it is; I 
believe that it rained yesterday because I remember that it did; 
1 I am using here the English word "guru," not the Sanskrit word from 
which it is derived. 
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and I believe that you are in a good mood because this is how 
I spontaneously interpret the expression on your face. Here, 
"because" introduces not reasons I might have weighted in 
forming these beliefs, but the causal processes through which I 
come to have them. Such beliefs are "intuitive" in the sense that 
they impose themselves on us without our being aware of the 
process through which they do so. 
Other beliefs I hold because I also believe there is a good 
reason to hold them. I believe that it will be sunny tomorrow 
because so said the weather report, and I find its next-day pre-
dictions reliable enough. I believe that you just made up with 
your friend on the phone because this is the best explanation I 
can find for your suddenly improved mood. In these cases, 
"because" introduces a reason for my belief. Such beliefs are 
"reflective" in the sense that we entertain them together with 
the reasons we have to accept them2. 
Entertaining a reason is as much a cognitive process as is per-
ceiving, remembering or mood-sensing. Conversely, the fact 
that perception, memory and mood-sensing are reliable cogni-
tive processes would give us a reason, if we cared for one, to 
accept the beliefs they generate. The contrast I want to draw 
between "reflective" and "intuitive beliefs" is not between 
beliefs held because of a cause and beliefs held because of a 
reason, but between beliefs held with or without mentally rep-
resented reasons. 
Reasons to accept a belief may be "internal," that is, have to 
do with the content of the belief: I believe some proposition 
because I accept an argument from which this proposition fol-
lows. Such an argument may be based on evidence: I believe 
that the cake in the oven is properly baked because the knife 
2 For the distinction between intuitive and reflective beliefs, see Sperber 
1997. 
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blade I inserted in it came out dry. The argument may be pure-
ly formal: I believe that there is no greatest prime number 
because, given any prime number however large, I know how 
a prime number greater than this one can be computed. 
Reasons to accept a belief may also be "external," that is, 
have to do with the source of the belief: I believe that what I 
have been told or what I read because I judge the source to be 
reliable. I believe my friend Mary will come to diner tonight 
because she said she would and I trust her. I believe that there 
are tensions between the President and the Prime Minister 
because so says Le Monde, a newspaper I find reliable on such 
issues. Catholics believe that the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Spirit are one because they trust the priests who tell them so. 
The belief that a friend, the newspaper or the priest is trust-
worthy may itself be held intuitively or reflectively. I intuitively 
trust my friend Mary, without having ever reflected on her trust-
worthiness. When, on the other hand, a belief in a source's 
trustworthiness is held in a reflective manner, it may, just as 
other reflective beliefs, be based on internal reasons having to 
do with the content of the belief or on external reasons having 
to do with the source of the belief. Christian children may 
believe the priest is trustworthy because their parents (whom 
they trust intuitively) told them he is - an external reason. I 
believe that Le Monde is, on the whole, trustworthy because I 
have had much direct evidence of this trustworthiness - an 
internal reason. 
We may initially accept a person's authority on the basis of 
her reputation - an external reason - , and then update our 
degree of trust on the basis of her record - an internal reason. 
I first went to doctor Z because she was warmly recommend-
ed to me. Now I keep going - and I myself recommend her to 
others - because, in my experience, her diagnoses and advice 
have been confirmed, and have heightened my confidence in 
her. 
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7.2 Trusting and interpreting 
Updating the strength of one's trust in an authority figure 
may be affected by what, in the psychological literature on rea-
soning, is known as a "confirmation bias"3: under some condi-
tions, confidence in their beliefs cause believers to pay more 
attention to confirming than disconfirming evidence, thereby 
increasing their initial confidence. Internal evidence of trust-
worthiness is typically interpreted on the basis of prior trust. I 
followed doctor Z's prescription and got well in a week when I 
had hoped to be cured in three or four days. Still, I trust her and 
take the fact that I was cured as further evidence of her trust-
worthiness. If my trust in doctor Z had been wavering, I might 
have taken the fact that it took me a whole week to get well 
when it seemed reasonable to hope for a more rapid recovery 
as a reason to question doctor Z's trustworthiness. 
The more the evidence is open to a variety of construals, the 
greater the risk of a confirmation bias. Few things better lend 
themselves to divergent construals than obscure statements. It 
is not surprising then often to find that their interpretation is 
strongly biased by the prior authority granted to their source. 
Divination practices around the world provide the best illustra-
tions of this kind of interpretive charity: consultants interpret 
pithy statements - and the Pithia's own, in her time - in a way 
that is relevant to them and confirms the powers they attribute 
to the diviner: 
Fortune-teller: I see a tall man...I see a bird...people you care 
about are in pain... Consultant: Amazing! Yes, everybody was sick 
after Thanksgiving, and the guy who sold me the turkey was very tall 
indeed. 
3 See Wason 1960. 
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Interpretive charity is not, however, an odd departure from 
normal interpretive practices, and not only pithy statements but 
all utterances leave room for interpretation. Quite generally, 
sentences vastly underdetermine their interpretation. Typically, 
they contain referring expressions the referent of which is not 
linguistically determined, they are multiply ambiguous, and 
they are open to a whole range of construals going from literal, 
to loose, to figurative. An utterance never fully encodes the 
speaker's meaning. Rather, it provides a richly structured piece 
of evidence from which the hearer (or the reader) can infer the 
speaker's (or the writer's) meaning. In this inferential process, 
hearers are helped by considerations of relevance. Utterances 
raise expectations of relevance that guide the comprehension 
process towards an interpretation that satisfies these expecta-
tions4. So, for instance, if John arriving late tells me, "I missed 
the bus," I understand him to refer to the bus that could have 
brought him in time, and to mean "miss" in the sense of fail to 
arrive in time to board and not of feel sad about the absence o f , 
of fail to hit with a projectile. In fact, typically, I home in on the 
contextually relevant interpretation without being aware of 
alternatives. 
We expect what people tell us to be relevant, and we inter-
pret it in a way that confirms this expectation. To the extent that 
speaker themselves expect us to home in on an optimally rele-
vant interpretation of their utterances and produces utterances 
the optimally relevant interpretation of which is the very one 
they intended, what could be seen as an instance of the confir-
mation bias is, in this case, a rational way to achieve coordina-
tion and understanding. 
Relevance itself has two aspects: everything else being equal, 
the greater the cognitive effects derived from the processing of 
4 This is a central claim or Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1995). 
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an utterance (or, for that matter, any other type of information), 
the greater its relevance. For instance, if you want to know at 
what time is the next train to Manchester, it would be more rel-
evant for you to be told "it is at 5:16" than to be told "it is some-
times after 5." The more precise statement not only entails all 
the consequences of the vaguer one, but it also entails further 
consequences that you are likely to pay attention to: more cog-
nitive effect, more relevance. The second aspect of relevance 
has to do not with cognitive effect but with processing effort. 
Everything else being equal, the greater the effort needed to 
process an utterance, the lesser its relevance. It would be more 
relevant for you to be told of the next train to Manchester, "it is 
at 5:16" than to be told, "it is twenty-two minutes after 4:54" 
(unless, of course, the lapse between 4:54 and the departure of 
the train is of special relevance to you) although the two state-
ments are synonymous and carry exactly the same conse-
quences. The second, more convoluted statement requires 
greater processing effort: more effort, less relevance. 
So, we expect what we are told or what we read to be relevant, 
that is, to carry sufficient effect to be worth our attention and to do 
so without causing us unnecessary effort of comprehension. Of 
course, speakers or writers tend to overestimate the relevance of 
what they have to say, and hearers' or readers' expectations of rel-
evance are frequently disappointed. In particular, when people of 
no particular authority express their thoughts in an obscure man-
ner, we often revise down our already moderate expectations of 
relevance to a level where trying to make sense of what they say 
is not even worth the effort. On the other hand, when we trust 
that what we are told is relevant, the fact that some stretch of dis-
course or text requires more effort leads to the expectation it will 
carry more effect (extra effort being a price paid for extra effect, 
thus maintaining the overall level of relevance). 
In fact, departing from plain and easy formulation is often a 
way of signalling that something other than plain meaning is 
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intended. I cannot resist using a famous if somewhat exagger-
ated examples of Paul Grice. He writes: 
Compare the remarks: 
(a) MissXsang "Home SweetHome." 
(b) Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely 
with the score of "Home Sweet Home." 
Suppose that a reviewer has chosen to utter (b) rather than (a). 
(Gloss: Why has he selected that rigmarole in place of the concise and 
nearly synonymous sang? Presumably to indicate some striking differ-
ence between Miss X's performance and those to which the word 
singing is usually applied. The most obvious supposition is that Miss 
X's performance suffered from some hideous defect. The reviewer 
knows that this supposition is what is likely to spring to mind, so that 
that is what he is implicating). (Grice 1989: 37) 
This example illustrates how a deliberately opaque formula-
tion directs one towards a richer interpretation. 
In other cases, comprehending an utterance may involve 
extra effort but in a way that was not intended, or at least not 
overtly intended. It is as if the speaker or writer had no easier 
way to express herself or as if she expected greater ease of 
comprehension on the part of her hearers that they are actually 
capable of. Even so, if the speaker of writer chose to go ahead 
and express a thought hard for her audience to understand, she 
is thereby suggesting that the thought in question is relevant 
enough to be worth the effort. 
As children we were often told things that we didn't quite 
understand but were clearly intended to. Little Lucy is told by 
her teacher that cucumbers are 95% water (an example I bor-
row from Andrew Woodfield). She thinks of water as a liquid. 
Now, cucumbers are solid, not liquid objects; water does not 
flow out of them; so what could the teacher mean? Accepting, 
however, the authority of the teacher, Lucy now believes, with-
out fully understanding it, that, somehow, cucumbers are 95% 
water. The very difficulty of grasping this idea indicates to her 
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that this is a relevant piece of information, worth remembering 
and thinking about until she can make better sense of it. 
Lucy was also told by her parents and at Sunday school that 
God is everywhere. This too she believes with only partial com-
prehension. Whereas many children end up understanding 
how solid bodies such as cucumbers can mostly be made of 
water, the belief that God is everywhere remains impossible to 
fully comprehend. This mysteriousness is, if anything, even bet-
ter recognized by theologians than by children. Given that, for 
the faithful, the relevance of the belief is beyond question, its 
very mysteriousness is a strong indication of its significance. 
Impenetrability indicates profundity. 
In front of religious mysteries (divine omnipresence, the 
Trinity), believers stand in awe. They may derive some relative-
ly unproblematic consequences from these beliefs (e.g., divine 
omnipresence implies that there is no place to hide from God) 
but it takes theologians to aim at sophisticated interpretations 
that, anyhow, are never final. For most believers, the existence 
of mysteries is, in fact, more relevant than their actual content. 
Because of the authority they grant religion, believers are con-
vinced that the content of mysteries would be extraordinarily 
relevant to them if only they could grasp it. The fragmentary 
interpretations of mysteries that lay and clerical believers arrive 
at are wholly guided by this certainty of relevance. The exis-
tence of barely glimpsed hyper-relevant content is yet another 
confirmation of the supreme authority of religion. 
The writing of many philosophers, especially but not uniquely 
in the so-called continental tradition, is full of hard-to-understand 
passages where difficulty is presented as pertaining not to expres-
sion but to content itself, as being not a rhetorical device but a 
direct and unavoidable aspect of sophisticated thinking. Here are 
a few characteristic quotes (which, being cited out of context, are 
not here to be judged, let alone sneered at; still, no contextualisa-
tion would make them simple and easy to understand): 
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- "Beauty is a fateful gift of the essence of truth, and here truth 
means the disclosure of what keeps itself concealed." Martin 
Heidegger (1968:19) 
- "Consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious 
of the nothingness of its being." Jean Paul Sartre (1948:86) 
- "In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing 
all things as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock 
to be reminded that, in operational and practical fact, the medi-
um is the message." Marshall McLuhan (1964:7) 
- "If d i f f é r a n c e is (and I also cross out the 'is') what makes possi-
ble the presentation of the being-present, it is never presented as 
such. It is never offered to the present. Or to anyone. Reserving 
itself, not exposing itself, in regular fashion it exceeds the order 
of truth at a certain precise point, but without dissimulating itself 
as something, as a mysterious being, in the occult of a non-
knowledge or in a hole with indeterminable borders (for exam-
ple, in a topology of castration)." Jacques Derrida (1982:7) 
The point I am trying to illustrate is independent of the qual-
ity and clarity of what the authors had in mind when writing 
these passages. Maybe, each and every one of them had in 
mind an important thought that could not be expressed in any 
simpler way. Maybe some readers (including, possibly readers 
of the present essay) have grasped these thoughts and been 
illuminated by them. The fact is that, for most if not all readers, 
the interpretation of such statements is highly problematic. Still, 
the very effort required tends to be seen as an indication of high 
relevance and to favour interpretations consistent with this indi-
cation. If they cannot come to any clear and plausible interpre-
tation, readers may nevertheless seek fragmentary and tentative 
interpretive hypotheses that go in the expected direction. Even 
if these statements remain hopelessly opaque, readers may take 
their very opacity as evidence of their depth. 
Faced with an inordinately recondite statement, readers have 
the choice between a negative judgment: the author had no 
good reason to be obscure, and a positive explanation: the 
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author wanted to convey a thought too deep for plain and sim-
ple expression. With a prior high confidence in the intellectual 
worth of the author, negative judgment is almost ruled out and 
depth can be inferred, even if no satisfactory interpretation of 
the statement in question is ever arrived at. Prior appreciation 
of an author justifies a positive construal of difficult passage. So 
far, so good. Things may go wrong if, in a viciously circular 
manner, this construal is taken as further justification for the 
appreciation. 
7.3 Authority and argumentation 
Suppose there is a claim that you won't accept just on my 
authority, I may still try to convince you by providing a rea-
soned argument, starting from premises that you are willing to 
accept (because you already believe them or because, for them, 
my authority is sufficient), going through a series of steps the 
validity of each you can judge by yourself, and concluding with 
the claim I want you to accept. The logical force of an argument 
does not depend on the authority of whoever puts it forward. A 
mathematical proof expounded by a known swindler may be 
convincing all the same. While there is no sure way to tell by 
mere inspection a true statement from a false one (unless the 
false statement is self-contradictory or contradicts what is 
already known to be true), competent examination is enough 
to tell a valid from an invalid argument. Thus, when authority 
fails to provide a sufficient external reason for accepting a 
claim, argumentation may provide an appropriate internal rea-
son. 
Authority and argumentation seem to be two quite different 
paths to persuasion, and, to a large extent, they are. From an 
evolutionary point of view, the capacity to produce and evalu-
ate arguments might have emerged as a way of partially over-
138 
coming the risk of deception and manipulation involved in 
accepting the authority of communicators5. Historically, the 
transition to modernity can be described as the replacement of 
authority by argument as the main basis of justified beliefs. In 
intellectual style, there is often a clear opposition between 
those who trust more authority than argument, and those who 
trust more argument than authority. Nevertheless, in commu-
nicative practices, what we find is not a dichotomy between 
appeal to authority and appeal to reason, but a variety of inter-
actions and overlaps between the two forms. 
To begin with, trivially, authority can be argued for. For 
instance, in John, 14: 11, Jesus says: "Believe me when I say that 
I am in the Father and the Father is in me; or at least believe on 
the evidence of the miracles themselves." Jesus gives a reason 
to accept his authority to those who would not spontaneously 
do so. 
More interestingly, trust in authority may give us a reason to 
accept the validity of an argument without examining its steps, 
or even without quite comprehending it. Bobby fails to under-
stand the math teacher's demonstration that there is no greatest 
prime number, but the very fact that the teacher presents what 
she claims is a proof causes Bobby to accept as a proven fact 
that there is no greatest prime number - and he is right, of 
course! This extends to non-demonstrative arguments. For 
example, people looking for an effective weight loss program 
may stumble on the following argument: "Where is the scientif-
ic evidence that eating the controlled carb way is healthy? By 
adhering to a controlled carbohydrate nutritional approach, an 
individual who chooses to eat nutrient-dense foods ... is more 
likely to meet his nutritional needs, promoting good health, 
than he would by following a calorie-restricted, fat-deficient 
5 See Sperber 2001. 
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diet. ... For studies that support the health benefits of a con-
trolled carbohydrate nutritional approach, click here. All these 
studies confirm that not only is controlling carbohydrate con-
sumption effective, it actually results in improved health param-
eters" (http://atkins.com). Even if they do not fully compre-
hend the argument or are not able to weigh its force and can-
not be bothered to click and look at the additional evidence 
proposed, people may be swayed by the fact that what looks 
like a forceful argument is being put forward for their consider-
ation. 
Suppose that you accept on trust some argument of mine as 
valid and its premises as true. Then, of course, you also will 
accept as true the conclusion of the argument. Given however 
that you are just relying on my authority, should the fact that I 
have argued for this conclusion give you a better reason to 
accept it than if I has merely asserted it? After all, if you are will-
ing to take my word for the soundness of an argument, why not 
just take it directly for the truth of its conclusion? Well, the very 
fact that I produced an argument, even if you are unable to 
assess its validity, or cannot be bothered, is of relevance to the 
evaluation of its conclusion. To argue is to make an effort in 
order to appeal to one's audience's reason. It can be seen as a 
mark of respect for one's audience (just as to refuse to argue is 
a mark of disrespect). A valid argument is harder to fake than a 
true statement. To argue is to expose oneself to critical exami-
nation. So, the very fact that I made the effort and took the risk 
involved in arguing may contribute to the believability of my 
conclusion, even if the argument remains unexamined. 
When paying with a check, you may offer to present some 
identification: sometimes, this very offer will be seen as evi-
dence of your trustworthiness and will be declined just because 
it was made, while, if not spontaneously offered, identification 
would have been requested. Of course, swindlers know this 
too and can use apparent forthrightness to achieve devious 
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goals. Similarly, the apparently honest display of argumentation 
can be used to impress, browbeat, or even deceive one's audi-
ence, and had been developed as a rhetorical technique by the 
Sophists depicted in Platonic dialogues. 
My interest here, however, is in honest rather than dishonest 
gurus. Honest gurus are not trying to deceive their audience. 
Nevertheless, they may produce arguments that will persuade most 
of their readers not by their logical force, but by their very difficul-
ty. A recent illustration is provided by The Emperor's New Mind by 
the eminent physicist Roger Penrose. As summarized by the blurb 
of the book, Penrose "argues that there are facets of human think-
ing, of human imagination, that can never be emulated by a 
machine. Exploring a dazzling array of topics - complex numbers, 
black holes, entropy, quasicrystals, the structure of the brain, and 
the physical processes of consciousness - Penrose demonstrates 
that laws even more wondrously complex than those of quantum 
mechanics are essential for the operation of a mind" (my italics). 
Given the wealth of premises from different fields of knowledge 
and the complexity of the argument, I doubt that most readers are 
in a position to evaluate what, if anything, Penrose demonstrates. 
Still, coming from such an authoritative source, the very elaborate-
ness of the argument is enough to suggest that it can withstand a 
level of scrutiny that most readers would be quite unable to pro-
vide, and that Penrose is offering a hard-to-grasp but plausible and 
highly relevant perspective on the relationship between funda-
mental physics and human psychology6. 
7.4 Runaway trust in authority 
A possible explanation of the obscurity of a statement made 
by an authoritative source may be that it expresses some impor-
6 For doubts that it is so, see Dennett 1989. 
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tant thought that could not be formulated in a simpler way. 
Similarly, a possible explanation of the difficulty of an argument 
may be that there is no simpler way to justify its conclusion. 
When my only alternative is to question the otherwise well-
established authority of the source just because I have trouble 
understanding it, these explanations may be the best I can 
come up with, and, if so, I should accept them. Such "infer-
ences to the best explanation" may in turn justify my accepting 
a statement as true or an argument as valid, even though I don't 
quite understand them. On the other hand, how could my fail-
ure to fully understand a statement or an argument ever justify 
me in granting even more authority to its source? Obscurity 
need not be held against an author - after all, it may just reflect 
the limits of my own understanding - , but how could it be held 
in her favour? An obvious risk in upgrading the authority of a 
source because of the obscurity of its pronouncements is that of 
running into the vicious circle I mentioned: the favourable 
interpretation I give of an obscure text is based on the prior 
authority I grant its source; if I then use this interpretation to 
value up this authority, and then this enhanced authority to 
interpret even more favourably the next obscure text from the 
same source, a string of obscure texts (or, for that matter, rein-
terpretations of just one of them) might cause me to grant near-
absolute authority to a source just because I don't understand it. 
Are individuals on their own predisposed to commit this kind 
of fallacy? I see no reason to believe they are, or at least, not sys-
tematically. On the other hand something of the sort happens 
in the collective recognition of authorities. 
Authority is social relationship that involves at least two indi-
viduals, and typically many more. Authority in a group goes 
with reputation. The reputation of a person is the more or less 
consensual view of her competence and reliability that spreads 
through repeated acts of communication across a social group. 
Individuals may just state that So-and-so is knowledgeable or 
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wise, or they may give examples of this knowledge and wis-
dom. They may also discuss the interpretation and the value of 
specific pronouncements. Clear statements and easy arguments 
may become the objects of a collective evaluation, but only 
obscure statements and difficult arguments are likely to become 
the objects of a collective endeavour of interpretation. 
As long as the interpretation of a text is not settled, its evalu-
ation is likely to be based on external rather than internal crite-
ria. We don't know what X meant in making some obscure 
statement, but, given the authority we recognise him, we have 
reasons to think that he was expressing a very important idea. 
In fact, if we did not think this, we would not be involved in try-
ing to comprehend that statement. Participating in a collective 
process of interpretation amounts to publicly vouching for the 
value of what is being interpreted. Moreover, it seems sensible 
to take the amount of attention paid to thinkers and their 
thought as a rough indication of their importance - and it 
would be sensible if it were not for the fact that these individ-
ual evaluations build on one another and together spiral into 
ever greater devotion. 
Participants in a collective process of interpretation have a dou-
ble stake in the value of the text they are working on and in the 
authority of its author. The greater this value and this authority, 
the more they are justified in joining the process, and the less the 
tentative and partial character of their interpretations can be seen 
as a negative reflection on their own intellectual abilities. 
Moreover, participating in such a collective process involves not 
just an intellectual but also - and more surely - a social benefit, 
that of belonging, of getting recognition as a person in the know, 
capable of appreciating the importance of a difficult great thinker. 
Not participating, on the other hand, may involve the cost of 
being marginalised and of appearing intellectually stale and flat. 
Here emerges a collective dynamics typical of intellectual 
schools and sects, where the obscurity of respected masters is 
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not just a sign of the depth of their thinking, but a proof of their 
genius. Left on their own, admiring readers interprets one rec-
ondite passage after another in a way that may slowly rein-
forces their admiration (or else render them wary). Now shar-
ing their interpretations and impressions with other admirers, 
readers find in the admiration, in the trust that other have for 
the master, reasons to consider their own interpretations as fail-
ing to do justice to the genius of the interpreted text. In turn 
these readers become disciples and proselytes. Where we had 
the slow back-and-forth of solitary reading between favourable 
interpretation and increased confidence in authority, now we 
have a competition among disciples for an interpretation that 
best displays the genius of the master, an interpretation that, for 
this purpose, may be just as obscure as the thought it is meant 
to interpret. Thus a thinker is made into a guru and her best dis-
ciples in gurus-apprentices. 
Unlike the people in Andersen's tale pretending to admire 
the emperor's non-existent clothes, participants in the collec-
tive dynamics of guruification need not be, and generally are 
not in bad faith: they have strong external reasons for their 
appreciation - reasons that they provide one another - , which 
in turn lead them to favourable interpretations that provide 
them with further internal reasons. Moreover they need not 
even be wrong: human intellectual history is full of challenging 
propositions and arguments that turned out to be true and 
important. Still the epidemiological mechanism7 I have briefly 
sketched explains how many obscure texts and their authors 
come to be overestimated, often ridiculously so, not in spite but 
because of their very obscurity. 
7 See Sperber 1996. 
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8. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY: AN INTRODUCTION 
The problem of authority is a problem of the possible justifi-
cation for subjecting one's will to that of another, and of the 
legitimacy of demands to do so. The account of authority which 
I offered, many years ago, under the title of the service con-
ception of authority, was addressed to this issue, and assumed 
that all others are subsumed under it. I will briefly restate the 
service conception of authority and then try to defend it against 
a few objections. 
The notion to be explained is the concept of authority which 
we use in discussion of political authorities, though it applies to 
others as well. The may be other notions of authority around, 
used in different contexts or for different senses, they are -
most likely - related in a variety of ways to the concept I am dis-
cussing, but they need not be considered here. As is common, 
I will distinguish between de facto and legitimate authority. 
Roughly speaking, a legitimate authority is one which has a 
right to rule. A mere d e f a c t o authority, i.e. one which exercis-
es power over its subjects, but lacks the right to it, involves that 
of legitimacy. What makes mere d e f a c t o authorities different 
from people or groups who exert naked power, e.g. power 
through terrorising a population, is that mere d e f a c t o authori-
ties claim, and those who have naked power do not, to have a 
right to rule those subject to their power. They claim legitima-
cy. They act, as I say, under the guise of legitimacy. If that is 
right then the concept of legitimate authority has explanatory 
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priority over that of a mere d e f a c t o authority. The latter pre-
supposes the former but not the other way round. From here on 
«authority» refers to legitimate authority. 
8.1 The service conception in brief 
The service conception is driven by two problems, one the-
oretical and one moral. Starting with the common thought, 
which broadly speaking and with appropriate qualifications 
and amplifications I endorse, that authority is a right to rule or 
to command, the first question is how to understand the stand-
ing of an authoritative directive (as I shall call the product of the 
exercise of the right to rule)? If issued by someone who has a 
right to rule, a right to command, then its recipient is bound to 
obey. The command, the directive, is binding on him and he is 
duty bound to obey it. But how could it be that the say-so of 
one person constitutes a reason, a duty, for another? Is it that 
easy to manufacture duties out of thin air? 
The moral question is how can it ever be that one has a duty 
to subject one's will and judgement to those of another? Of 
course, we are affected by others and by the actions of others 
in innumerable ways. We often act to induce others to help or 
not to hinder us, to collaborate with us in common enterprises, 
to avoid hurting us or to turn their actions to our advantage. But 
the case of authority is special. Directives issued by authority 
aim to constitute reasons for their subjects and are binding on 
their subjects because they are meant to be so binding. If we 
recognise a duty to obey them we recognise that they have a 
right to command us, not only to affect the circumstances which 
shape our opportunities and the obstacles on our path. 
Authorities tell us what to intend, with the aim of achieving 
whatever goals they pursue through commanding our will. Can 
one human being ever have such justified power over another? 
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Can it ever be right to acknowledge such power over oneself in 
another? 
The theoretical problem is similar to the one which promises 
(and all voluntary undertakings) present. By promising we 
impose on ourselves obligations which we did not have before, 
and we do so simply by expressing an intention to do so. In 
exercising authority we impose on others duties, which they 
did not have before, and we do so simply by expressing an 
intention to do so. How can actions expressing intentions to 
create reasons or obligations (for ourselves or others) do so just 
because they express these intentions? 
The answer is that fundamentally there is nothing special in 
such a case. Various of our actions incur obligations. 
Conceiving and giving birth to a child is often assumed to be 
one such case. Infringing other people's rights is another (it 
generates an obligation to make amends, etc.). Claims that we 
have an obligation because of what we did, or because of how 
we acted are true, if they are, in virtue of general reasons for 
people who acted in certain ways to have certain reasons or 
obligations. There are, it is assumed, general reasons for any-
one if he or she has a child to look after it, a general reason for 
anyone, if he or she violates another's right, to compensate 
them, and so on. 
Promises and authorities are no exception. Not every time 
someone acts with the intention of undertaking an obligation 
towards someone does he or she make a binding promise. A 
promise is binding only if the promised action is of a class 
regarding which there are sufficient reasons to hold the 
promisor bound by his promise. That means that to be binding 
promises must meet many conditions: the promisor must be 
capable of knowing the meaning of his action, he must be capa-
ble of having a reasonable understanding of its likely conse-
quences, and, and most importantly, the act promised belongs 
to a class of actions such that it enhances people's control over 
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their life to be able to make such promises, and the act must not 
be grossly immoral, etc. A promise to be a slave is not binding, 
nor a promise to make someone else a slave, and so on. 
The theoretical question regarding the nature of authority is 
answered in similar fashion. A person can have authority over 
another only if there are sufficient reasons for the latter to be 
subject to duties at the say so of the former. That, of course, 
while probably right does not tell us when one person has 
authority over another. It does not establish even that anyone 
can ever have authority. But it states what has to be the case if 
some people have authority over others. That is all that one can 
ask of a general account of authority, namely that it establish 
what it takes for there to be legitimate authority, rather than that 
it should show who has authority over whom and regarding 
what. That latter task is a matter for evaluating individual cases. 
But of course, a general account of authority can, while still not 
establishing who actually has authority, say much more about 
the conditions under which people are subject to authority. In 
particular we would expect it to address the moral problem 
about authority I alluded to earlier, namely how can it be con-
sistent with a person's standing as a person to be subject to the 
will of another in the way one is when subject to the authority 
of another? 
The suggestion of the service conception is that the moral ques-
tion is answered when two conditions are met, and regarding 
those matters with respect to which they are met: First, that the 
subject would better conform to reasons which apply to him any-
way (that is to reasons other than the directives of the authority) if 
he intends to be guided by the authority's directives than if he does 
not. Second, that the matters regarding which the first condition is 
met are such that with respect to them it is better to conform to rea-
son than to decide for oneself, unaided by authority. 
Simple examples of regulations to do with dangerous activi-
ties or materials illustrate the point. I can best avoid endanger-
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ing myself and others by conforming to the law regarding the 
dispensation and use of pharmaceutical products. I can rely on 
the experts whose advice it reflects to know what is dangerous 
in these matters better than I can judge for myself, a fact which 
is reinforced by my reliance on other people's conformity to the 
law, which enables me to act with safety in ways which other-
wise I would not be able to do. Of course, none of this is neces-
sarily so. The law may reflect the interests of pharmaceutical 
companies, and not those of consumers. If that is so it may lack 
authority over me because it fails to meet the first condition. But 
if it does meet the first condition it is likely to meet the second as 
well. Decisions about the safety of pharmaceutical products are 
not the sort of personal decisions regarding which I should 
decide for myself rather than follow authority. They do not 
require me to use any drugs, etc., and in that they are unlike 
decisions about undergoing a course of medication or treatment 
where we may well feel that I should decide for myself, rather 
than be dictated to by authority. As recent disputes about the 
way to test drugs which may help fight Aids show, the distinction 
between determining which courses of treatment are impermis-
sible, a matter taken over by authority, and determining whether 
a course of treatment is permissible, and the decision about it be 
left to individuals can be and often is a difficult and a contentious 
one. The purpose of the observations above was not to come to 
any determination, but to frame the decision, to describe in 
abstract terms the considerations on which it should turn. 
I said that the two conditions solve the moral question about 
authority. But in what sense do they do so? Several objections 
can be anticipated. The second condition, it may be objected, 
merely restates the problem and does not help with its solution. 
The whole point of the moral problem is that acting by oneself 
is more important than anything. What advance is there in stat-
ing that authority is legitimate only where acting by oneself is 
less important than conforming to reason? 
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Another objection to the second condition has it that it sug-
gests that one can compare the importance of conforming to 
reason with the importance of deciding for oneself, independ-
ently of authority. But this, says the objection, cannot be done: 
the two are very different concerns which are incommensu-
rable. There is never an answer to the question which of the 
two is more important. I doubt that this objection is valid. It 
seems to be premised on the thought that the concerns which 
underlie reasons with which we should conform and those 
which underlie the reason to act independently of authority 
have nothing to do with each other. But that is not so. 
Some of the reasons for relying on one's own judgement 
derive from the need to cultivate the ability to be self-reliant, 
simply because often one has no one else to rely on. The clear-
est case is the way parents should allow their children freedom 
to decide for themselves on a gradually expanding range of 
matters, in spite of knowing that they, the parents, would do 
better for their children were they to take over deciding on 
those matters. This is the way children learn how to decide for 
themselves, and become self-reliant. There are other reasons to 
decide for oneself. Certain matters are, by the social forms of 
various cultures, to be decided by oneself. For example, while 
in some forms of marriage parents choose the partners, in oth-
ers parents are not expected to have any say in the matter. In 
such cases one cannot have the relationship, or engage in the 
good or the activity unless one does so oneself, not through an 
agent, nor by following a superior. 
The former case for self-reliance is instrumental where the 
end is to secure what conformity with reason will, in the long 
run, secure; the latter case depends on the fact that there are 
reasons which can only be satisfied by independent action. 
Both of them trace the concerns behind independence back to 
concerns with satisfying reasons. The thought that the two con-
cerns never meet and must be incommensurate is unjustified. 
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There are other, perhaps more fundamental considerations at 
stake. We are not fully ourselves if too many of our decisions 
are not taken by us, but by agents, automata, or superiors. On 
the other side, sometimes it is our duty, our moral duty if you 
like, to accept authority. In some accident situations co-ordina-
tion, which in the circumstances requires recognising someone 
as being in charge of the rescue, is essential if lives are to be 
saved. We must yield to the authority, where there is one. There 
are in the political sphere many less dramatic analogues of such 
situations, where a substantial good is at stake, a good which 
we have moral reasons to secure for ourselves and for others 
but which can in the circumstances be best secured by yielding 
to a co-ordinating authority. These cases justify giving up decid-
ing for oneself, and pose no threat to the authenticity of one's 
life, or to one's ability to lead a self-reliant and self-fulfilling life. 
None of this denies that often the two concerns, one satisfied 
by conformity with reasons the other with acting on one's own 
judgment, may be radically different and the cases for con-
formity or independence may be incommensurate. 
The other objection to the second condition cannot be dis-
missed that easily. It should be met not by a refutation but by a 
deflection. Indeed, the second condition does little to solve the 
problem. That is not its task. It merely frames the question. Part 
of the answer to the moral challenge to all authority is in the 
first condition, which says that authority can be legitimate if 
conformity with it improves one's conformity with reason. It 
provides the key to the justification of authority: it helps our 
rational capacity whose function is to secure conformity with 
reason. It allows it to achieve its purpose more successfully. 
These observations express a way of understanding our gener-
al capacity to guide our conduct (and our life more broadly) by 
our own judgement. The point of this general capacity is to 
enable us to conform to the reasons which confront us at any 
given time. It is conformity achieved by the exercise of one's 
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judgment. We value the ability to exercise one's judgment and 
to rely on it in action, but it is a capacity we value because of its 
purpose, which is - by its very nature - to secure conformity 
with reason. The point is perfectly general. The value of many 
of our capacities should not be reduced to the value of their 
use. But it depends on the value of their successful use, even if 
it reflects also the value of the freedom to use it or not. 
The value of our rational capacity, i.e. our capacity to form a 
view of our situation in the world and to act in light of it, derives 
from the fact that there are reasons which we should satisfy, 
and that that capacity enables us to do so. It is not, however, 
our only way of satisfying reason. We are, e.g., hard wired to be 
alert to certain dangers and react to them instinctively and with-
out deliberation, as we react to fire, or to sudden movement in 
our immediate vicinity. In other contexts we do better to follow 
our emotions than to reason our way to action. These examples 
suggest that the primary value of our general ability to act by 
our own judgment derives from the concern in satisfying rea-
son, and that concern can be met in a variety of ways. It is not 
therefore surprising that we find it met also in ways which come 
closer to obeying authority, such as making vows, taking 
advice, binding oneself to others, long before the time for 
action, with a promise to act in certain ways, or relying on tech-
nical devices to «take decisions for us», as when setting alarm 
clocks, speed limiters, etc. 
Both being guided by our emotions and being guided by our 
judgement (not necessarily mutually exclusive conditions) are 
constituents of some valuable activities and relationships which 
are valuable in themselves, resulting in those cases where the 
second condition of legitimacy is not satisfied. By the same 
token, there can be other forms of activities, joint activities and 
enterprises, which are valuable in themselves and which inher-
ently involve yielding to decisions taken by others. The condi-
tions of legitimacy are open to different views about what is 
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and what is not valuable and worthwhile. They merely state 
how conclusions on such issues bear on the question of author-
ity. 
In postulating that authorities are legitimate only if their 
directives enable their subjects to better conform to reason we 
see authority for what it is. Not a denial of people's capacity for 
rational action, but simply one device, one method, through the 
use of which people can achieve the goal (telos) of their capac-
ity for rational action, albeit not through its direct use. That way 
of understanding matters is reinforced by the fact that in fol-
lowing authority, just as in following advice, or being guided by 
any of the technical devices, one's ultimate self-reliance is pre-
served, for it is one's own judgment which directs one to recog-
nise the authority of another, just as it directs one to keep one's 
promises, follow advice, use technical devices and the like. 
Of course, authority is special in the way in which it restricts 
one's ability to act independently. The service conception 
expresses that thought by the thesis that authoritative directives 
pre-empt the reasons against the conduct that they require that 
the authority was meant to take into account in deciding to 
issue its directives. Those subject to the authority are not 
allowed to second guess the wisdom or advisability of the 
authority's directives. A simplified description of typical situa-
tions explains the point. There are reasons with which we 
should all conform, say regarding safe driving. In the absence 
of the law (or other authoritative directives) telling us how to 
drive (by imposing speed restrictions, traffic lights, road signs, 
etc.) we would have tried to drive as safely as we can. The law 
of the road is meant to enable us to drive more safely (i.e. to 
conform better to the background reasons) and it does so by 
directing us to do things which otherwise we might not have 
done. Where the law leaves driving decisions to us we are still 
guided by those background considerations. But where it inter-
venes to require certain ways of driving we are bound to obey 
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it, and are not allowed to question its force, even while we are 
of course allowed to question its wisdom and advocate its 
reform. This is, roughly, what I mean when I say that legitimate 
laws and the directives of legitimate authorities generally, pre-
empt the background reasons which militate against the author-
itative directives, and replace them with their own require-
ments. 
The pre-emptive force of authority is part and parcel of its 
nature. It cannot achieve its purpose, i.e. improve our con-
formity with reason, if it does not pre-empt the background rea-
sons. Its function is to improve our conformity with those back-
ground reasons by making us try to follow its instructions rather 
than them. It cannot do so without making us act differently 
than we would have done without it, and that means that it 
must stop us from acting for reasons which conflict with 
authoritative demands. Pre-emption is what it is about. How 
much is pre-empted? What count as background reasons? They 
are among the reasons which the authority was meant to con-
sider in issuing its directives, provided of course that it acts 
within its legitimate power, i.e. on matters and for reasons 
regarding which trying to follow it will improve our conformi-
ty to the background considerations which should inform its 
decisions. 
The pre-emptive standing of authoritative directives shows 
why the moral question about the law is a serious one. It shows 
what truth there is in the saying that in accepting authority we 
surrender our judgement to the authority. At the same time the 
solution of the theoretical problem shows that in spite of its 
special character authority, when subjected to the two condi-
tions, is just another case of the world confronting us with rea-
sons for action. The theoretical puzzle was «how can people 
create reasons by acting with the intention of doing so?» The 
answer is that this is so when considerations which are inde-
pendent of human will make it so. 
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Yet again we see the analogy (as well as the difference) 
between authority and promises. Both yield reasons generated 
by action designed to do so, a fact which gives both of them 
their puzzling air, and both can do so because of considerations 
independent of the human will which validate such creation of 
reasons. Therefore, in following both we follow reason, and 
thus exercise our judgment, though in both cases we do it at 
one remove, by accepting, through our judgment, the binding 
force of acts (promises, directives) which pre-empt our free-
dom to act for some of the background reasons. It is true that 
only authority involves accepting the directives of another. But 
if the two conditions are right, even authoritative directives, just 
like promises, are binding only because and where they 
improve our powers by enabling us to conform to reason bet-
ter than we could without them. 
8.2 Some refinements and elaborations 
So far I tried to sketch the outlines of the service conception, 
and to explain how it contends with two basic problems about 
authority. Its success in dealing with them is the main case for 
believing that it is along the right lines. But to establish itself the 
account has to deal with a whole host of additional difficulties. 
In this section I will briefly look at a range of them, reflection 
on which leads to refining the account, as well as displaying 
some of its strengths. The following sections will discuss at 
greater length some more troubling objections. 
a) Reason and knowability 
It is a matter of dispute whether a factor not known by some 
agents, or not knowable by them, can nevertheless constitute a 
reason for those agents. Whatever is the truth on that general 
question there are independent reasons for thinking that some-
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one can be an authority only if the fact that the two conditions 
(or some alternative sufficient condition) are met can be known 
to its subjects. The point of being under an authority is that it 
opens a way of improving one's conformity with reason. One 
achieves that by conforming to the authority's directives, and, 
special circumstances apart, one can reliably conform only if 
one has reliable beliefs regarding who has legitimate authority, 
and what are its directives. If one cannot have trustworthy 
beliefs that a certain body meets the conditions for legitimacy 
then one's belief in its authority is haphazard, and cannot 
(again special circumstances apart) be reliable. Therefore, to 
fulfil its function the legitimacy of an authority must be know-
able to its subjects. 
In stating this argument I assumed that regarding the condi-
tions for legitimacy whenever one can form reliable beliefs that 
they are met one can also have knowledge of that fact. I was 
also relying on the fact that generally speaking the only reliable 
way of conforming to authority is through having a reliable 
belief that it is an authority, and therefore should be obeyed. 
This assumption helps with defining more precisely what has to 
be the case for the legitimacy to be knowable. Since the point 
is to improve conformity with reason there is at least a rough 
measure of how important such improvement is. We engage in 
such assessments every day of the week. We regularly need to 
decide how far to pursue an inquiry in the hope of coming to a 
more reliable or more nuanced conclusion about what is the 
right course of action on various occasions. When the issue is 
of importance we extend our inquiries and deliberations well 
beyond what we do when the matter is relatively trifling. The 
same kind of consideration applies to establishing the existence 
of authorities. How much it can be expected to improve our 
conformity to reason, and how important the matter is, estab-
lish what inquiry is reasonable to undertake. When reasonable 
inquiry will not reveal the case for authority, that case, if it exists 
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at all, is unknowable. It follows that people are not subject to 
any authority regarding those matters. 
This argument is used here to derive not merely that it is not 
rational, or not worth while to carry on with the inquiry about 
the existence of certain reasons, but that those reasons, author-
itative directives, do not exist. There is no authority over the 
matter, because to exist authorities must be knowable. This 
extension of the argument is not surprising. The service con-
ception makes the legitimacy of authorities turn primarily on 
their value in achieving something beyond them, i.e. conform-
ity to background reasons existing independently of them. 
In general we have no reason to pursue the means to the 
ends they serve unless they are worth pursuing given the cost 
of doing so relative to the importance of the ends. To give one 
simple example: I suppose that I can get you to give me five 
pounds by giving you ten pounds on condition that you give 
me five pounds in return. But (special circumstances apart) I 
have no reason to pursue this means to that end, no reason at 
all. It is not merely the case that I have a reason which is defeat-
ed by the cost of pursuing the means. The case of authority is 
not exactly the same, but it is analogous: obeying Jane, let us 
say, would help me better to conform with reasons which apply 
to me. However, I cannot know that without pursuing an 
inquiry which it would be irrational to pursue. It follows that I 
have no reason to obey Jane, and it follows from that that Jane 
has no authority over me. 
b) Burdens of inquiry and decision 
The second condition of legitimacy is premised on the 
thought that it is important that people decide for themselves 
how to conduct their life, and that especially in some areas they 
should do so with only limited reliance on direct advice, let 
alone commands, from others. We do not fully live as 
autonomous persons if we do not decide for ourselves. It does 
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not follow, of course, that we always enjoy doing so. Some peo-
ple find the burden of decision hard to bear. They prevaricate, 
get depressed, feel oppressed and pressurised, and of course 
often decide unwisely, often deciding almost arbitrarily in order 
to relieve themselves of the burden of decision. 
Not everyone suffers from an aversion to taking decisions 
and assuming responsibility, though most people feel the bur-
den. We are tempted to think that one is not a responsible agent 
if one does not, as it shows a lack of seriousness about one's 
actions. Let this be as it may, everyone has to carry the burden 
of inquiry. It makes demands on our attention, energy, time and 
resources. It may impose a strain on our relations with others, 
and so on. To be sure, the process of purposeful inquiry, of 
working one's way towards a decision, can also be enjoyable 
and rewarding in its own right. But given that its primary pur-
pose and justification is instrumental, that is to contribute to a 
good decision, one cannot expect the rewards to match the 
burdens, and often the burdens far exceed the rewards. 
There are ways of reducing the burdens of decision and 
inquiry, and some of them involve ways of shifting the burden 
on to others. The practice of relying on professional advice has 
grown in recent times, perhaps in parallel with a decline in the 
family as a source of advice and support in decision making. 
Submitting to authority is one way of reducing the burdens. It 
can be justified only if it is consistent with the second condition 
of legitimacy (though when the psychological vulnerability to 
the burden is extreme it may be justified to mitigate the condi-
tion to relieve the burden). The first condition, however, is bet-
ter understood broadly to allow that meeting the burdens of 
decision and inquiry is one of the benefits authorities can bring. 
c ) Respect and other reasons 
We can accommodate the burdens of decision and inquiry in 
an account of legitimate authority either through an appropri-
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ate reading of the two conditions, or by recognising these bur-
dens as additional factors bearing on legitimacy, which modify 
or add to the two conditions. I do not believe that it is possible 
to enumerate exhaustively the considerations which can bear 
on the legitimacy of authority, or for that matter on the justifi-
cation of any other normative institution which is widely 
accepted and is enshrined in social practices. Such institutions 
do sometimes have a core purpose, but once they are recog-
nised and are followed in practice they become enmeshed in 
other practices and concerns, which lead them, without deflect-
ing from their primary justification, to accrue additional pur-
poses and justifying reasons. They reveal different meanings 
and purposes which they can serve in societies or communities 
where they are widely recognised. 
One such factor arises out of the way in which in many soci-
eties some authorities become the primary visible expression of 
institutions to which they belong, and in the name of which 
they function. Political and legal institutions with legal authori-
ty are a case in point. In many countries superior legal authori-
ties are identified with the state or the country or the nation and 
speak in their name. Where this is so respect for and identifica-
tion with the state, country or nation may express themselves in 
respect for legal authority, and that in turn takes the form 
(among others) of trusting these institutions, taking it on trust 
that they have authority, not questioning their conduct too 
closely to see whether they exceed their authority, etc. Trust is 
a general mark of respect, and a natural one. If respect for the 
state, country or nation is desirable, which sometimes it is, and 
if it is appropriate, given the circumstances of the society in 
question, for it to express itself through respect and trust for its 
legal institutions, then a certain slackening of vigilance regard-
ing the two conditions of legitimacy is also acceptable. That is, 
in such cases while the conditions themselves are unaffected, 
people would be justified in maintaining that the government 
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has authority on evidence which would not be sufficient to 
reach such conclusions but for the trust they have in the gov-
ernment. 
I do not maintain that people have a duty to trust and respect 
their government in that way. That would be like claiming that 
they have a duty to have someone as their friend. The respect 
we are concerned with here is not the basic respect we owe 
every person. It is respect arising out of identification with the 
country, and there is no duty on anyone to identify with any 
country. The claim is simply that that is, sometimes, when cer-
tain moral conditions are met, an appropriate attitude to have. 
Does it show that sometimes people who trust the govern-
ment are justified in believing that the government has author-
ity when it does not, or does it show that sometimes the gov-
ernment has authority over such people even though it does 
not have authority or has only a more limited authority over 
people who do not trust it? One can argue either way. On the 
one had it may be thought desirable to separate epistemic from 
substantive considerations, and to have an account which tends 
to make governmental authority independent of individually 
variable factors such as trust resulting from identification with 
the country. On the other hand, as we saw, the service concep-
tion does incorporate epistemic elements into the conditions of 
authority, and, as we shall see, it allows for considerable vari-
ability in the extent of governmental authority over the popula-
tion over which it claims authority. So it may be that the better 
view is to regard identification as affecting the conditions of 
legitimacy and not merely the occasions in which it is justified 
to believe that they are met. This way the account is closer to 
people's rational attitudes to authority. 
d) Pre-existing reasons and concretisation 
The account may appear unduly restrictive. It may appear to 
exclude any power for governments to improve the economic 
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conditions of their citizens. After all, the authority may do so by 
imposing taxes, and using the revenue to subsidise training 
which is useful for full employment and for economic develop-
ment. Neither I nor other inhabitants have reason to impose 
taxes or subsidise training in the country. But that is a misper-
ception. To the extent that the inhabitants of a country have rea-
son to improve their own economic situation they will have rea-
son to do so through a common authority in those matters 
where that authority will be capable of achieving that goal bet-
ter than they can do so by acting independently of it. Does it 
mean that I do have reason to raise taxes? No, but the objection, 
or puzzle, stems from overlooking the fact that typically reasons 
do not come singly, rather they are nested. Typically we have 
one reason because conforming to it is a way of advancing 
another reason. The more general reasons apply as a standard 
background to our activities, and are less affected by changing 
circumstances, whereas the more specific reasons which nest in 
them tend to apply to shorter periods, and depend on condi-
tions which are often liable to change every so often. My rea-
son to improve my economic situation is an example of a rela-
tively general reason, not likely to disappear until my retire-
ment or even later, though its urgency and force may change 
over time. My reason to change employment may derive from 
it. I should change employment in order to improve my eco-
nomic condition. But it is a more short term reason which may 
disappear if for example I am offered promotion by my current 
employer, or through other circumstances. 
People assigned the task of helping us do so by conforming 
to or realising some reasons which apply to us, reasons we 
have ourselves. These reasons have others nested in them and 
setting out ways of realising them. But those nested reasons 
need not be reasons for us. That is, those helping us may have 
good grounds for pursuing the goals set by reasons which 
apply to us in ways which are not open to us. Indeed, as the 
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service conception of authority illustrates, they may be assigned 
the task of helping us precisely because of that. 
e) Co-ordination and meta co-ordination 
A major, if not the main, factor in establishing the legitimacy 
of political authorities is their ability to secure co-ordination. 
Some writers, commenting on this fact, went further and 
argued: (a) that the sole (or only major) function of political 
authorities is to co-ordinate the conduct of those subject to 
them for the achievement of some goods; (b) that co-ordination 
being secured via a Lewis-type convention does not require an 
authority with a right to rule. All it requires is the ability to make 
certain coordinative outcomes salient; ( c ) that it follows that 
political authorities, as such, do not enjoy a right to rule. 
Such views overlook quite a number of facts central to the 
functioning of legitimate political authorities. First, that they can 
satisfy the normal justification thesis not only by securing coor-
dination, but also by having more reliable judgement regarding 
the best options, given the circumstances, and that in their nor-
mal activities expertise and coordination are inextricably 
mixed. Second, that the coordination which political authorities 
should secure and often do is rarely the sort of coordination 
resulting from the solution to a Lewis-type coordination prob-
lem. Coordinating the actions of many agents means nothing 
more than making them act in such a way that they all play 
diverse roles in some possible plan of action which is likely to 
yield some sought-after results. Third, this kind of coordination 
cannot generally be achieved via a Lewis-type convention. 
Fourth, one reason for that is that the need for coordination and 
the means for achieving it are not necessarily generally known, 
and are often a matter of controversy. Fifth, that since the goals 
people actually have need not be desirable, coordination aimed 
at securing these goals need not be desirable either. The coor-
dinated schemes of action which political authorities should 
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pursue are those to which people should be committed, or 
those needed to secure goals which people should have. Sixth, 
that typically, when the political authority is otherwise legiti-
mate and reasonably successful it will also be rightly taken, at 
least in some areas, to be an authority on when coordination is 
in place. 
8.3 The Qualification Objection 
One possible reaction to the service conception is that it 
misses its target. It describes the conditions under which an 
authority is a good enough authority. It articulates the tests of 
success for authorities, but it does not explain what it is to be 
an authority. It describes the conditions which have to hold if 
an authority is capable of successfully discharging its tasks, but 
it is not and cannot be the case that everyone who can dis-
charge a task well has that task. Not everyone who can be a 
good prime minister of a country is the prime minister of that 
country, not everyone who can be a good teacher in the pri-
mary school of my neighbourhood is a teacher in that school. 
Moreover, no one is a prime minister or a teacher just in virtue 
of the fact that they can perform the task well. Something else 
has to happen to give them the task, to make it their task. 
To evaluate this point we should contrast theoretical and 
practical authority. Theoretical authorities are experts whose 
knowledge and understanding of the matter on which they are 
authorities is both exceptionally extensive and remarkably sys-
tematic and secure, making them reliable guides on those mat-
ters. Their word is a reason for holding certain beliefs and dis-
carding others. Once their authority as experts is established it 
follows that our non-expert evaluations of the same evidence 
cannot reliably challenge theirs. I see the piece of meat at the 
butchers, and its colour makes me think that it is not fresh. But 
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I do not have experience or theory to back me up. My expert 
friend reassures me that the meat is fresh, and I just yield. If I 
accept my friend's expertise, relative to me, I have no choice. 
Theoretical advice pre-empts the reasons for belief which I 
would have relied upon otherwise. Just as with any practical 
authority, the point of a theoretical authority is that it enables 
me to conform to reason, this time reasons for belief, better 
than I would otherwise be able to do. This requires taking the 
expert advice, and allowing it to override my own assessment 
of the evidence. If I do not do that I do not benefit from it. 
Theoretical authority resembles practical authority in its point 
(to improve conformity with reason) and in being pre-emptive, 
as well as in being relational both regarding who has to take an 
authority's word as authoritative, and on what matters: it is pos-
sible that I should take this expert's word as authoritative, 
because he knows much more than I do, but you have no rea-
son to do the same, as you know as much as he does on these 
matters. 
These similarities notwithstanding there are significant differ-
ences between theoretical and practical authorities. Some 
expertise can be the basis of predicting future events. But it can-
not change anything. Practical authorities can change things, 
create duties and rights, leading to other changes in the world. 
That explains why the ability to co-ordinate plays a major role 
in establishing the legitimacy of practical authorities, and none 
at all regarding theoretical authorities, whose authority 
depends entirely on expertise, on secure knowledge and 
understanding. 
Furthermore, and it hardly needs saying, theoretical authori-
ties, experts, cannot order us to believe one thing or another, 
and cannot impose duties to believe - the nature of belief and 
belief formation excludes such duties. Belief formation, just like 
actions, is responsive to reasons, but only actions, and not the 
formation of beliefs, involve the will. 
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These points are associated with important differences of 
idiom. For example, some people are authorities on 18thC farm-
ing methods, but they do not have authority over anyone. I 
know nothing about 18thC farming methods and should take 
what they say as authoritative, but they are not authorities over 
me. Similarly the notion of legitimate authority is confined to 
practical authority. People may or may not be experts in or 
authorities on 18thC farming methods. But they cannot be de 
facto authorities, or legitimate authorities on the subject. 
Finally, only regarding practical matters can we say that some-
one has authority, or lacks it. In theoretical matters someone 
either is or is not an authority, but no one has authority. 
What have these points to do with the critique of the service 
conception, with the claim that it mistakes an analysis of when 
an authority is good at what it is doing with an analysis of what 
it is to be an authority? At first blush, they may suggest that the 
critique is correct regarding practical authorities, but mistaken 
about theoretical authorities. They do not require an additional 
condition beyond those of the service conception. If they are 
qualified as authorities they are authorities. The greatest expert 
on 18thC farming methods may be a solitary scholar unknown 
to the academic community, and unrecognised by anyone. He 
is still an authority, just in virtue of his knowledge of his subject. 
Nothing more is needed. So the objection fails regarding theo-
retical authorities. Practical authorities, on the other hand, 
impose duties on people. They have authority over people. 
They have normative powers over people. To be authorities 
they need more than the capacity to function well. They need 
to be made authorities, not necessarily by being appointed to 
the job, but something like an appointment has to be there. 
The admission that the objection fails regarding theoretical 
authorities seems to me to establish that it fails altogether. It is 
implausible to think that what is a successful analysis of what it 
is to be an authority in theoretical matters is no contribution at 
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all to an understanding of the notion of authority, of what it is 
to have practical authority. Possibly, the differences between 
the two kinds of authority mean that it is a successful analysis 
of one kind, and only a partial analysis of the other. But it is 
implausible to claim that it has nothing to do with the analysis 
of the other. There is another reason to doubt the objection. It 
seems implausible to think that one can be a legitimate author-
ity however bad one is at acting as an authority. If the primary 
point of authority, practical authority included, is to improve 
conformity with reason, it is implausible to think that someone 
who contributes not at all in that respect, someone who in fact 
make us act more against reason than we would do had we not 
tried to follow him, can have legitimate authority. 
We can therefore reject the objection. But another more 
modest objection is just round the corner. It says that regarding 
practical authorities, given their ability to change things, to 
impose duties and confer rights, the service conception fur-
nishes only part of their analysis. It states a necessary condition 
for being an authority, but not a sufficient one. This objection is 
more plausible. But to succeed it needs to meet one doubt: the 
differences between theoretical and practical authorities may 
lead to differences in what has to be established to confirm that 
they do meet the service conception's criteria for legitimate 
authority. Would not those differences be sufficient to show 
that not everyone who can be a good authority has practical 
authority? 
Confining the discussion to political authorities, we know 
that a major part of their role, improving public services, per-
sonal safety, security of contracts and other commercial trans-
actions, requires them to be successful in co-ordinating the con-
duct of large number of people. That ability is not enough for 
the performance of such tasks, but it is necessary for it. It fol-
lows that only bodies which enjoy de facto authority, i.e. which 
are in fact followed or at least conformed with by considerable 
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segments of the population, can have legitimate authority over 
all these matters. Hence there cannot be an unknown political 
authority. Similarly, there cannot be a political authority which 
does not exercise its authority, i.e. does not issue directives 
which impose duties, confer rights, etc. We can contrast this 
with theoretical authority: our expert in 18thC farming methods 
may never give any advice, or express any opinions on the mat-
ter. It is enough that he could, for his authority depends on his 
knowledge, not on his power over people, his ability to make 
them modify their behaviour to conform to his directives, as 
does the legitimacy of political authorities. 
Finally, but most importantly, given how things are in our 
world, governments of the kind we are familiar with can only 
succeed in meeting the conditions of legitimacy (according to 
the service conception) if they have the authority to use and are 
successful in the use of force against those who flout certain of 
their directives. No need now to establish what are the general 
conditions for the rightful use of force by governments. For our 
purposes it is enough that such a right must exist for a govern-
ment to meet the conditions of legitimacy, and that it must be 
effectively used. This is an additional double obstacle on the 
road to the possession of legitimate governmental authority. It 
is a normative obstacle: justifying the possession of a moral 
right to use force, and a factual obstacle: being de facto able to 
use it effectively. No such conditions need be met by theoreti-
cal authorities. Does not the existence of these conditions show 
that the service conception explains not who would be good 
had he been given authority, but who really has authority? At 
the very least they show that the service conception recognises 
and has some account of the difference between being quali-
fied to hold authority, and having authority. The question is 
whether its account is adequate. That question is still open. But 
the accusation that it simply confused qualification for authori-
ty with authority fails. 
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8.4 Consent 
Let us examine one contender for this missing element: the 
consent of the subjects. On the view to be considered, the con-
ditions of the service conception need to be met for consent to 
confer authority on anyone. To have authority a person or body 
must meet the necessary qualifications for holding authority. 
The two conditions of the service conception state what the 
qualifications are, and therefore to qualify for having authority 
anyone must meet them. But actually to have authority over 
another requires the consent of that other as well. 
The claim that all authority derives from consent can be, and 
is commonly, seen by its advocates as deriving from other con-
siderations, independent of the preceding argument. To use the 
familiar slogans, it cannot be - people say - that one person is 
subject to the will of another except by his own choosing, 
expressed by his consent to be subject to that authority. 
We assume that there can be duties without the consent of 
the person bound. I have a duty to respect others which does 
not depend on my consent to respect others, let alone on my 
consent to an obligation to do so. The claim is, presumably, that 
no one can intentionally impose an obligation on a person 
without the consent of its subject. This idea is supposed to tie 
up with the ideal of personal autonomy. 
Do you have the impression that we have come full circle? 
Have we not considered that precise point? Was it not the moral 
question which was answered earlier? If that answer was good, 
and nothing was said to indicate otherwise, why are we back 
with it? Presumably there is a residual feeling that the earlier 
reply did not cover all aspects of the moral problem. What is 
left? How are we to find it? The way to an answer was indicat-
ed earlier. We saw that consent is a source of obligation only 
when some considerations, themselves independent of con-
sent, vindicate its being such a source. And those considera-
n o 
tions would also determine what kind of consent is required to 
legitimise the authority and over what matters it will reign. 
Oddly, it is this test which I find no way of meeting. The 
moral question was about the legitimacy of one person being 
subject to the will of another. But that problem cannot be 
solved by consent. Suppose you say to me: «I impose on you an 
obligation to come to my party tomorrow» (and you may add: 
«provided of course that you agree»), and I reply: «I agree». I def-
initely consented to come to your party. I may even have prom-
ised to do so. But clearly whatever you said, you did not impose 
an obligation on me. The obligation is entirely my own cre-
ation. You may have invited me in a funny way, or expressed a 
strong desire that I should come, again in a funny way. But you 
did not obligate me to come. 
Now suppose you say to me: «You will have an obligation to 
do whatever I tell you to do», or: «Whenever I tell you to do 
something which in my judgment you should do anyway, you 
will have a duty to do it, provided you now agree to this», if you 
tell me something like that and I agree, then while until I 
agreed, and at the moment of agreeing I was not subject to your 
will, once I agree I am subject to you will. It is analogous to 
becoming a slave. I was free, and I lost my freedom. Here, I was 
independent of your will, and now I am subject to your will. Of 
course it is not the case that I am subject to your will because I 
want to be. I may have wanted it when I consented. But once I 
consented what I want becomes immaterial. I am subject to 
your will whether I want to or not. Does not that raise the moral 
problem, rather than answer it? 
Still, as I said the feeling persists that the solution to the moral 
question given before left some of our concerns unanswered. It 
saw the issue as one having some other person decide for one, 
rather than deciding for oneself. The emphasis was on «not 
deciding for oneself». It showed that there is no objection to 
that, that we should approve of that when it makes us conform 
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better with reason. The argument drew analogies between author-
ities, agents, mechanical devices, and so on. And that is where it 
falls short. It did not notice that while they are all cases of not 
deciding for oneself there is a difference between these cases and 
that of authority, for only it involves subjecting our will to that of 
another, and that is not merely a matter of not deciding for oneself. 
Let us concede for the sake of argument that the problem exists, 
that perhaps the solution offered so far ignores it. It remains the 
fact that consent does not solve the problem. It can solve the prob-
lem only when there is a reason for such a consent to bind us, and 
there is none, other than the one which dispenses with consent, 
i.e. that the authority will make us better conform to reason. 
Perhaps, however, the popularity of consent-based explanations 
of authority has something to tell us. Perhaps while being mistak-
en it points in the right direction. The question is a question of 
appropriation. The aspect of the moral problem we are con-
fronting is not the limits to one's freedom which the law or other 
authoritative directives pose. It is that the limits are imposed delib-
erately, and that they are imposed by another. They are not limits 
set by me. Consent explanations appeal because they seek to 
make the limits the agent's own. They are chimerical because they 
fail to do that. They remain imposed limits, deliberately imposed 
by another. My historical consent cannot have the significance 
placed on in; it cannot make the limits my own. 
What we need, you may think, is another way of explaining 
appropriation, of explaining how the commands of authority can 
lose the character of subjection of one person to the will of 
another. That is where the search for collective identities begins. 
8.5 Collective identities 
A rule or directive may be neither imposed on me by anoth-
er nor made by me. It could be made by «us», by a collectivity 
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of which I am a part. The simplest and least controversial exam-
ples derive from limited collective enterprises. We, six friends, 
may go on an adventure trip together, or organise a party or a 
conference together. And we may decide, by mutual consulta-
tion, what to do in pursuing our joint venture, decisions which 
bind each and all of us. While none of them is made by me, 
none of them is imposed on me by the will of another. They are 
made by us. Is it not an additional necessary condition of the 
legitimacy of authority that it acts for a collectivity so that its 
directives are not imposed on members of that group, but are 
their decisions, collectively taken, perhaps through their agents 
or representatives? 
I have no general reason to think that there are no practical 
authorities, i.e. authorities with a right to command, which are 
not the organs of collectivities, such as parents being part of 
families, and governments being the organs of countries or of 
states. But it may well be that cases in which authorities act for 
collectivities and are organs of collectivities are typical. They 
may be the paradigm in relation to which we understand all 
authorities. So let us allow that point, necessary for the success 
of the thought that the answer to the moral problem is that 
authorities' actions are our actions. 
This is not the place to investigate the nature of collective 
action. But one aspect of such an investigation is important for 
our purpose: is it the case that a university, a country, a gov-
ernment, or whatever other collectivity, is my university, coun-
try or government only if I identify with it? 
The notion of identification is both important and obscure, 
but I think that there can be no doubt that the answer to the 
question is negative. Oxford University is my University 
whether I identify with it or not. Your country is your country 
whether you like it or not, and this government is the govern-
ment of all the people of this country however much they hate 
it. There were times in the past when the Anglo-Irish did not 
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identify with Eire and its government as their state or their gov-
ernment. They did not regard it as their state and their govern-
ment. But Eire was their state, and its government was their 
government. Not infrequently we find in a country individuals 
or groups which do not and cannot bring themselves to identi-
fy with their country or to regard its government as their own. 
They will not use the language of «we», as in «we just changed 
the law to make it harder for asylum seekers to stay in the coun-
try». Their refusal, often their inability to use such locutions is 
highly significant but it does not change the fact that that is their 
country, their law, and their government. 
The fact that people can be alienated from their countries, 
that they may refuse to talk of what «we» did when talking of 
their countries, raises severe doubts on the contention that the 
answer to the moral problem is that the commands of authori-
ties are our commands, even while we are their subjects. Tell 
this to the people who are alienated from their country, or from 
their regime. Tell them that it is they who passed the laws which 
they regard as anathema, etc. It is a sad form of trickery to think 
that it being the authority of their country makes its command 
their command in any sense which solves the moral problem. 
One response to this point is to say that an authority's action 
is «our» action, the action of its subjects only if they identify with 
it. The question is: does this mean that the legitimate power of 
authorities is limited to people who so identify with the collec-
tivities they represent? Does it mean, for example, that the 
Anglo-Irish who did not identify with Eire and its government 
were not subject to its authority, that they were not subject to 
the law of Eire? 
The problem of the limits of the state's authority is more far 
reaching. We tend to believe that states have some extra-terri-
torial jurisdiction, and that in any case they have territorial 
jurisdiction over all people within the boundaries of the state. 
But we do not expect visitors to identify with the state or the 
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regime, or to feel that its laws are their laws. It may be a good 
thing if the population of a country identifies with it, and with 
its regime. But there is no reasonable argument to deny that 
where the state has any legitimate authority at all its authority 
reaches beyond ruling those who identify with her. 
This brief argument relies on the fact that people, including 
us, who believe that political authorities can ever be legitimate, 
hold true views about their legitimacy in many concrete cases 
which cannot be reconciled with the view that political bodies 
have legitimate authority only over people who identify with 
them, or with the regimes for which they act. It is open to some 
to maintain that the views are not true, that we should revise 
our beliefs about the scope of authority. My sense is that that 
would be a mistake. The problem of appropriation to which 
identification is supposed to be the answer, is a misguided 
question. It is not part of our normal understanding of authori-
ty that its actions are the actions of its subjects. On the contrary, 
the normal understanding is that authority involves a hierarchi-
cal relationship, that it involves an imposition on the subject. 
The service conception explains how and when such power 
can be justified, at least in the sense of being for the good. The 
quest for a solution to the appropriation problem is perhaps 
best seen as an aspirational ideal: it would be good, desirable, 
to have the bulk of those subject to a political authority identi-
fy with the regime for which it acts. But identification should 
not be thought of as a condition of legitimacy. 
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